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In  response  to  a  lack  of  access  to  essential  medicines  in  the  developing  world,  a  
number  of  mechanisms  have  developed  that  aim  to  promote  greater  access  to  essential  
medicines,  particularly  antiretroviral  drugs  for  the  treatment  of  HIV/AIDS  and  drugs  for  
the  treatment  of  neglected  diseases.    These  mechanisms  operate  in  a  variety  of  different  
ways,  but  share  a  common  theme  in  that  they  all  ultimately  aim  to  provide  greater  
access  to  affordable  drugs  to  patients  in  resource-­‐‑poor  settings.    However,  the  existing  
mechanisms  to  facilitate  increased  access  to  essential  medicines,  while  beneficial,  all  
have  a  number  of  cons.    Patent  pools  represent  a  novel  approach  to  facilitating  access  to  
essential  medicines  and  have  the  potential  to  go  beyond  the  status  quo  as  compared  to  
various  traditional  alternatives.  
This  paper  aims  to  analyze  patent  pools  recently  formed  in  the  field  of  global  
health  and  whether  such  approaches  to  intellectual  property  management  can  facilitate  
greater  access  to  antiretroviral  medicines  for  the  treatment  of  HIV/AIDS  and  drugs  for  
the  treatment  of  neglected  diseases  in  low-­‐‑  and  middle-­‐‑income  countries,  both  in  terms  
of  fostering  the  developing  of  new  drugs  and  increasing  the  affordability  and  
availability  of  drugs  current  in  the  market.    Two  patent  pools  in  particular⎯the  
Medicines  Patent  Pool  and  WIPO’s  Re:Search  Consortium⎯are  evaluated  and  compared  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing World 
Approximately  one-­‐‑third  of  the  world’s  population  lacks  access  to  essential  
medicines.1    This  includes  medicines  for  a  range  of  diseases,2  including  those  for  the  
treatment  of  HIV/AIDS  and  neglected  diseases  (NDs).    This  is  a  particularly  unfortunate  
situation  because  a  majority  of  patients  in  need  of  essential  medicines  are  afflicted  by  
diseases  that  are  preventable,  curable,  or  can  be  managed  by  existing  treatments  that  are  
available  but  to  which  they  lack  access,  either  because  the  drugs  are  too  costly  or  not  
tailored  to  patients  in  developing  countries.    Others  suffer  from  a  lack  of  access  because  
the  medicines  they  need  have  yet  not  been  developed.  
While  strong  patent  protection  greatly  contributes  to  patients’  lack  of  access  to  
essential  medicines  in  developing  countries,  a  number  of  other  factors  further  
undermine  the  availability  of  such  medicines.3    Some  other  factors  contributing  to  the  
access  problem  include:  poor  infrastructure  that  results  in  delayed  or  inadequate  supply  
and  distribution  of  medicines;  insufficient  health  facilities  and  staff;  low  investment  in  
                                                                                                              
1  The  WHO  defines  essential  medicines  as  drugs  that  “satisfy  the  priority  health  care  needs  of  the  majority  of  
the  population”  and  should  thus  be  available  “at  all  times,  in  adequate  amounts  and  in  appropriate  dosage  
forms.”  
  
2  The  WHO  List  of  Essential  Medicines  includes  over  350  medicines.  
  
3  It  is  thus  important  to  keep  in  mind  that,  while  increasing  access  to  drugs  via  price  reductions  is  a  
necessary  component  to  solving  the  global  access  to  medicine  problem,  it  is  not  sufficient.  
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health  by  national  governments;  poor  sanitation;  legal  and  social  barriers  that  prevent  
discriminated  groups4  from  obtaining  access  to  drugs;  and  stigma  associated  with  
disease  and  lack  of  education  that  negatively  impact  health-­‐‑seeking  behavior.      
Despite  these  barriers  to  treatment,  one  of  the  greatest  barriers  is  patent  
protection  over  pharmaceuticals.5    Strong  patent  protection  inhibits  access  to  medicines  
for  both  HIV/AIDS  and  NDs,  though  the  landscapes  for  the  two  are  quite  different.6    
Though  low-­‐‑  and  middle-­‐‑income  countries  (LMICs)  make  up  most  of  the  disease  burden  
of  both,  HIV/AIDS  treatments  commands  a  global  market  whereas  most  ND  treatment  
does  not.    This  difference  is  significant  and  impacts  the  types  of  solutions  needed  to  
solve  the  access  problem  for  each.      
With  respect  to  HIV/AIDS,  a  number  of  treatments  exist  that  have  been  proven  
successful  at  ameliorating  the  effects  of  the  disease,  curtailing  the  spread  of  the  virus  
and  prolonging  the  lives  of  people  living  with  HIV/ADIS.    Fixed-­‐‑dose  combinations  
(FDCs)  that  combine  three  or  four  different  drugs  are  being  increasingly  used  to  treat  
                                                                                                              
4  Particularly  sex  workers,  intravenous  drug  users,  and  men  who  have  sex  with  men.  
  
5  Despite  the  fact  that  about  90%  of  the  drugs  on  the  WHO  Essential  Medicines  List  are  off  patent,  the  
inclusion  of  drugs  on  the  list  is  based,  in  addition  to  effectiveness  and  safety,  on  cost  effectiveness.    Thus,  a  
lot  of  newer,  patented  drug  are  not  included  in  the  list  because  of  high  prices,  but  would  be  included  if  
prices  were  lower.    
  
6  HIV/AIDS  and  some  NDs  (e.g.  TB  and  malaria)  can  be  classified  as  “Type  II”  diseases,  meaning  that  they  
occur  in  both  wealthy  and  poor  nations,  and  thus  R&D  incentives  exist,  but  the  level  of  R&D  spending  is  
very  low  compared  to  the  global  disease  burden.    Other  NDs,  particularly  NTDs,  can  be  classified  as  “Type  
III”  diseases,  meaning  they  occur  almost  exclusively  in  poor  countries,  and  thus  R&D  for  them  is  almost  
entirely  lacking.  
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HIV/AIDS.    In  addition  to  increased  efficacy  over  individual  drugs  and  decreased  drug  
resistance,  FDCs  offer  advantages  over  single-­‐‑dose  drugs  in  that  they  are  easier  to  
administer  and  distribute  and  increase  patience  adherence  to  treatment  [1].    A  country’s  
ability  to  procure  affordable  antiretrovirals  (ARVs) greatly  impacts  its  ability  to  fight  to  
the  epidemic  because  successful  treatment  depends  on  a  continuous,  reliable  supply  
ARVs.    Primarily  due  to  generic  competition,  the  price  of  ARVs  has  dropped  by  more  
than  99%  over  the  last  decade  [2].7    However,  the  treatment  needs  of  patients  in  LMICs  
are  changing,  and  the  number  of  people  needing  newer,  better  treatment  is  increasing.    
Current  first-­‐‑line  regiments  offered  in  LMICs8,  while  inexpensive  due  to  lack  of  patent  
protection,  often  have  many  adverse  side  effects  and  can  be  highly  toxic  to  patients  
[116].    Additionally,  the  incidence  of  drug  resistance  to  first-­‐‑line  therapy  is  increasing  in  
LMICs.    The  prevalence  of  drug  resistance  to  any  given  ARV  after  eight  years  of  
treatment  is,  on  average,  7.4%,  and  is  increasing  in  certain  LMICs,  particularly  Sub-­‐‑
Saharan  Africa,  by  14%  per  year  [2].    This  means  that,  at  an  increasing  rate,  newer,  
patented,  second-­‐‑  and  third-­‐‑line  ARVs  will  be  needed  in  LMICs.    However,  because  of  
strong  patent  protection,  the  price  of  newer  ARVs  remains  extremely  high  in  most  
                                                                                                              
7  First-­‐‑line  treatments  today  are  available  at  just  under  $100  per  patient  per  year,  as  compared  to  the  price  in  
2000,  when  first-­‐‑line  treatments  (which  were  still  under  patent  protection)  were  priced  at  $10,000  per  patient  
per  year.  
  
8  The  majority  of  patients  in  LMICs  receiving  first-­‐‑line  treatment  are  taking  a  combination  of  3  drugs:  3TC,  
d4T,  and  NVP.    D4T  causes  drastic  weight  loss  in  many  patients  and  can  cause  life  threatening  lactic  
acidosis.    As  a  result,  this  treatment  regimen  is  very  rarely  used  in  developed  countries.  
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developing  countries,  where  the  impact  of  HIV/AIDS  has  been  most  devastating.    While  
lobbying  groups  around  the  world  have  had  some  success  in  increasing  access  to  these  
newer,  patented  drugs,  costs  still  remain  prohibitively  high  for  many  patients  in  
developing  countries.    Thus,  as  current  treatment  regimens  lose  their  effectiveness  due  
to  drug  resistance,  and  as  newer,  less  toxic,  first-­‐‑line  treatments  are  needed,  the  ability  of  
the  fifty-­‐‑five  million  people  expected  to  need  ARVs  by  2030  [116]  to  access  affordable  
treatment  is  being  jeopardized  by  strong  patent  protection.        
Strong  patent  protection  also  affects  the  availability  of  drugs  for  the  treatment  of  
neglected  diseases  because  it  limits  access  to  not  only  patents,  but  data  and  know-­‐‑how  
as  well.    Because  the  ND  drug  market  is  so  small,  most  patents  related  to  ND  drugs  have  
little  or  no  commercial  value,  and  thus  IP  holders  do  not  have  a  very  strong  incentive  to  
protect  these  patents  relative  to  the  incentives  to  protect  patents  related  to  profitable  
drugs.    Thus,  access  to  data  and  know-­‐‑how  is  arguably  more  important  than  access  to  
patents  in  the  ND  context.    Those  wanting  to  use  these  patents,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how  to  
engage  in  research  and  development  (R&D)  and  innovate  new  diagnostics,  technologies,  
and  drugs  for  NDs  are  prohibited  from  doing  so  because  of  the  patents  held  by  
pharmaceutical  companies  on  underlying  basic  technologies  and  other  necessary  
research  inputs.    And  because  existing  IP  regimes  create  an  incentive  structure  whereby  
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pharmaceuticals  companies  are  largely  driven  by  profit  rather  than  health  needs9,  
pharmaceutical  companies  holding  this  IP  don’t  have  an  incentive  to  use  it  and  innovate.  
A  situation  thus  emerges  where  R&D  for  NDs  is  seriously  lacking.    Because  of  
the  small  demand  for  ND  treatment,  pharmaceutical  companies  have  little  incentive  to  
invest  in  R&D  for  NDs  because  it  is  unlikely  that  the  market  exclusivity  offered  by  
patent  protection  will  be  sufficient  to  recoup  R&D  costs.    Thus,  the  parties  with  access  to  
patents  have  no  incentive  to  use  them,  and  anyone  else  wanting  to  use  patents,  data,  and  
know-­‐‑how  relevant  for  ND  drug  development  is  unable  to  do  so  because  of  patent  
barriers.    Because  of  this  situation,  cures  for  NDs  either  have  not  been  developed  or  are  
not  available  to  patients  in  LMICs,  despite  the  fact  that  NDs  make  up  a  significant  
percentage  of  the  global  disease  burden.  
1.2 The Present HIV/AIDS Situation in LMICs 
As  compared  to  a  couple  decades  ago,  HIV  today  is  a  manageable  illness  but  
requires  a  lifetime  of  treatment.    Of  the  thirty-­‐‑five  million  people  living  with  HIV/AIDS  
throughout  the  world  [3],  28.6  million  reside  in  LMICs.    Since  the  turn  of  the  last  
century,  there  has  been  a  massive  scale-­‐‑up  of  treatment  in  LMICs.    This  has  been  largely  
due  to  the  expiration  of  patents  on  first-­‐‑line  medicines  that  has  allowed  for  robust  
                                                                                                              
9  Because  NDs  are  virtually  absent  from  developed  nations  and  occur  almost  exclusively  in  LMICs  where  
patients  are  largely  unable  to  afford  expensive  drugs,  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  pharmaceutical  
companies  to  recoup  their  R&D  costs  or  profit  from  the  sale  of  drugs,  and  thus  there  is  little  or  no  financial  
inventive  for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  engage  in  R&D  for  NDs.  
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generic  competition  for  ARVs  [4],  which  has  dramatically  reduced  the  price  of  
treatment,10  and  for  the  formulation  of  generic  FDCs,11  a  simplified  treatment  regimen  
that  requires  patients  taking  only  two  pills  a  day,  leading  to  increased  adherence  to  
ARVs,12  which  decreases  drug  resistance.    This  scale-­‐‑up  has  been  monumentally  
important,  not  just  because  treatment  prolongs  the  lives  of  people  living  with  HIV,  but  
also  because  it  dramatically  decreases  transmission  rates13  [3].  
While  the  massive  scale-­‐‑up  in  treatment  over  the  last  decade  has  resulted  in  9.7  
million  people  in  LMICs  currently  receiving  treatment  [3],  about  nineteen  million  still  
lack  access  to  treatment  [5].    Thus,  despite  the  great  strides  that  have  been  made,  only  
34%  of  the  28.6  million  people  living  with  HIV/AIDS  in  LMICs  are  currently  receiving  
treatment  [6].    While  treatment  rates  vary  significantly  by  country,  of  all  the  LMICs,  only  
nine  have  reported  treatment  coverage  of  greater  than  80%,  and  sixty-­‐‑eight  have  
reported  coverage  of  less  than  50%  [7].  
                                                                                                              
10  First-­‐‑line  treatments  today  are  available  at  just  under  $100  per  patient  per  year,  as  compared  to  the  price  in  
2000,  when  first-­‐‑line  treatments  (which  were  still  under  patent  protection)  were  priced  at  $10,000  per  patient  
per  year.  
  
11  Particularly  the  generic  first-­‐‑line  FDC  stavudine/lamivudine/nevirapine.  
  
12  Increased  adherence  to  treatment  is  significant  because  it  decreases  the  incidence  of  drug  resistance,  which  
develops  primarily  in  patients  who  take  ARVs  intermittently.    
  
13  For  an  HIV-­‐‑positive  individual  on  antiretroviral  therapy,  the  risk  of  transmitting  the  virus  is  reduced  by  
96%.    
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While  the  cost  of  first-­‐‑line  treatment  in  LMICs  has  dropped  as  low  as  just  under  
$100  per  patient  per  year  for  generic  versions14  [120]⎯a  16%  price  decrease  over  the  past  
year  alone  [2]⎯second-­‐‑  and  third-­‐‑line  treatments  remain  too  expensive  for  most  
patients,15  particularly  in  middle-­‐‑income  countries  (MICs)  that  do  not  receive  price  
discounts  from  pharmaceutical  companies16  [2]  (see  Appendix  B).    Out  of  pocket  
payments  are  still  the  primary  source  for  covering  the  cost  of  medicines  in  LMICs  [8,  
117];  this  means  that  even  the  cost  of  first-­‐‑line  treatments  is  out  of  reach  for  millions  
living  in  LMICs  who  survive  on  just  $1/day.  
As  first-­‐‑line  treatments  continue  to  fail  at  greater  rates  due  to  incidence  drug  
resistance17  [4]  or  toxicity,  an  increasing  number  of  people  in  LMICs  need  second-­‐‑line  
treatments,  the  cost  of  which  is  dramatically  higher  than  first-­‐‑line  treatments  (Figure  1).    
This  has  created  an  urgent  need  to  make  affordable  second-­‐‑line  treatments  available  in  
LMICs.    
  
                                                                                                              
14  Competition  among  generic  suppliers  has  decreased  the  price  of  treatment  from  $10,000  per  patient  per  
year  in  2000  to  as  little  as  $79  per  patient  per  year  today.  
  
15  To  date,  the  cheapest  second-­‐‑line  treatment  available  in  LMICs  is  $303  per  patient  per  year,  and  the  
cheapest  third-­‐‑line  treatment  regimen  available  is  $2,006  per  patient  per  year.  
  
16  For  example,  the  ARV  LPV/r  (patent  held  by  Abbott)  is  priced  at  $265  per  patient  per  year  in  qualifying  
“Category  1”  countries,  whereas  LPV/r  is  priced  in  middle-­‐‑income  countries  (which  Abbott  classified  as  
“Category  2”  countries)  at  $740  per  patient  per  year.  
  
17  In  one  study  conducted  in  Khayelitsha,  South  Africa  by  MSF,  16%  of  patients  on  treatment  for  5  years  
needed  to  be  switched  to  second-­‐‑line  FDCs.    
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Figure  1:  Price  Comparison  of  First-­‐‑Line,  Second-­‐‑Line,  and  Possible  Third-­‐‑Line  
Treatment  Regimens  
1.3 Neglected Disease Situation in LMICs 
Broadly  speaking,  neglected  diseases18  are  those  diseases  that  have  high  
mortality  rates  in  developing  countries  but  are  virtually  absent  in  developed  nations.    
Neglected  tropical  diseases  (NTDs)  are  a  subset  of  neglected  diseases,  encompassing  
those  diseases  that  almost  exclusively  affect  those  living  in  LMICs.19    The  World  Health  
Organization  (WHO)  estimates  that  one  billion  people  (one-­‐‑sixth  of  the  world’s  
population)  currently  suffer  from  one  or  more  NDs  [9].    However,  despite  this  high  
                                                                                                              
18  G-­‐‑FINDER  classifies  the  follow  as  neglected  diseases:  HIV/AIDS,  malaria,  TB,  dengue,  diarrheal  diseases,  
kinetoplastids,  bacterial  pneumonia  &  meningitis,  helminth  infections,  salmonella  infections,  trachoma,  
leprosy,  Buruli  ulcer  and  rheumatic  fever.  
  
19  The  WHO  classifies  the  follow  as  neglected  tropical  diseases:  Buruli  ulcer,  Chagas  disease,  taeniasis/  
Cysticercosis,  dengue,  Dracunculiasis,  Echinococcosis,  endemic  treponematoses,  foodborne  trematodiases,  
human  African  trypanosomiasis,  the  Leishmaniasis,  soil-­‐‑transmitted  helminthiases.  
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disease  burden,  many  NDs  lack  effective  treatments  because  pharmaceutical  R&D  is  
primarily  market  driven,  rather  than  based  on  health  needs.    There  is  thus  little  
correlation  between  health  R&D  that  is  needed,  based  on  burden  of  disease  data,  and  
that  which  is  ultimately  undertaken  [10].    
However,  there  are  some  NDs  for  which  treatments  exist,  but  many  do  not  
effectively  reach  those  who  need  it,  or  are  old,20  toxic,  and/or  ineffective  at  treating  
patients  who  have  developed  drug  resistance  to  these  treatments  [39].    Additionally,  
many  existing  treatments  are  not  suited  for  use  in  LMICs,  as  they  “require  long-­‐‑term  
protocols,  have  inconvenient  administration,  require  refrigeration,  lack  available  
vaccines,  or  have  low  efficacy/poor  safety  profiles  and  serious  side  effects”  [11].    There  
are  also  some  treatments  available  in  the  form  of  drugs  that  have  been  developed  for  
developed-­‐‑country  markets  but  have  proven  to  be  simultaneously  effective  in  treating  
NDs21  [12].    For  the  few  NDs  that  have  small  developed-­‐‑country  markets  (e.g.  Chagas  
disease,  TB,  malaria),  some  treatments  have  been  developed,  but  these  treatments  often  
are  not  adapted  to  treat  patients  in  LMICs  because  they  are  expensive  and/or  difficult  to  
administer.      
                                                                                                              
20  Many  ND  treatments  have  not  been  updated  since  the  early  20th  century.    For  example,  the  TB  vaccine  that  
has  not  been  updated  since  1924  and  the  primary  first-­‐‑line  drug  regimen  for  TB  was  developed  in  the  1960s.  
  
21  For  example,  amphotericin  B,  originally  developed  as  an  antifungal  drug  sold  in  developed  countries,  is  
also  useful  for  the  treatment  of  leishmaniasis.  Eflornithine  (developed  as  an  anti–facial  hair  treatment)  is  
also  an  effective  treatment  for  HAT.    
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Despite  the  availability  of  some  treatments,  the  global  disease  burden  for  NDs  
remains  high,  with  many  lacking  treatment  altogether.    The  high  global  burden  of  NDs  
has  created  an  urgent  need  to  incentivize  R&D  in  this  area,  and  a  number  of  mechanisms  
have  developed  with  this  aim.    However,  because  NDs  are  virtually  absent  from  
developed  nations,  there  is  little  investment  in  R&D  for  new  vaccines  and  treatments  
aimed  at  combatting  these  diseases.    Being  almost  exclusively  prevalent  in  LMICs,  most  
of  the  patients  who  need  the  drugs  are  not  able  to  afford  them,  making  it  difficult,  if  not  
impossible,  for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  recoup  their  R&D  costs  or  profit  from  the  
sale  of  drugs.    There  is  thus  little  or  no  financial  inventive  for  pharmaceutical  companies  
to  engage  in  R&D  for  NDs,  resulting  in  a  lack  of  viable  treatment  options  available  to  
those  living  in  LMICs.    This  has  created  an  urgent  need  to  come  up  with  innovative  
models  that  can  increase  ND  R&D  and  ultimately  lead  to  the  development  of  drugs  that  
are  inexpensive,  easy  to  administer,  and  tailored  to  patients  in  LMICs.    
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2. IP Barriers to Access to Medicine 
2.1 Overview of IP, TRIPS, and the Doha Declaration 
All  countries  that  are  members  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  are  
required  to  grant  drug  patents  to  pharmaceutical  companies,  pursuant  the  1994  WTO  
Agreement  on  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  (TRIPS)1  [13].    TRIPS  sets  
out  minimum  international  standards  regarding  intellectual  property  (IP)  protection  
with  which  all  member  countries  must  comply.    Specifically  with  regard  to  patents,  
TRIPS  requires  that  member  countries  structure  their  national  patent  laws  so  that  
eligible  patent  holders  of  drugs  are  granted  a  monopoly  in  the  marketplace,  allowing  
them  to  prevent  others  from  making,  using,  selling,  or  importing  the  drug2  for  the  
duration  of  the  patent⎯twenty  years  from  the  filing  of  the  patent  minus  the  time  
necessary  to  evaluate  the  patent3  [13].    By  removing  generic  competition  from  the  
marketplace,  which  serves  as  a  major  catalyst  for  price  reductions  of  drugs  [2],  
pharmaceutical  companies  holding  patents  are  able  to  charge  astronomically  high  prices  
for  drugs⎯prices  that  are  out  of  reach  for  most  in  the  developing  world.  
                                                                                                              
1  See  Article  27(1)  of  TRIPS.  
  
2  See  Article  27  of  TRIPS.  
    
3  See  Article  33  of  TRIPS.    
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The  strong  patent  protection  on  pharmaceuticals  that  is  required  by  TRIPS  has  
been  quite  controversial  and  has  garnered  a  lot  of  international  criticism.    One  such  
criticism  is  that  TRIPS  “was  the  product  of  duress  by  powerful  states  against  weak  states  
rather  than  a  bargain  struck  by  sovereign  equals”  [14],  effectuated  through  the  threat  of  
trade  sanctions  and  the  promise  of  better  trade  access.    As  such,  the  protections  
provided  by  TRIPS  tend  to  be  much  more  favorable  to  developed  nations⎯since  
developed  nations  hold  over  80%  of  the  world’s  drug  patents  [15],  they  reap  the  benefits  
of  strong  IP  protection  much  more  than  developing  countries.    Proponents  of  strong  
international  IP  protection  claim  that  such  protection  necessary  to  ensure  that  
pharmaceutical  companies  recoup  the  R&D  costs  associated  with  bringing  a  drug  to  the  
market,  which  is  necessary  for  future  innovation  [16].    However,  there  has  been  much  
debate  over  whether  such  strong  IP  protection  is  actually  necessary  to  recoup  R&D  
costs.    In  some  cases,  due  to  a  lack  of  transparency,  it  is  unclear  how  much  money  is  
actually  spent  on  R&D  by  pharmaceutical  companies  and  how  much  is  funded  by  
national  governments4  [17,  118].    It  is  also  unclear  how  much  money  is  spent  on  
marketing  new  drugs,  which  is  often  included  under  the  umbrella  of  R&D  costs;  some  
                                                                                                              
4  A  number  of  drugs  developed  by  private  pharmaceutical  companies  in  the  United  States  are  heavily  
funded  by  the  National  Institutes  of  Health.    An  example  of  this  is  the  Abbott’s  HIV  drug  Ritonavir.    
Though  the  NIH  heavily  funded  the  R&D  for  the  drug,  prices  remained  as  high  as  they  would  for  any  other  
drug.    Additionally,  a  study  by  Stevens  et  al.  examining  the  role  of  public-­‐‑sector  research  in  the  discovery  of  
drugs  and  vaccines  found  that,  from  1990-­‐‑2007,  public-­‐‑sector  research  institutions  have  contributed  to  the  
discovery  of  9.3-­‐‑21.2%  of  all  drugs  involved  in  new-­‐‑drug  applications  approved.    
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estimates  suggest  that  about  one-­‐‑third  of  all  sales  revenue  is  actually  spent  on  marketing  
new  products⎯roughly  twice  what  is  spent  on  R&D  [18].    Proponents  of  strong  IP  
protection  also  claim  that  it  could  serve  as  “a  powerful  tool  for  development”  [19],  
ultimately  resulting  in  the  availability  of  new  and  improved  medicines  in  developing  
countries.      
Unfortunately,  rather  than  bringing  about  such  development,  strong  patent  
protection  has  acted  as  a  huge  barrier  to  access  to  medicine  in  the  developing  world,  
where  resources  are  limited  and  the  cost  of  improved  quality  drugs  remains  largely  
unaffordable  [20].    The  2001  Doha  Declaration  on  the  TRIPS  Agreement  and  Public  
Health  spoke  directly  to  this  issue  [21].    It  acknowledged  the  “gravity  of  the  public  
health  problems  affecting  many  developing  and  least-­‐‑developed  countries,  especially  
those  resulting  from  HIV/AIDS,  tuberculosis,  malaria,  and  other  epidemics”5  [21]  and  
emphasized  that  the  “TRIPS  agreement  does  not  and  should  not  prevent  Members  from  
taking  measures  to  protect  public  health”6  [21].    In  essence,  the  Doha  Declaration  
affirmed  the  right  of  countries,  particularly  in  the  developing  world,  to  take  advantage  
of  flexibilities  contained  within  TRIPS  in  order  to  promote  access  to  essential  medicines  
in  light  of  public  health  needs.  
                                                                                                              
5  See  §1  of  the  Doha  Declaration.  
  
6  See  §4  of  the  Doha  Declaration.  
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The  Doha  Declaration  was  monumental  in  its  recognition  that  countries  in  the  
developing  world  need  ways  to  procure  affordable  medicines.    However,  TRIPS  also  
recognized  this,  albeit  less  explicitly,  when  it  allowed  for  a  transition  period  that  
permitted  developing  and  least-­‐‑developed  countries  (LDCs)  to  delay  full  compliance  
with  TRIPS  [13].    By  creating  different  compliance  timelines  for  countries  at  different  
stages  of  development,  developing  and  least-­‐‑developed  countries  were  able  to  delay  full  
compliance  until  2005  and  2021,  respectively7  [22].    Because  of  these  different  compliance  
timelines,  LDCs  are  still  exempt  from  granting  patent  protection  to  pharmaceutical  
companies  and  are  granted  maximum  flexibility  to  produce  and  distribute  medicines.    
Unfortunately,  a  number  of  LDCs  have  failed  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  compliance  
extension  and  already  grant  pharmaceutical  patents,  often  as  a  result  of  trade  pressure  
from  developed  nations.    For  example,  by  2004,  twenty-­‐‑eight  of  the  thirty  least-­‐‑
developed  African  countries  already  had  adopted  patent  laws  [23].  
Despite  the  strong  patent  protection  required  by  TRIPS,  patent  protection  under  
TRIPS  is  not  limitless,  even  within  the  twenty-­‐‑year  period  of  patent  protection.    
Espoused  in  TRIPS  and  affirmed  by  the  Doha  Declaration  are  a  number  of  flexibilities  
that  developing  countries  can  and  should  take  advantage  of  to  promote  access  to  
                                                                                                              
7  LDCs  were  initially  given  10  years  to  become  fully  TRIPs  compliant,  but  in  2005  this  grace  period  was  
extended  until  2013  for  most  IP  protections  and  2016  for  patent  protection  of  pharmaceuticals.    The  grade  
period  was  extended  again  in  October  2013  until  July  1,  2021  (or  until  a  particular  country  ceases  being  
classified  as  a  LDC).  
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medicine.    One  such  flexibility  that  has  been  taken  advantage  of  by  developing  countries  
is  the  right  to  issue  compulsory  licenses  (CLs)8  [13],  which  permit  a  nation,  or  third  party  
authorized  by  that  nation,  to  use  a  patented  invention  without  the  permission  of  the  
patent  holder  in  exchange  for  payment  of  a  government-­‐‑determined  royalty  [24].    This  
important  exception  to  a  patent  holder’s  right  to  exclusivity,  though  controversial  and  
seldom  used  in  the  past9  [23],  has,  in  recent  years,  been  increasingly  used  by  developing  
countries  and  has  been  extremely  influential  in  promoting  access  to  medicine.  
In  addition  to  the  strong  patent  protection  over  pharmaceuticals  mandated  by  
TRIPS,  there  are  other  regimes  affecting  access  to  medicine  in  developing  countries,  
particularly  free  trade  agreements  (FTAs)  between  developing  and  developed  countries  
that  require  developing  countries  to  enact  national  patent  laws  that  go  above  and  
beyond  what  is  required  by  TRIPS,  known  as  “TRIPS-­‐‑Plus”  provisions.    Many  FTAs,  for  
example,  require  countries  to  adopt  data  exclusivity  laws  that  serve  to  extend  a  
company’s  patent  term  beyond  twenty  years  by  restricting  the  ability  of  generic  
manufacturers  to  use  previous  clinical  trial  data  for  a  period  of  time  to  show  a  
bioequivalent  generic’s  efficacy  [26].    These  laws  create  additional  market  entry  barriers  
and  further  hamper  the  development  of  generics  because  clinical  trials  can  be  expensive.    
Thus,  many  generic  companies  may  choose  to  wait  out  the  data  exclusivity  period  rather  
                                                                                                              
8  See  Article  31  of  TRIPS.  
9  In  2003,  “compulsory  licensing  is  so  extraordinarily  rare  that  it  has  not  been  used  once  in  the  last  decade  by  
any  country  in  respect  to  a  finished  medicine.”  
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than  conducting  costly  clinical  trials,  which  would  significantly  increase  the  costs  
associated  with  bringing  a  generic  drug  to  market.    Some  free  trade  agreements  also  
restrict  the  ability  of  a  country  to  issue  CLs10  [119].    Such  restrictions  can  seriously  
impact  a  country’s  access  to  medicine  initiatives,  particularly  in  the  area  of  HIV/AIDS.  
Also  problematic  is  a  lack  of  transparency  in  patent  information.    This  has  
exacerbated  the  access  problem  in  LMICs  and  hampered  the  ability  of  countries  to  
procure  generics  because  it  creates  uncertainty  as  to  what  drugs  are  patented  and  what  
are  not.    An  example  of  the  lack  of  transparency  problem  can  be  seen  in  the  case  of  the  
avian  flu  outbreak  of  2005.    Needing  large  quantities  of  generic  versions  of  the  drug  
oseltamivir,  many  LMICs  began  considering  their  options  with  respect  to  either  
voluntary  or  compulsory  licenses.    However,  some  countries  were  later  told  by  Roche  
(the  patent-­‐‑holder)  that  no  patents  were  in  force  [27].  
2.2 IP Barriers to ARVs 
Despite  the  plethora  of  barriers  to  access  to  medicines  in  LMICs,  IP  barriers  
remain  a  significant  barrier  to  accessing  ARVs  in  LMICs.    While  many  older  ARVs  have  
become  affordable  because  the  patents  on  them  have  expired,  newer,  less  toxic  ARVs  are  
patented  and  thus  largely  unaffordable.    Patent  protection  remains  such  a  significant  
                                                                                                              
10  For  example,  the  US-­‐‑FTAs  with  Singapore  and  Jordan  prohibit  the  issuance  of  compulsory  licenses  except  
for  in  the  event  of  a  “national  emergency  of  other  circumstance  of  extreme  urgency”  [as  opposed  to  TRIPS,  
which  grants  governments  broad  discretion  in  determining  when  to  issue  a  compulsory  license];  The  US-­‐‑
Morocco  FTA  similarly  limits  the  issuance  of  compulsory  licenses  to  circumstances  of  “extreme  urgency”  or  
“national  emergency”  and  to  certain  diseases  (HIV/AIDS,  TB,  malaria,  and  other  epidemics).  
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barrier  because  without  generic  competition,  which  serves  as  a  major  catalyst  for  price  
reductions  (Figure  2),  the  prices  of  drugs  remain  so  high  as  to  be  out  of  reach  for  many.    
Generic  market  entry  is  significant  because  it  not  only  makes  lower-­‐‑cost,  bioequivalent  
drugs  available,  but  also  reduces  prices  of  originator  drugs.    
  
Figure  2:  Generic  Competition  as  a  Catalyst  for  Price  Reductions  
  
Patents  are  also  a  significant  barrier  to  the  development  of  FDCs.    In  order  for  a  
generic  company  to  manufacture  a  FDC  in  which  more  than  one  component  is  patented,  
generic  companies  must  negotiate  individual  licensing  agreements  with  a  number  of  
patent  holders,  a  process  that  can  by  costly  and  time-­‐‑consuming.    Additionally,  patent-­‐‑
holders  can  simply  refuse  to  license  their  patents,  barring  production  of  an  FDC  even  if  
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the  other  components  are  available11  [2,  120].    As  a  result,  certain  key  first-­‐‑  and  second-­‐‑
line  FDCs  either  don’t  exist  or  are  not  available  in  sufficient  quantities  in  LMICs12  [2].  
While  a  number  of  ARVs  are  available  n  LMICs,  the  treatment  of  HIV/AIDS  in  
LMICs  requires  pediatric  and  heat-­‐‑stabilized  formulations,  which  are  not  required  in  
developed  nations.    For  these  formulations,  there  is  no  market-­‐‑driven  solution  for  their  
production.    Like  NDs,  pediatric  and  heat-­‐‑stabilized  formulations  are  a  need  exclusive  to  
the  developing  world,  and  thus  there  is  little  incentive  for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  
engage  in  R&D  and  innovate  in  this  area.    
The  pediatric  ARV  market  is  quite  small,  representing  less  than  7%  of  all  people  
living  with  HIV  who  are  treated.    Because  of  this  small  market  size,  pediatric  HIV  is  
really  a  ND,  and  there  is  a  significant  market  failure  with  respect  to  pediatric  
formulations.    Because  so  few  children  are  born  with  HIV  is  developed  nations,  there  is  
not  a  lucrative  market  for  pediatric  ARVs,  and  thus  there  is  little  incentive  for  
pharmaceutical  companies  to  develop  pediatric  formulations.    The  small  pediatric  ARV  
market  is  further  fragmented  into  smaller  niche  markets  because  pediatric  HIV  
treatment  changes  as  children  move  through  different  stages  of  development.    This  
                                                                                                              
11  The  key  second-­‐‑line  FDC,  ATV/r,  was  not  available  in  a  generic  form  until  the  patent  over  ritonavir  (r)  was  
successfully  opposed  in  India  in  2011.    Prior  to  this  patent  opposition,  ATV  was  being  produced  in  generic  
form  in  India,  where  the  patent  on  ATV  was  previously  rejected.  
  
12  For  example,  only  1  Indian  generic  manufacturer  currently  sources  the  entire  global  supply  of  generic  
ATV/r  for  adult  use  because  of  patent  protection  over  ritonavir  in  other  LMICs.  
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requires  not  just  the  development  of  one  pediatric  formulation,  but  the  development  of  
multiple  products  in  varying  doses  and  delivery  formats  as  children  move  from  infancy  
to  adulthood  [121].    The  result  of  this  is  that  there  is  currently  only  one  triple  FDC  that  is  
suitable  for  children,  and  one-­‐‑third  of  ARVs  are  currently  unavailable  in  pediatric  
formulations  [28].    The  fact  that  there  are  any  ARVs  available  for  children  is  quite  
remarkable,  and  it  likely  due  to  purchase  commitments  from  organizations  like  the  
Clinton  HIV/AIDS  Initiative,  which  has  stimulated  the  development  of  pediatric  
formulations  by  ensuring  a  market  for  pharmaceutical  companies  [28].  
2.2.1 India’s Role in Access to ARVs in LMICs 
India  has  been  instrumental  in  supplying  low-­‐‑cost  drugs  to  the  developing  
world,  often  being  referred  to  as  “the  pharmacy  of  the  developing  world.”    Indian  
manufacturers  produce  more  than  80%  of  annual  purchase  volumes  of  ARVs  that  go  to  
LMICs,  including  88%  of  all  FDCs  and  91%  of  all  pediatric  formulations  [29].  
India  positioned  itself  to  play  this  role  by  taking  full  advantage  of  TRIPS  
flexibilities,  refusing  to  recognize  patents  for  pharmaceuticals13  until  2005  when  such  
patent  protection  was  mandated  by  TRIPS.    This  move  by  the  Indian  government  
allowed  India  to  develop  a  robust  generic  drug  industry,  as  there  were  no  patent  
                                                                                                              
13  Prior  to  the  2005  amendments  to  the  Indian  Patent  Act,  India  granted  only  process  patents  on  
pharmaceuticals,  so  that  many  inventors  could  patent  the  same  final  drug  product,  provided  that  it  was  
formulated  through  a  novel  process.  
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barriers  to  manufacturing  cheap  drugs  for  the  developing  world.    Since  the  inception  of  
the  generic  drug  industry  in  India,  the  business  models  of  Indian  firms  have  been  
focused  on  the  production  of  high-­‐‑volume,  low-­‐‑margin  products  like  generic  ARVs.  
Since  the  implementation  of  TRIPS  in  2005,  the  landscape  for  access  to  affordable  
drugs  has  changed.    Although  most  first-­‐‑line  ARVs  are  off-­‐‑patent,  newer  second-­‐‑  and  
third-­‐‑line  treatments  that  are  more  effective,  have  fewer  side  effects,  and  lead  to  less  
drug  resistance  have  been  patented14  [122],  preventing  Indian  generic  companies  from  
producing  the  drugs  for  LMICs.    Drugs  like  etavirine,  raltegravir,  and  maraviroc,  which  
are  needed  for  treatment  for  people  who  have  failed  on  first-­‐‑line  treatments,  lack  
available  generic  treatments  because  they  are  now  patented  in  India  [30].    This  has  
somewhat  curtailed  India’s  ability  to  supply  cheap  drugs  to  LMICs  because  generic  
manufacturers  are  unable  to  enter  the  market  and  create  the  kind  of  competition  that  
leads  to  the  dramatic  price  reductions  seen  in  the  past  with  first-­‐‑line  ARVs  [4].  
However,  despite  being  obligated  to  grant  patent  protection,  India  has  
maintained  its  public  health  commitment  by  granting  compulsory  licenses  when  
                                                                                                              
14  India  has  granted  patents  on  the  following  ARVs:  ABC  for  pediatric  use  (patent  held  by  GSK);  EVG  
(patent  held  by  Gilead);  ETV  (patent  held  by  Janssen);  FPV  (patent  held  by  GSK);  MVC  (patent  held  by  
Pfizer);  an  improved  composition  of  SQV  (patent  held  by  Roche);  TAF  (patent  held  by  Gilead).    The  
following  ARVs  have  pending  patents  in  India:  ATV  (filed  by  BMS);  COBI  (filed  by  Gilead);  DTG  (filed  by  
GSK);  a  liquid  composition  of  3TC  (filed  by  GSK);  an  extended  release  formulation  of  NVP  (filed  by  
Boehringer  Ingelheim).  
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necessary15  and  maintaining  a  high  threshold  for  patentability⎯reserving  patent  
protection  for  original  drugs  only  and  refusing  patent  protection  for  minor  
improvements  to  existing  drugs  or  reformulations  of  known  chemical  compounds.16    As  
a  result  of  this  high  patentability  threshold,  patents  on  a  number  of  important  
ARVs⎯TDF,  darunavir,  LPV/r,  and  atazanavir⎯have  been  rejected  [12].    This  has  
allowed  Indian  generic  companies  to  continue  to  supply  affordable  ARVs  to  LMICs.  
India’s  role  as  the  “pharmacy  of  the  developing  world”  is  changing.    Free  trade  
agreement  negotiations  may  further  jeopardize  India’s  ability  to  supply  low-­‐‑cost  drugs  
to  LMICs.17    However,  India  will  continue  to  play  an  instrumental  role  in  supplying  
drugs  to  LMICs  because  it  is  one  of  the  only  countries  in  the  developing  world  with  
significant  manufacturing  capabilities.  
2.3 Barriers to ND Research 
The  ND  drug  landscape  represents  a  classic  case  of  market  failure  for  which  the  
conventional  patent-­‐‑based  drug  discovery  system  is  ill  equipped  to  solve.    Because  R&D  
is  market-­‐‑driven  and  pharmaceutical  companies  seek  the  highest  return  on  their  R&D  
                                                                                                              
15  For  example,  in  2012  India  issued  a  compulsory  license  authorizing  Natco  Pharmaceuticals  to  make  and  
sell  generic  versions  to  the  cancer  drug  Nexavar.  
  
16  In  a  recent  challenge  by  Novartis  to  India’s  patent  laws,  the  Indian  Supreme  Court  upheld  India’s  
patentability  standards  and  denied  patent  protection  for  a  Leukemia  drug  that  was  only  a  minor  
improvement  over  the  original  patent.    India  also  revoked  a  Roche  patent  for  the  antiviral  drug  Pegasys.  
  
17  For  example,  the  India-­‐‑EU  FTA  encourages  patent  “evergreening.”    Patent  evergreening  allows  
pharmaceutical  companies  to  extend  their  market  exclusivity  for  a  drug  by  making  minor  changes  to  a  drug  
whose  patent  is  about  to  expire  in  order  to  gain  an  entirely  new  patent  over  the  drug.  
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investments,  the  R&D  system  is  heavily  focused  on  developing  new  drugs  for  diseases  
that  primarily  affect  developed  nations  (e.g.  arthritis,  diabetes,  depression,  obesity  and  
acne)  [31]  or  on  discovering  minor  therapeutic  changes  to  currently  successful  drugs  
that  can  then  be  re-­‐‑patented.    For  global  diseases⎯diseases  endemic  to  LMICs  but  for  
which  a  therapeutic  market  still  exists  in  developed  countries⎯drug  innovation  occurs  
because  there  is  sufficient  market  demand  for  pharmaceuticals  [32].    However,  in  the  
case  of  NDs,  innovation  rarely  occurs  because  of  the  timely  and  costly  process  of  drug  
development,  which  requires  not  only  the  discovery  of  a  novel  drug  that  may  be  
effective  against  a  target  disease,  but  the  demonstration  of  a  drug’s  efficacy  through  
clinical  trials  and  the  eventual  manufacture  and  distribution  of  the  final  product  [33].  
The  IP  system  thus  incentivizes  R&D  only  for  diseases  that  capture  a  profitable  market  
and  is  ineffective  at  adequately  addressing  the  health  needs  of  developing  countries.  
While  some  NDs  are  global  and  capture  some  marketable  profit  (e.g.  HIV/AIDS  
and  malaria)18  [34],  most  NDs  (particularly  NTDs)  have  been  nearly  eradicated  in  
developed  countries,  and  thus  lack  market  incentives  necessary  to  drive  R&D  for  these  
diseases.19    Because  of  the  significant  technological  barriers  associated  with  ND  drug  
                                                                                                              
18  These  are  classified  at  “Type  II”  diseases,  meaning  that  they  occur  in  both  wealthy  and  poor  nations,  and  
thus  R&D  incentives  exist,  but  the  level  of  R&D  spending  is  still  very  low  compared  to  the  global  disease  
burden.      
  
19  These  are  classified  as  “Type  III”  diseases,  meaning  they  occur  almost  exclusively  in  poor  countries,  and  
thus  R&D  for  them  is  almost  entirely  lacking.  
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development,  as  well  as  the  small,  uncertain  product  markets  that  command  drugs  for  
NDs,  there  are  few  existing  financing  or  policy  mechanisms  in  place  to  compensate  for  
the  risks  associated  with  ND  drug  development  [35].    
    The  lack  of  market  incentive  results  from  the  fact  that  the  primary,  and  
sometimes  only,  consumer  base  for  ND  drugs  are  those  living  in  poverty  in  LMICs20  
[123,  124],  and  thus  are  unable  to  afford  the  high  prices  charged  for  branded  drugs.    This  
has  resulted  in  a  situation  where  only  10%  of  R&D  funding  goes  towards  research  on  
neglected  diseases,  which  affect  90%  of  the  world’s  population,  a  phenomenon  that  has  
come  to  be  known  as  the  90-­‐‑10  gap  [36].  
In  addition  to  inadequate  incentives  to  stimulate  ND  R&D,  strong  IP  rights  often  
act  as  a  barrier  to  innovation  in  the  form  of  “patent  thickets,”  which  limit  the  ability  of  
researchers  wishing  to  engage  in  ND  R&D  from  developing  new  treatments  and  
technologies  [37].    These  thickets  often  create  complete  gridlock  with  respect  to  R&D,  
particularly  in  the  early  states  of  R&D.    In  addition  to  cost  and  time  associated  with  
licensing  IP  rights,  even  the  initial  search  for  who  owns  rights  over  certain  molecules  
                                                                                                              
20  According  to  the  World  Health  Organization,  NTDs  is  particular  primarily  affect  “low-­‐‑income  and  
politically  marginalized  people  living  in  rural  and  urban  areas.”    NDs  primarily  affect  those  living  in  
poverty  in  LMICs  because  the  presence  of  unsafe  drinking  water,  poor  sanitation,  substandard  housing  
conditions,  and  little  or  no  access  to  healthcare  increases  the  incidence  of  NDs  in  a  given  population.  
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and  processes  can  be  overly  burdensome,21  and  thus  it  is  not  surprising  that  ND  R&D  
remains  stymied  [38].  
For  NDs  for  which  treatments  are  available,  pharmaceutical  companies  holding  
patents  often  charge  prices  that  are  unaffordable,  making  treatment  inaccessible  to  the  
world’s  poorest22  [125].    Additionally,  with  respect  to  NDs  for  which  treatments  are  
available,  in  many  cases  the  treatments  are  very  outdated  and  are  becoming  less  
effective  due  to  a  high  incidence  of  drug  resistance  [34].    The  greatest  example  of  this  can  
be  seen  with  TB.    In  addition  to  a  vaccine,  which  is  not  effective  in  adults  and  only  
partially  effective  in  infants,  that  has  not  been  updated  since  1924  and  a  first-­‐‑line  drug  
regimen  developed  in  the  1960s,  [39]  half  a  million  patients  every  year  develop  multi-­‐‑
drug  resistant  TB,  for  which  adequate  treatment  is  not  available  [37].  
2.3.1 The Potential Role for India and other Emerging Economies in 
ND R&D 
Emerging  economies  have  recently  been  playing  a  role  in  ND  R&D.    Within  the  
past  few  years,  an  Indian  generic  firm  has  developed  a  drug  for  the  treatment  of  visceral  
leishmaniasis  and  a  Brazilian  manufacturer  has  developed  a  treatment  for  skin  
infections  in  patients  with  leprosy  [40].    In  addition  to  drug  development,  Brazil  has  
                                                                                                              
21  For  example,  when  the  University  of  Iowa  wanted  to  study  a  rare  ocular  disease,  it  had  to  contact  71  
different  entities  just  to  determine  ownership  of  IP  rights.    
  
22  For  example,  the  cost  of  the  best  (most  effective)  treatment  for  the  ND  visceral  leishmaniasis  (VL)  is  $454  
per  patient.    The  actual  cost  of  the  medication  is  $150,  but  treatment  is  administered  intravenously  over  the  
course  of  20  days,  requiring  patients  to  pay  additional  costs  for  hospital  stays.    
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invested  $10  million  in  seventy-­‐‑six  different  projects  as  part  of  a  pilot  R&D  program,  
with  ultimate  aims  of  finding  treatments  for  TB,  malaria,  Chagas  disease,  leprosy,  and  
leishmaniasis  [40].  
  Countries  like  China,  India,  Brazil,  and  South  Africa,  which  have  developed  
generic  pharmaceutical  industries,  have  an  interest  in  engaging  in  ND  R&D  because,  
unlike  multinational  pharmaceutical  companies  based  in  developed  countries,  their  
populations  are  affected  by  NDs.    They  are  also  in  a  better  position  to  engage  in  ND  
R&D  because,  although  the  market  for  ND  drugs  is  small,  the  costs  of  R&D  in  these  
countries  is  much  lower  than  R&D  costs  in  developed  countries23  [40].    This  can  be  
attributed  to  a  number  of  factors,  particularly  “lower  fixed  asset  costs  (i.e.,  lower  costs  of  
building  manufacturing  facilities),  cheaper  labor,  lower  costs  of  regulation,  efficient  
manufacturing  processes,  a  large  suitable  population  to  be  recruited  quickly  and  cheaply  
for  clinical  trials,  and  inexpensive  marketing”  [40].  
                                                                                                              
23  R&D  and  manufacturing  costs  in  India  and  China  are  one-­‐‑eighth  and  one-­‐‑fifth,  respectively,  of  the  costs  
incurred  by  Western  pharmaceutical  companies.  
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3. Overview of Mechanisms to Facilitate Broader Access 
to Medicines 
3.1 Facilitating Access to ARVs 
The  first  step  in  facilitating  access  to  ARVs  in  LMICs  is  delaying  implementing  
patent  protection  until  required  by  TRIPS  or,  if  patent  laws  are  in  place,  restricting  
patentability  criteria.    However,  once  a  patent  is  granted,  the  ways  in  which  broader  
access  is  facilitated  must  focus  on  making  ARVs  more  affordable,  and  since  the  
beginning  of  the  AIDS  crisis,  a  number  of  difference  mechanisms  have  been  used  to  
increase  access  to  ARVs.  
One  method  that  has  been  used  to  reduce  prices  is  licensing,  either  voluntary  or  
compulsory.    A  number  of  pharmaceutical  companies  have  also  agreed  to  not  assert  
their  patent  rights  over  ARVs  in  a  number  of  developing  countries  (known  as  “non-­‐‑
assert  declarations).    Pharmaceutical  companies  have  also  offered  “tiered  pricing”  
arrangements  to  certain  developing  countries,  selling  patented  drugs  at  a  much  lower  
cost  than  they  are  sold  for  outside  these  countries  or,  in  some  cases,  donating  drugs  to  
LMICs.      
However,  these  initiatives  alone  fall  short  for  a  number  of  reasons.    Most  
arrangements  exclude  a  number  of  MICs  with  high  HIV  burdens,  making  facilitating  
access  more  difficult  in  these  countries.    These  approaches  are  also  on  a  drug-­‐‑by-­‐‑drug  
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and  country-­‐‑by-­‐‑country  basis,  so  they  fail  to  address  the  problem  globally.    Most,  with  
the  exception  of  compulsory  licensing,  also  depend  on  the  on-­‐‑going  goodwill  of  
pharmaceutical  companies.  
Because  the  WHO  now  recommends  newer,  less  toxic  first-­‐‑  and  second-­‐‑line  
treatments  for  HIV,  and  because  key  countries  in  the  scale-­‐‑up  of  treatment  like  India  
now  grant  patent  protection  over  newer  ARVs,  drug  prices  remain  unaffordable  for  
many  living  with  HIV/AIDS  in  LMICs.    Unfortunately,  the  existing  mechanisms  to  
facilitate  broader  access  to  these  newer,  patented  drugs  fall  short,  mandating  a  need  for  
new  solutions  to  the  access  problem  for  developing  countries  as  a  whole.      
3.2 Facilitating Access to ND Drugs 
Recently,  there  has  been  increasing  attention  being  paid  to  the  ND  problem.    A  
number  of  initiatives  have  come  to  life,  and  product  development  partnerships  (PDPs)  
and  other  collaborations  have  increased  R&D  for  NDs.    However,  these  alone  won’t  
solve  the  problem,  as  they  are  often  disease  and/or  product  focused,  with  little  
collaboration  among  these  initiatives.    In  order  to  adequately  solve  the  ND  R&D  
problem,  there  needs  to  also  be  increased  access  to  research  results  and  increased  
research  collaboration.  
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3.3 Overview of Patent Pools for Global Health 
3.3.1 Patent Pools Generally 
Strong  IP  rights  create  a  “tragedy  of  the  anti-­‐‑commons,”  restricting  the  use  of  
knowledge  by  anyone  other  than  the  patent  holder.    The  tragedy  of  the  anti-­‐‑commons  is  
greatest  when  relevant  patents  for  a  particular  product  or  process  are  held  by  a  number  
of  different  entities;  this  creates  a  huge  barrier  to  access  and  innovation  because  anyone  
seeking  to  expand  on  existing  knowledge  must  obtain  rights  from  each  individual  
patent  holder.    Patent  pools  aim  to  avert  this  tragedy  by  making  patented  products  more  
readily  available.      
Broadly  speaking,  a  patent  pool  is  an  “agreement  among  two  or  more  patent  
owners  to  license  a  set  of  their  patents  to  one  another  or  to  third  parties”  [41].    Such  
pools  function  by  “collecting  a  series  of  patents  that  relate  to  the  use  of  a  particular  
technology  so  that  they  can  be  efficiently  licensed  to  those  making,  using,  or  selling  that  
technology”  [42].    Thus,  by  making  patents  more  readily  available  to  non-­‐‑patent  holders,  
patent  pools  facilitate  broader  availability  of  new  technologies.    
The  use  of  patent  pools  for  facilitate  access  to  technology  is  not  a  new  
phenomenon,  as  they  have  been  utilized  in  a  number  of  industries  for  a  variety  of  
reasons1  and  have  resulted  in  a  number  of  benefits  to  patent  holders  and  industries  at  
                                                                                                              
1  Patent  pools  in  other  industries  have  been  formed  for  reasons  such  as:  to  establish  a  technological  standard  
across  an  industry  and  to  facilitate  institutionalized  exchange  of  information  that  is  not  covered  by  patents.    
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large2  [43].    In  addition  to  facilitating  broader  access  to  technologies,  patent  pools  
simultaneously  reducing  the  risks  associated  with  using  patented  technologies  and  
decrease  the  time  and  cost  associated  with  individual  license  deals.      
3.3.2 Patent Pools for Global Health  
  Patent  pools  for  global  health  represent  a  novel  way  to  move  beyond  the  status  
quo  in  initiatives  aimed  at  increasing  access  to  ARVs  and  facilitating  ND  R&D.    Like  
other  patent  pools,  patent  pools  for  global  health  aim  to  overcome  some  of  the  
shortcomings  associated  with  the  current  market-­‐‑based  IP  landscape.    By  managing  IP  
from  a  public  health  perspective,  global  health  patents  pools  have  the  potential  to  
“counteract  high  prices,  spur  needs-­‐‑driven  research,  and  facilitate  innovation,”  [28]  
making  medicines  more  available  and  affordable.  
While  the  experiences  of  other  patent  pools  can  be  instructive,  patent  pools  for  
global  health  are  different  from  other  patent  pools.    Unlike  most  patent  pools,  which  
involve  either  cross-­‐‑licensing  among  competitors  in  order  to  share  patents  necessary  for  
the  manufacture  or  a  particular  technology  or  industry-­‐‑wide  patent  pools  that  are  
necessitated  by  the  need  for  an  industry-­‐‑wide  standard,  patent  pools  for  global  health  
                                                                                                              
  
Examples  of  patent  pools  are:  the  SARS  vaccine  patent  pool;  the  Golden  Rice  patent  pool;  and  the  aircraft  
patent  pool.    
  
2  For  example,  the  sewing  machine  patent  pool  led  to  a  substantial  reduction  in  licensing  costs  as  compared  
to  original  fees  charged;  the  MAA  and  auto  industry  patent  pools  brought  an  end  to  ubiquitous  litigation.  
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involve  a  distinct  set  patent  donors,  who  license  their  technology  into  the  pool  for  
reasons  other  than  profit,  and  patent  users,  who  use  the  IP  in  the  pool  without  also  
donating  into  it  [12].    This  changes  the  dynamic  of  the  patent  pools  for  global  health  as  
compared  to  other  patent  pools,  as  it  is  necessitated  not  by  practical  or  monetary  
concerns,  but  rather  humanitarian  concerns,  and  thus  proper  incentives  need  to  exist  to  
compel  patent  holders  to  donate  into  the  pool.      
Two  patent  pools  for  global  health  have  recently  been  formed⎯the  Medicines  
Patent  Pool  (MPP)  and  WIPO  Re:Search  Consortium.    While  both  are  patents  pools  for  
global  health,  they  are  significantly  different  in  terms  of  disease  focus  and  inputs.    The  
MPP  is  a  patent  pool  for  ARVs;  it  aims  to  overcome  the  IP  barriers  that  currently  bar  
production  of  newer  ARVs  that  are  more  effective  and  less  toxic.    The  inputs  into  the  
pool  are  patents  related  to  the  development  and  manufacture  of  patented  ARVs,  and  the  
pool  aims  to  increase  production  of  generic  ARVs  and  eventually  stimulate  downstream  
development  of  new  FDCs  that  are  better  suited  to  the  needs  of  developing  countries.3      
Re:Search  is  a  patent  pool  for  compounds,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  NDs.    
Unlike  the  MPP,  which  focuses  on  downstream  innovation,  Re:Search  focus  is  on  
stimulating  upstream  innovation  of  entirely  new  drugs  for  NDs.    By  facilitating  the  
exchange  of  information  and  providing  users  with  access  to  patents,  data,  and  know-­‐‑
                                                                                                              
3  One  goal  of  the  MPP  is  to  facilitate  production  pediatric  and  heat-­‐‑stabilized  formulations  that  are  lacking  
in  developing  countries.    
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how  associated  with  NDs,  Re:Search  aims  to  speed  up  the  development  of  new  ND  
drugs  and  reduce  the  financial  and  administrative  burdens  associated  with  licensing    
arrangements,  which  may  be  necessary  after  product  development  [44].    The  real  value  
in  Re:Search  is  that  it  facilitates  collaborations,  overcomes  information  barriers,  and  
reduces  transaction  costs,  helping  those  wanting  to  develop  ND  drugs  and  technologies  
locate  and  work  with  the  holders  of  relevant  patents,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how  [12].    It  also  
may  help  overcome  the  tragedy  of  the  anti-­‐‑commons  with  respect  to  upstream  
knowledge,  products,  and  processes  that  are  currently  under-­‐‑utilized  because  multiple  
parties  hold  varying  rights  over  necessary  inputs  for  downstream  products  [45].    In  this  
way  it  overcomes  the  patent  thicket  problem  that  currently  prevents  researchers  from  
sharing  and  using  knowledge  to  develop  new  medicines,  vaccines,  diagnostics,  and  
other  technologies  for  NDs.  
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4. Traditional Mechanisms that Facilitate Access to 
ARVs 
Nearly  all  originator  companies  with  HIV/AIDS  treatments  are  now  engaged  in  
some  form  of  initiative  to  promote  access  to  ARVs  in  developing  countries,  whether  
through  voluntary  licenses,  non-­‐‑assert  declarations,  tiered  pricing,  or  drug  donations.    
Despite  these  efforts,  costs  remain  high,  particularly  for  newer  drugs,  and  access  
remains  limited.    While  all  of  these  efforts  are  certainly  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  
nothing  can  substitute  for  generic  competition,  which  is  achieved  only  through  
licensing.    Ultimately,  all  of  these  mechanisms  have  shortcomings  that  cannot  be  
overlooked,  as  they  all  operate  on  a  drug-­‐‑by-­‐‑drug  and  country-­‐‑by-­‐‑country  basis  and  fail  
to  address  the  access  problem  globally.      
4.1 Voluntary Licensing 
Under  voluntary  licenses,  pharmaceutical  companies  holding  patents  on  HIV  
drugs  authorize  a  generic  manufacturer  to  manufacture  and  sell  the  drug.    Due  to  a  lack  
of  transparency,  the  terms  of  voluntary  license  agreements  are  not  readily  available,  but  
the  agreements  generally  set  out  a  number  of  requirements  relating  to  the  geographic  
scope  of  the  license,  the  payment  of  royalties,  formulations  of  combination  products,  
sourcing  of  active  pharmaceutical  ingredients  (APIs),  technology  transfer,  data  
exclusivity,  and  provisions  relating  to  compulsory  licenses  [46].  
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A  number  of  originator  companies  have  signed  voluntary  licenses  with  generic  
manufacturers,  and  at  least  seven  originator  companies1  with  HIV  drugs  in  their  patent  
portfolio  engage  in  voluntary  licensing  as  part  of  their  stated  access  to  medicines  policies  
[46].    There  is  little  public  information  available  about  the  terms  of  individual  license  
agreements,  but  the  information  that  is  available  suggests  that  the  terms  vary  
significantly  across  licenses  (Appendix  A).    Some  licenses  are  better  than  others,  but  they  
all  contain  one  or  more  restrictions  that  are  quite  problematic.    However,  because  
licensees  often  have  little  negotiating  power  with  respect  to  the  patent  holders,  they  
often,  and  will  likely  continue  to,  accept  terms  that  are  not  ideal.      
Though  many  licenses  are  royalty-­‐‑free,  some  require  royalty  payments  as  high  as  
15%  [46].    With  respect  to  APIs,  which  represent  a  significant  portion  of  the  final  price  of  
a  drug,2  some  licenses  do  not  allow  licensees  to  manufacture  APIs,3  while  others  give  
licensees  the  freedom  to  manufacture  and  sell  APIs  [46].  
With  respect  to  FDCs,  some  licenses  permit  only  those  combinations  specified  in  
the  license,4  some  require  pre-­‐‑approval  from  patent  holders  before  any  combination  
                                                                                                              
1  Abbott,  Boehringer-­‐‑Ingelheim,  BMS,  Gilead,  J&J,  Merck,  Roche,  and  ViiV  all  include  voluntary  licensing  in  
their  access  initiatives.  
  
2  For  some  drugs,  APIs  can  represent  as  much  as  40-­‐‑50%  of  the  cost  of  goods  sold.  
  
3  For  example,  the  Johnson  &  Johnson  licenses  for  ATV  and  DRV  .  
  
4  Johnson  &  Johnson  license  for  RIL  permits  combinations  only  with  TDF/FTC.  
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products  are  made,5  and  some  grant  licensees  the  freedom  to  co-­‐‑formulate  with  any  
other  products.6    Illustrative  of  the  impact  of  FDC  formulation  restrictions  is  the  case  of  a  
new  WHO-­‐‑recommended  first-­‐‑line  FDC  that  consists  of  tenofovir  (Gilead),  lamivudine  
(GSK)  and  either  nevirapine  (Boehringer-­‐‑Ingelheim)  or  efavirenz  (Bristol  Myers  Squibb).  
A  FDC  of  these  drugs  currently  does  not  exist  or  is  in  limited  supply  [28],  largely  
because  any  manufacturer  wishing  to  develop  it  would  have  to  not  only  seek  voluntary  
licenses  from  all  three  or  four  patent-­‐‑holders,  but  would  also  have  to  negotiate  the  
freedom  to  make  FDCs  in  the  license  agreements.    FDC  restrictions  can  be  particularly  
significant  for  drugs  that  have  the  potential  to  be  used  pediatric  or  heat-­‐‑stabilized  
formulations.    Because  pharmaceutical  companies  neglect  developing  these  
formulations,  barring  licensees  from  developing  these  formulations  might  foreclose  
product  development  entirely.      
With  respect  to  technology  transfer,  data  exclusivity,  and  the  ability  of  licensees  
to  challenge  patents  or  supply  drugs  to  countries  that  issue  compulsory  licenses,  
information  is  not  publicly  available  [46].    If  voluntary  licenses  restrict  the  ability  of  
licensees  to  supply  drugs  to  countries  that  have  issued  a  compulsory  license,  this  would  
dramatically  limit  the  usefulness  of  compulsory  licenses  as  a  tool  to  facilitate  broader  
access  to  ARVs.  
                                                                                                              
5  For  example,  the  Gilead-­‐‑MPP  license  for  EVG.  
  
6  For  example,  the  Gilead-­‐‑MPP  license  for  TDF  and  COBI.  
    35  
While  the  geographic  scope  of  voluntary  licenses  varies  significantly,  there  is  a  
general  trend  of  limiting  licenses  to  supply  in  LDCs,  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa,  and  India;  
lower-­‐‑middle  and  middle-­‐‑income  countries  tend  of  be  excluded  entirely.    To  date,  there  
is  not  a  single  voluntary  license  that  covers  all  low-­‐‑  and  middle-­‐‑income  countries  [47].  
   Despite  the  restrictions  contained  in  most  voluntary  licenses,  they  have  
nevertheless  played  a  significant  role  in  promoting  broader  access  to  ARVs,  as  they  have  
introduced  some  level  of  competition  into  the  market  and  thus  made  ARVs  covered  in  a  
license  more  affordable  to  those  living  in  LMICs.    Because  patent  protection  is  not  
granted  in  India  and  other  MICs,  voluntary  licensing  is  a  way  to  get  generics  on  the  
market  much  more  quickly  than  waiting  for  a  patent  to  expire  or  waiting  for  the  patent  
board  to  rule  on  a  pre-­‐‑grant  opposition  of  the  patent  [127].    Voluntary  licensing  can  also  
operate  as  an  important  tool  for  north-­‐‑south  technology-­‐‑transfer,  allowing  generic  
companies  in  developing  countries  that  become  licensees  to  gain  knowledge  and  
expertise  from  developed-­‐‑country  drug  manufacturers  [126].    By  allowing  for  such  
technology-­‐‑transfer,  voluntary  licenses  can  help  speed  up  the  development  of  the  drug  
manufacturing  industry  in  countries  that  are  in  the  early  stages  of  developing  
manufacturing  capabilities.    Additionally,  if  voluntary  licenses  contain  data  exclusivity  
waivers,  this  can  further  speed  up  the  timeline  for  when  a  generic  reaches  the  market,  as  
licensees  will  not  have  to  conduct  their  own  lengthy,  costly  clinical  trials  [127].  
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However,  regardless  of  the  benefits  of  voluntary  licenses,  they  are  ill-­‐‑equipped  to  
solve  the  problem  of  access  to  ARVs  globally  because  they  are  all  drug-­‐‑specific  and  
country-­‐‑specific,  and  thus  don’t  represent  a  true  global  solution.    Additionally,  because  
the  number  of  licensees  that  patent  holders  will  sign  agreements  with  is  often  limited  in  
number,  voluntary  licenses  do  not  bring  about  the  level  of  robust  generic  competition  
that,  in  the  past  when  patents  were  not  an  issue,  dramatically  brought  down  prices  of  
ARVs,  even  if  they  do  somewhat  bring  down  prices.    Additionally,  generics  on  the  
market  that  are  not  under  a  voluntary  license  are  usually  cheaper  than  generics  offered  
under  a  voluntary  license7  [127].    Another  problem  with  relying  on  voluntary  licenses  to  
solve  the  access  problem  is  that  they  depend  on  the  on-­‐‑going  goodwill  of  
pharmaceutical  companies.  
4.2 Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory  licensing  is  an  important  tool  that  can  be  utilized  within  the  current  
IP  system  to  promote  access  to  ARVs,  and  can  be  really  instrumental  in  bringing  down  
prices  of  ARVs.    In  Thailand,  for  example,  a  compulsory  license  issued  in  2007  for  the  
drug  LPV/r  brought  prices  down  in  some  middle-­‐‑income  countries  by  79%,  from  $2,200  
per  patient  per  year  to  $470  [4].    Despite  their  ability  to  bring  about  such  significant  price  
                                                                                                              
7    For  example,  in  2006,  Lamivudine  (offered  by  generic  manufacturer  Aspen  under  a  voluntary  license  from  
GSK)  is  priced  at  $69  per  patient  per  year,  whereas  the  generic  manufacturer  Cipla  (not  under  a  voluntary  
license)  offers  it  for  $51  per  patient  per  year  and  by  Aurobindo  (also  not  under  a  voluntary  license)  for  $54  
per  patient  per  year.    Similarly,  the  drug  Nevirapine,  under  voluntary  license,  is  priced  at  $97  per  patient  
per  year,  whereas  the  price  for  generics  not  under  a  voluntary  license  is  $61  per  patient  per  year.  
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reductions,  compulsory  licenses  have  historically  and  continue  to  be  under-­‐‑utilized  as  a  
means  for  reducing  drug  prices.    Since  the  mid-­‐‑1990s,  governments  have  only  proposed  
compulsory  licenses  around  twenty-­‐‑five  times,  with  very  few  occurring  since  2008  [48].    
The  problem  with  relying  on  compulsory  licenses  is  that  the  granting  of  them  
relies  on  the  political  will  of  developing-­‐‑country  governments  to  address  the  health  
needs  of  their  populations.    Additionally,  countries  that  grant  compulsory  licenses  often  
face  direct  or  indirect  retaliatory  measures  for  pharmaceutical  companies  and  
governments  of  other  countries.    For  example,  Thailand’s  granting  of  compulsory  
licenses  resulted  in  the  pharmaceutical  company  Abbott  refusing  to  supply  Thailand  
with  any  of  their  new  ARVs  and  the  imposition  of  trade  sanctions  by  the  United  States8  
[128].    In  Indonesia,  a  presidential  decree  in  authorizing  compulsory  licenses  for  ARVs  
resulted  in  PHRMA  claiming  that  it  had  abused  compulsory  licensing  rules  and  could  
“reduce  the  incentive  to  invest  in  future  R&D.”    
Even  the  threat  of  a  compulsory  license  can  impact  prices  of  ARVs,  because  it  can  
serve  as  an  impetus  for  voluntary  price  reductions.    In  one  analysis  of  compulsory  
licenses,  over  half  of  the  instances  in  which  LMIC  governments  initiated  the  compulsory  
licensing  process  ended  with  the  patent  holder  issuing  a  voluntary  license,  giving  a  
discount  on  the  drug,  or  even  giving  the  branded  drugs  away  [48].    Brazil  has  threatened  
                                                                                                              
8  This  included  being  placed  on  the  United  States  Special  301  watch  list  and  the  withdrawal  of  three  export  
products  from  US  GSP  [generalized  system  of  preferences]  status,  which  resulted  in  tariffs  of  3.9%-­‐‑6.5%  
being  imposed  on  the  three  products.  
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compulsory  licenses  a  number  of  times  since  2001,  and  in  every  instance  it  has  lead  to  
drug  discounts  or  voluntary  licenses  [23].    In  2006,  Gilead  established  a  voluntary  license  
allowing  for  the  distribution  of  a  low-­‐‑cost  generic  version  of  tenofovir  in  a  number  of  
countries.    However,  China  was  excluded  from  this  deal,  and  has  recently  threatened  to  
issue  a  compulsory  license;  Gilead  is  now  reportedly  negotiating  a  deal  with  the  Chinese  
government  in  which  they  will  donate  a  substantial  amount  of  tenofovir  to  China  [48].  
However,  smaller  countries  are  at  a  serious  disadvantage  because  they  do  not  have  the  
same  level  of  negotiating  power  that  larger  countries  have,  and  thus  they  are  less  likely  
to  get  the  sorts  of  deals  that  countries  like  Brazil  and  China  are  able  to  obtain.    
Compulsory  licenses,  whether  enacted  or  threatened,  are  a  powerful  tool  for  
LMICs  to  stimulate  price  reductions  on  ARVs.    However,  because  “health  ministries  are  
generally  more  interested  in  receiving  price  reductions  for  specific  drugs  than  in  
dramatically  overhauling  the  patent  system”[48],  compulsory  licensing  does  not  change  
the  status  quo  with  respect  to  drug  prices,  because  countries  take  the  price  discounts  
rather  than  issuing  a  compulsory  license  and  allowing  for  generic  market  entry.    
Additionally,  because  compulsory  licenses  must  be  granted  on  a  country-­‐‑by-­‐‑country  
basis,  at  a  global  level  this  approach  to  increasing  access  to  ARVs  is  “less  likely  to  
achieve  economies  of  scale  rapidly,  would  entail  higher  transaction  costs,  imply  greater  
uncertainty  for  generic  producers,  and  require  significant  political  capital”  [28].  
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The  circumstances  surrounding  the  granting  of  a  compulsory  license,  as  well  as  
its  benefits  and  drawbacks  are  best  exemplified  by  the  case  of  the  compulsory  licensing  
issued  in  Thailand.      
4.2.1 Compulsory Licenses in Thailand 
Thailand’s  AIDS  epidemic  was  the  first  major  Southeast  Asian  epidemic,  and  by  
the  early  1990s  it  was  considered  to  be  the  fastest  growing  AIDS  epidemic  in  the  world  
[49].    For  over  a  decade,  the  Thai  government  was  unable  to  procure  affordable  ARVs  
for  its  citizens.    Thailand  remained  heavily  dependent  on  foreign  aid  for  the  funding  of  
ARVs,  resulting  in  the  majority  of  the  population  being  unable  to  obtain  treatment.    
Costs  for  ARVs  remained  so  high  that  when  Thailand  adopted  a  universal  health  care  
scheme,  ARV  treatment  was  initially  excluded  [50].  
This  changed  in  2001,  when  the  Thai  Government  Pharmaceutical  Organization  
(GPO)  developed  drug-­‐‑manufacturing  capabilities  and  began  production  of  a  generic,  
fixed-­‐‑dose  combination  ARV  called  GPO-­‐‑VIR9  [51].  The  domestic  production  of  GPO-­‐‑
VIR  was  crucial  to  increasing  access  to  treatment,  as  it  resulted  in  an  eighteen-­‐‑fold  
decrease  in  the  cost  of  treatment  [52].    This  cost  reduction  expanded  treatment  coverage  
significantly⎯by  the  end  of  2006  the  number  of  patients  receiving  treatment  increased  
from  under  5,000  in  2002  to  over  80,000  [51]  and  over  80%  of  people  living  with  AIDS  
had  access  to  public  ARVs,  an  increase  from  almost  0%  [53].    Due  to  drastic  price  
                                                                                                              
9  A  first-­‐‑line  triple  FDC  containing  stavudine  (d4T),  lamivudine  (3TC),  and  nevirapine  (NVP)  
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reductions  associated  with  domestic  production  of  ARVs  by  the  GPO,  Thailand  was  able  
to  adopt  a  policy  on  universal  access  to  ARVs  under  its  universal  health  care  scheme  
[54].    Without  the  prevention  and  treatment  efforts  implemented  by  the  Thai  
government  after  generic  production  of  ARVs  began,  it  is  estimated  that  the  HIV/AIDS  
disease  burden  in  Thailand  would  be  fourteen  times  more  than  what  was  actually  
experienced  [53].    
Despite  Thailand’s  success  in  addressing  the  HIV/AIDS  epidemic,  adverse  side  
effects  and  high  levels  of  drug  resistance  to  GPO-­‐‑VIR  prompted  the  need  to  look  
towards  procuring  newer  drugs  with  fewer  side  effects  and  less  resistance  [52].    
Unfortunately,  this  came  at  a  time  when  Thailand  was  fully  TRIPS  compliant,  and  thus  
unable  to  produce  or  import  the  drugs  necessary  to  meet  the  needs  of  their  infected  
population.    In  2006,  Thailand  addressed  these  needs  and  issued  a  compulsory  license  
for  the  ARV  Efavirenz  [55].    This  license  allowed  the  Thai  GPO  to  import  or  produce  
generic  versions  of  Efavirenz,  resulting  in  the  number  of  people  having  access  to  a  
steady  supply  of  the  drug  to  increase  from  around  4,500  before  the  license  to  over  29,000  
people  by  the  end  of  2010  [56].    In  2007,  following  failed  negotiations  to  lower  prices  on  
a  newer,  second-­‐‑line  ARV,  Thailand  issued  another  compulsory  license  for  the  
production  or  importation  of  LPV/r  [55].    After  the  Thai  GPO  began  importing  a  generic  
version  from  India,  the  cost  of  treatment  was  drastically  reduced  from  $2,200  per  patient  
per  year  to  $600  per  patient  per  year  [57].    This  increased  the  number  of  people  having  
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access  to  a  steady  supply  of  the  drug  from  almost  none  to  over  6,000  by  the  end  of  2010  
[57].    
Unfortunately,  the  issuance  of  compulsory  licenses  in  Thailand  was  not  without  
its  drawbacks,  as  Thailand  faced  retaliatory  measures  from  pharmaceutical  companies  
and  the  United  States  government.    In  2007  Abbott,  the  patent-­‐‑holder  on  LPV/r,  was  so  
angered  by  Thailand’s  decision  to  grant  a  compulsory  license  that  they  withdrew  all  of  
their  pending  patent  applications  and  refused  to  supply  any  of  their  newest  drugs  there,  
one  of  which  was  a  new,  heat-­‐‑resistant  formulation  of  LPV/r  [58].    In  2006,  Thailand  was  
placed  on  Office  of  the  United  Stated  Trade  Representative’s  (USTR)  “Special  301”  
Report  Watch  List,  based  on  a  concern  surrounding  weak  patent  protection  over  
pharmaceuticals  [59].    In  2007,  Thailand  was  elevated  to  the  “Special  301”  Report  Priority  
Watch  List;  in  the  same  year  the  USTR  also  removed  GPS  status  for  three  Thai  imports,  
withdrawing  duty-­‐‑free  access  to  the  U.S.  market  for  these  products  [50].    However,  
despite  these  drawbacks,  Thailand  is  one  of  the  few  developing  countries  that  has  
achieved  universal  access  to  ARVs  [129],  and  this  is  primarily  attributable  to  it’s  issuance  
of  compulsory  licenses  that  has  helped  the  government  secure  a  continuous,  reliable,  
affordable  supply  of  ARVs.  
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4.3 Non-Assert Declarations 
Non-­‐‑assert  declarations10  are  part  of  the  stated  access  initiatives  of  a  number  of  
pharmaceutical  companies  holding  ARV  patents.    With  these  declarations,  patent  
holders  make  a  commitment  that  they  will  not  enforce  patents  in  certain  countries,  
under  certain  circumstances  [60].    With  these  declarations  in  force,  third  parties  are  
permitted  to  manufacture  and  sell  or  import  the  patented  ARV  within  a  specified  scope  
without  fear  that  the  patent  holder  will  bring  an  infringement  suit  [60].  
These  declarations  are  becoming  increasingly  popular  with  pharmaceutical  
companies.    Novartis,  Roche  and  Lilly  do  not  file  new  patents  or  enforce  old  patents  in  
LDCs  [60].  Boehringer  Ingelheim  has  granted  non-­‐‑assert  declarations  to  WHO  pre-­‐‑
qualified  generic  manufacturers  to  manufacture  and  sell  the  ARV  tipranavir  and  
products  containing  nevirapine  [60].    Janssen  Pharmaceuticals  has  granted  a  non-­‐‑assert  
on  the  second-­‐‑line  ARV  darunavir  [60].    
Non-­‐‑assert  declarations,  in  theory,  have  the  potential  to  increase  access  to  low-­‐‑
cost  generics  in  LMICs,  but  unfortunately  are  often  geographically  restricted.    The  
Boehringer  Ingelheim  non-­‐‑assert  allow  for  sale  of  drugs  only  to  seventy-­‐‑eight  
countries⎯low-­‐‑income  countries,  all  LDCs11  and  all  African  countries  [60].    Similarly,  the  
                                                                                                              
10  Also  referred  to  as  “non-­‐‑assert  covenants”  and  “immunity  from  suit  agreements.”  
  
11  Low-­‐‑income  countries  are  those  countries  classified  by  the  World  Bank  as  having  a  GNI  per  capita  of  $745  
or  less.    LDCs  are  a  subset  of  low-­‐‑income  countries  that  suffer  from  the  most  severe  structural  impediments  
to  sustainable  development.  
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Lilly,  Roche,  and  Novartis  non-­‐‑asserts  apply  only  to  LDCs,  and  the  Janssen  non-­‐‑assert  
applies  only  to  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa  and  LDCs.  
The  problem  with  non-­‐‑asserts,  particularly  for  newer,  second-­‐‑  and  third-­‐‑line  
ARVs,  is  that  they  exclude  middle-­‐‑income  countries.    Exemplary  of  the  shortcomings  of  
non-­‐‑assert  declarations  is  the  Johnson  &  Johnson  non-­‐‑assert  with  respect  to  darunavir.    
The  greatest  demand  for  second-­‐‑  and  third-­‐‑line  ARVs  like  darunavir  is  in  middle-­‐‑
income  countries,  where  patients  have  been  receiving  treatment  for  long  enough  to  have  
developed  resistance  to  first-­‐‑line  ARVs  [61].    Because  middle-­‐‑income  countries  are  
excluded  from  the  non-­‐‑assert,  patients  in  these  countries  have  to  rely  on  the  goodwill  of  
Johnson  &  Johnson  to  offer  them  affordable  prices  or  to  engage  in  voluntary  licensing.    
Johnson  &  Johnson  has  entered  into  voluntary  licenses  covering  darunavir  with  two  
generic  manufacturers,  but  the  terms  of  the  license  exclude  most  middle-­‐‑income  
countries.    Because  Johnson  &  Johnson  has  not  offered  sufficiently  discounted  prices  to  
middle-­‐‑income  countries,  prices  in  excluded  countries  remain  unaffordable,  remaining  
as  high  as  $6,000  per  patient  per  year  in  some  MICs  [61].12    Because  darunavir  must  be  
boosted  with  ritonavir  [2],  this  price  represents  just  one  component  of  treatment.    
Additionally,  because  the  greatest  demand  for  darunavir  is  in  middle-­‐‑income  countries  
[61],  exclusion  of  these  countries  from  the  non-­‐‑assert  declaration  shrinks  the  global  
                                                                                                              
12  In  Brazil,  the  cost  of  darunavir  is  $6,037  per  patient  per  year;  in  Georgia,  the  price  is  $8,468  per  patient  per  
year;  in  Thailand,  the  price  is  $4,854  per  patient  per  year.  
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market  for  darunavir.    This  creates  a  situation  where  generic  manufacturers  currently  do  
not  have  adequate  incentives  to  produce  generic  darunavir,  because  they  are  unable  to  
sell  to  the  largest  market  base  for  the  drug.    Also  problematic  is  Johnson  &  Johnson’s  
declaration  that  it  would  “assert  its  patent  rights  if  –  in  its  unilateral  judgment  –  
darunavir  was  being  produced  in  sub-­‐‑optimal  formulations  or  dosages”  [61].    While  
quality  assurance  is  vital  for  effective  antiretroviral  treatment,  Johnson  &  Johnson  has  
failed  to  comment  on  how  they  will  make  this  “unilateral  judgment,”  creating  a  lot  of  
uncertainty  around  the  production  of  darunavir.    Additionally,  Johnson  &  Johnson  has  
not  clarified  whether  or  not  they  will  allow  co-­‐‑formulation  with  darunavir  under  the  
non-­‐‑assert.    This  is  problematic  because  darunavir  requires  co-­‐‑formulation  for  its  
effectiveness,  requiring  boosting  with  a  protease  booster  [2].    All  of  the  uncertainty  
surrounding  the  darunavir  non-­‐‑assert  underscores  why  generic  manufacturers  are  
hesitant  to  produce  generic  formulations  of  drugs  operating  under  non-­‐‑assert  
declarations.  
In  theory,  non-­‐‑assert  declarations  could  lead  to  the  generic  manufacture  of  
ARVs.    However,  they  are  not  a  real,  long-­‐‑term  solution  to  the  access  problem  because  
they  depend  on  the  on-­‐‑going  goodwill  of  pharmaceutical  companies.    There  is  also  a  lot  
of  uncertainty  surrounding  non-­‐‑assert  declarations  with  respect  to  how  long  generic  
manufacturers  will  have  the  freedom  to  produce  a  generic.    Because  generic  
manufacturers  would  have  to  stop  production  in  the  event  that  a  pharmaceutical  
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company  decides  to  assert  its  patent  rights,  there  is  little  incentive  to  invest  in  drug  
development.  
4.4 Drug Donations 
A  number  of  organizations13  pour  billions  of  dollars  each  year  into  increasing  
access  to  ARVs.    In  2008  alone,  $15.6  billion  was  spent  on  AIDS  programs  in  LMICs,  
with  a  substantial  portion  of  that  going  to  ARV  procurement  [12].    These  programs  have  
been  instrumental  in  the  scale-­‐‑up  of  HIV  treatments  in  LMICs,  but  the  focus  tends  to  be  
pretty  narrow,  with  most  of  the  money  being  funneled  into  HIV/AIDS,  TB,  and  malaria.  
While  assistance  in  the  form  of  drug  donations  undoubtedly  increases  the  
number  of  people  who  have  access  to  ARVs,  such  assistance  is  unsustainable,  
particularly  as  governments  and  organizations  face  increasing  financial  constraints.    
While  international  assistance  for  HIV/AIDS  programs  in  LMICs  have  risen  dramatically  
since  the  early  2000s,  donor  funding  began  to  flat-­‐‑line  in  2008  at  the  onset  of  the  global  
economic  crisis,  and  in  2011,  began  to  decline  [130].    This  is  significant  because  as  the  
demand  for  newer,  more  expensive  ARVs  increases  and  donor  budgets  shrink,  the  need  
for  access  to  affordable  ARVs  becomes  increasingly  pressing.    However,  because  these  
newer  ARVs  are  patented  in  India  and  other  MICs,  generics  are  not  available.    Thus,  
organizations  have  to  either  pay  the  branded  price  or  negotiate  individually  with  drug  
companies  for  lower-­‐‑cost  branded  drugs.    Like  non-­‐‑asserts,  this  depends  heavily  on  the  
                                                                                                              
13  Notably,  GAVI,  the  Global  Fund,  The  Bill  &  Melinda  Gates  Foundation,  PEPFAR,  and  CHAI.  
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continuing  good  will  of  pharmaceutical  companies  to  offer  organizations  prices  that  are  
low  enough  such  that  they  can  afford  to  continue  donating  ARVs  to  LMICs.  
In  some  instances  pharmaceutical  companies  will  donate  drugs  to  countries  or  
donor  organizations.14    While  drug  donations  can  be  hugely  beneficial  in  cases  on  
national  emergencies  or  other  instances  where  drugs  are  not  available  in  sufficient  
quantity  globally  because  of  a  lack  of  a  sustainable  market,  as  in  the  case  of  NDs15  [131].    
However,  for  a  chronic  disease  like  HIV  that  requires  a  lifetime  of  treatment,  drug  
donations  are  not  sustainable.    In  addition  to  drug  donations  for  HIV  being  
unsustainable,  they  can  negatively  impact  generic  competition,  as  these  organizations  
are  financially  constrained  and  will  accept  donations  rather  than  purchase  drugs  from  
generic  manufacturers.      
Thus,  drug  donations  do  not  encourage  long-­‐‑term  solutions  to  the  access  
problem,  particularly  the  generic  manufacture  of  ARVs.    Because  “health  ministries  are  
generally  more  interested  in  receiving  price  reductions  for  specific  drugs  than  in  
dramatically  overhauling  the  patent  system”  [48],  they  are  willing  to  accept  drug  
donations  rather  than  make  a  commitment  to  a  more  long-­‐‑term  solution.    Drug  
                                                                                                              
14  For  example:  Pfizer  has  donated  Diflucan;  Merck  has  donated  Mectizan;  Boehringer  has  donated  
Viramune.  
  
15  For  example,  the  Merck  donation  of  Mectizan  for  treatment  of  river  blindness  has  been  very  successful,  
providing  treatment  to  millions  living  in  LMICs.    However,  this  donation’s  success  can  be  largely  attributed  
to  the  fact  that  river  blindness  is  geographically  isolated  to  a  few  regions,  has  a  very  simply  treatment  
protocol,  and  has  the  potential  to  be  eradicated.    Drug  donations  in  the  context  of  HIV  are  much  more  
complex,  as  HIV  requires  a  lifetime  of  constantly  evolving  treatment.  
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donations  thus  fail  to  change  or  challenge  the  existing  IP  regime  or  allow  LMICs  to  
become  self-­‐‑sustainable.    Without  promoting  generic  competition,  long-­‐‑term  drug  prices  
will  likely  remain  high.    By  decreasing  the  market  for  donated  ARVs,  drug  donations  
deter  generic  market  entry  because  they  increase  the  risk  associated  with  investing  the  
time  and  costs  to  produce  a  generic  ARV  [133].    Thus,  even  if  ARVs  are  available  for  free  
today,  if  drug  donations  stop,  prices  will  potentially  remain  high  if  the  donations  are  on  
a  large  enough  scale  that  they  deter  generic  market  entry.        
Additionally,  pharmaceutical  company  donations  of  ARVs  are  often  are  often  
limited  in  time,  scope,  and  geography.    For  example,  Boehringer-­‐‑Ingelheim  announced  a  
drug  donation  program  for  nevirapine  in  2000,  but  the  donation  was  only  for  the  
prevention  of  mother-­‐‑to-­‐‑child  transmission  of  HIV,  without  any  provision  for  follow-­‐‑up  
treatment,  and  was  only  available  for  fifty-­‐‑nine  low-­‐‑income  countries  [132].    
Like  non-­‐‑asserts,  drug  donations  are  an  unsustainable  method  of  increasing  
access  to  ARVs  in  the  long-­‐‑term  because  their  success  depends  on  the  ongoing  good  will  
of  pharmaceutical  companies.    While  the  threat  of  a  compulsory  license  has,  in  the  past,  
prompted  pharmaceutical  companies  to  donate  drugs  in  some  circumstances,  this  has  
only  really  been  seen  in  countries  like  South  Africa  and  Brazil  that  have  large  enough  
economics  to  give  them  negotiating  power.      
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4.5 Tiered/Differential Pricing 
Almost  all  pharmaceutical  companies  with  ARV  patents  engage  in  some  form  of  
tiered  or  differential  pricing,  whereby  they  sell  drugs  at  different  prices  in  developed  
and  developing  countries,  as  well  as  different  prices  in  low-­‐‑income  and  middle-­‐‑income  
countries.    Although  the  price  discounts  on  ARVs  are  lower  than  they  would  be  without  
tiered-­‐‑pricing  arrangements,  drug  prices  are  often  still  high  compared  to  the  prices  of  
generics  [62],  particularly  in  those  countries  excluded  from  a  pharmaceutical  company’s  
lowest  pricing  tier  [2].16  
    The  biggest  problem  with  differential  pricing  is  that  middle-­‐‑income  countries,  
with  the  exception  of  India  and  South  Africa,  are  almost  always  excluded  from  tiered-­‐‑
pricing  arrangements.    While  India  and  South  Africa  have  been  able  to  obtain  inclusion  
in  tiered  pricing  arrangements,  this  is  possibly  due  to  international  pressure,  in  the  case  
of  South  Africa,  and  a  high  level  of  bargaining  power  due  to  high  manufacturing  
capabilities,  in  the  case  of  India.    This  is  problematic  because,  in  addition  to  LMICs  being  
                                                                                                              
16  There  are  some  exceptions  to  this,  with  discounted  prices  by  patent  holders  being  cheaper  than  generic  
equivalents.    Once  case  is  darunavir,  which  is  offered  by  Johnson  &  Johnson  for  $810  per  patient  per  year  for  
the  lowest-­‐‑tiered  pricing  country  category  and  the  generic  company  Aspen  for  $861  per  patient  per  year.    
Similarly,  the  Johnson  &  Johnson  price  for  Etravirine  is  $438  per  patient  per  year  for  the  lowest  tiered  
pricing  country  category  and  the  generic  price  offered  by  Aspen  is  $467  per  patient  per  year,  and  the  lowest  
price  offered  by  Johnson  &  Johnson  for  LPV/r  ranges  from  $108  per  patient  per  year  to  $265  per  patient  per  
year  for  different  formulations,  whereas  the  generic  price  ranges  from  $150  per  patient  per  year  to  $389  per  
patient  per  year  from  a  number  of  manufacturers.    However,  Johnson  &  Johnson  have  voluntary  licenses  in  
place  for  these  drugs,  which  may  explain  the  price  difference.    The  only  real  outlier  is  Ritonavir,  which  is  
offered  by  AbbVie  for  $83  per  patient  per  year  and  by  Mylan  for  $178  per  patient  per  year  and  by  Cipla  for  
$316  per  patient  per  year.    It  is  unclear  what  explains  this  price  difference.  
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financially  differentiated  from  developed  countries,  many  middle-­‐‑income  countries  are  
high  differentiated  nationally.    Because  of  the  high  levels  of  income  inequality  that  are  
pervasive  in  almost  all  middle-­‐‑income  countries17,  close  to  70%  of  the  world’s  poor  [63],  
and  most  of  the  world’s  poorest  billion  [8],  reside  in  middle-­‐‑income  countries.    Despite  
these  levels  of  poverty,  middle-­‐‑income  countries  are  almost  always  excluded  from  
tiered-­‐‑pricing  arrangements  because  there  are  enough  people  in  these  countries  with  
incomes  high  enough  such  that  they  are  able  to  afford  higher-­‐‑priced  drugs  [64].    While  
some  pharmaceutical  companies,  like  Gilead,  have  included  a  number  of  middle-­‐‑income  
countries  in  their  tiered  pricing  arrangements,  Abbott,  Merck,  Johnson  &  Johnson,  and  
ViiV  Healthcare  all  excluded  all  middle-­‐‑income  countries  entirely  from  their  tiered  
pricing  categories,  even  if  drugs  are  being  purchased  from  donor  organizations  like  
PEPFAR  and  the  Global  Fund,  resulting  in  drug  prices  in  middle-­‐‑income  countries  being  
negotiated  on  a  per-­‐‑country  basis  [63].    
  These  negotiations  have  the  potential  to  lead  to  significant  price  discounts,  but  
smaller  middle-­‐‑income  countries  that  lack  significant  negotiating  power  often  pay  much  
higher  prices  than  larger  countries.    For  example,  in  2006,  the  price  of  the  ARV  LPV/r  in  
Honduras  was  six  times  higher  than  the  price  in  Brazil,  despite  the  fact  that  both  
countries  have  equivalent  HIV  prevalence  rates  and  Honduras’  per  capita  GNI  is  one-­‐‑
fourth  that  of  Brazil’s  [62].    For  the  second-­‐‑line  drug  ATV,  Bristol-­‐‑Myers  Squibb  
                                                                                                              
17  For  example,  South  Africa  and  Brazil  are  ranked  the  8th  and  10th  most  unequal  countries  in  the  world.    
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excludes  Southern  African  countries  from  its  lowest  pricing  tier.    Thus,  despite  the  fact  
that  Southern  Africa  has  the  highest  HIV  prevalence  rate  in  the  world,  the  price  of  ATV  
is  $547  per  patient  per  year,  25%  higher  than  the  $412  per  patient  per  year  price  for  the  
countries  in  the  lowest  tier  [62].    
Despite  the  shortcoming  of  these  per-­‐‑country  negotiations,  particularly  for  
smaller  countries,  these  negotiations  can  be  heavily  impacted  after  the  issuance  of  a  
compulsory  license.    Until  2007,  middle-­‐‑income  countries  had  to  negotiation  on  a  per-­‐‑
country  basis  with  Abbott  for  LPV/r.    Prices  remained  right⎯5,000  in  China;  $7,775  in  
Honduras  [62]  ⎯until  Thailand  issued  a  compulsory  license.    After  the  compulsory  
license,  Abbott  reduced  the  price  of  LPV/r  to  $1,000  for  fifty-­‐‑five  middle-­‐‑income  
countries  [62].    
Another  problem  with  tiered  pricing  is  that,  despite  the  short-­‐‑term  benefits  with  
respect  to  price,  it  does  not  result  in  the  long-­‐‑term  price  reductions  that  arise  through  
generic  competition.    This  is  particularly  true  for  third-­‐‑line  ARVs  that  are  patented  
almost  everywhere.    MSF  estimates  that,  with  respect  to  the  one  potential  third-­‐‑line  
regimen,  tiered  pricing  will  result  in  costs  of  $2,766  per  patient  per  year  for  the  lowest  
tier,  and  up  to  $6,000  per  patient  per  year  for  middle-­‐‑income  countries  [30].  
There  are  also  no  international  standards  with  respect  to  tiered  pricing⎯every  
pharmaceutical  company  seems  to  have  different  standards  for  the  countries  eligible  for  
the  discounted  drugs  [62].    Additionally,  like  the  other  alternatives,  differential  pricing  is  
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not  sustainable,  as  it  requires  the  on-­‐‑going  goodwill  of  pharmaceutical  companies  to  
offer  these  lower  prices.  
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5. The Medicines Patent Pool: A Novel Approach for 
Increasing Access to ARVs 
5.1 History and Overview of the MPP 
The  MPP  represents  a  novel  solution  to  overcoming  some  of  the  problems  
associated  with  access  to  ARVs  in  LMICs.    By  collectively  managing  IP  rights  associated  
with  ARVs,  the  MPP  offers  a  more  global,  systematic  approach  to  solving  the  access  
problem  than  what  is  currently  offered  by  drug-­‐‑by-­‐‑drug,  country-­‐‑by-­‐‑country  
approaches.      
The  idea  for  a  patent  pool  for  ARVs  was  first  proposed  by  Jamie  Love  in  2002  at  
the  International  AIDS  Conference.    Love’s  idea  was  for  a  patent  pool  for  ARVs  based  on  
compulsory  licensing,  modeled  after  the  US  pool  for  essential  airline  patents  in  19171  
[65].    Knowledge  Ecology  International  and  MSF  to  UNITAID  again  proposed  the  idea  
in  2006.    The  initial  proposal  suggested  a  focus  on  the  patents  required  for  the  
development  and  production  of  a  generic  version  FDC  TDF/3TC/EFV  or  NPV,  for  both  
adult  and  pediatric  use,  as  well  as  the  development  of  a  generic  version  of  the  heat-­‐‑
stabilized  drug  LPV/r.    While  some  people  engaged  in  access  initiatives  felt  that  the  
                                                                                                              
1  Until  1917,  it  was  impossible  to  manufacture  aircrafts  without  the  consent  of  the  patent  holders⎯the  
Wright  brothers  and  Glenn  Curtiss.    When  World  War  I  broke  out,  patents  related  to  aircrafts  became  
important  for  national  security.    A  commission  was  created  to  study  the  problem,  with  the  ultimate  result  
that  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  were  able  to  “secure,  by  purchase,  condemnation,  
donation  or  otherwise,  such  basic  patent  or  patents  as  they  may  consider  necessary  to  the  manufacture  and  
development  of  aircraft  in  the  United  States  for  governmental  or  civil  purposes.”    This  prompted  the  
creation  of  the  Manufacturers  Aircraft  Association,  which  formally  formed  a  patent  pool  for  aircraft  patents  
on  July  24,  1917.  
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contributions  to  the  MPP  should  be  compulsory  [65],  UNITAID  rejected  this  for  a  variety  
of  legal,  practical,  and  political  reasons  [42].    The  final  UNITAID  proposal  outlined  a  
patent  pools  based  on  voluntary  contributions  from  patent  holders,  with  the  option  for  
using  compulsory  licenses  to  obtain  IP  rights  should  a  voluntary  scheme  fail  [42].    In  
2008,  after  conducting  a  legal  review  of  the  proposed  MPP,  UNITAID  approved  the  
creation  of  the  MPP  and  established  a  task  force  to  design  the  structure  of  the  pool.    In  
July  2010,  the  MPP  became  operational.    
The  MPP  represents  a  one-­‐‑stop  shop  for  both  patent  holders  willing  to  contribute  
their  IP  into  the  pool  and  generic  companies  seeking  to  develop  generic  formulations  of  
patented  ARVs  [66].    Patent  holders⎯pharmaceutical  companies,  researchers,  
governments,  and  universities⎯voluntarily  offer  sought-­‐‑after  IP  related  to  ARVs  to  the  
pool,  and  any  company  seeking  to  use  the  IP  in  the  pool  to  produce  generics  can  obtain  a  
license  from  the  pool,  after  which  they  can  being  the  process  of  developing  generics  for  
LMICs.    By  streamlining  the  licensing  process,  the  MPP  has  the  potential  to  drive  more  
rapid  formulation  of  FDCs  and  foster  the  development  of  pediatric  drug  formulations  
[66].  
The  mission  of  the  MPP  is  to  both  increase  generic  competition  for  ARVs,  lowing  
prices  through  market-­‐‑forces,  and  to  bring  to  developing-­‐‑country  markets  generic  
versions  of  existing  FDCs  and  new  formulations  that  are  better  adapted  to  developing  
countries  [42].    With  these  aims  in  mind,  three  types  of  products  are  currently  being  
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licensed  in  the  MPP:  (i)  products  that  already  have  regulatory  approval  and  have  
generic  versions  available  on  the  market;  (ii)  products  that  already  exist  as  originator  
products  but  do  not  yet  have  a  generic  equivalent  on  the  market,  so  prices  remain  high;  
and  (iii)  entirely  new  products  that  are  not  yet  on  the  market.  
Legally  speaking,  because  the  MPP  relies  on  voluntary  licenses,  TRIPS  is  not  
relevant  to  the  activities  of  the  pool.    However,  if,  in  the  future,  the  MPP  were  to  rely  on  
a  compulsory  license  to  obtain  access  to  IP,  TRIPS  rules  related  to  compulsory  licensing  
for  both  importing  and  exporting  countries  would  come  into  play.    A  problem  with  
relying  on  a  compulsory  license  is  that  national  patents  laws  in  some  countries  may  have  
restrictions  with  respect  to  compulsory  licensing.2    Thus,  in  addition  to  TRIPS  
considerations,  national  patent  laws  would  need  to  be  taken  into  account.  
5.2 Theoretical Benefits of MPP 
The  MPP  has  the  potential  to  offer  a  number  of  benefits  that  go  beyond  the  status  
quo  of  current  access  initiatives.    If  successful,  the  MPP  has  the  ability  to  be  instrumental  
in  bringing  down  the  price  of  ARVs  and  developing  much  needed  FDCs  and  pediatric  
formulations  [4].    By  providing  generic  manufacturers  with  easier,  faster  access  to  
relevant  patents,  patients  needing  treatment  will  in  turn  have  faster  access  to  better,  
more  affordable  treatments.  
                                                                                                              
2  For  example,  some  countries  have,  in  their  national  patent  laws,  restrictions  on  sub-­‐‑licensing  of  
compulsory  licenses.  
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By  facilitating  access  to  multiple  patents  by  multiple  manufacturers,  the  MPP  
offers  the  prospect  of  robust  generic  competition  for  drugs  in  the  pool,  thereby  reducing  
the  cost  of  ARVs.    UNITAID  alone  spends  $80  million  a  year  on  the  procurement  of  
ARVs  [67].    If  the  MPP  is  able  to  successfully  bring  down  the  costs  of  ARVs,  donor  
organizations  would  be  able  to  scale-­‐‑up  treatment  and/or  use  the  money  saved  on  other  
initiatives.      Scaling-­‐‑up  treatment  is  not  just  about  getting  the  cheapest  available  drugs  to  
patients  and  increasing  the  number  of  people  on  ARVs;  it  also  requires  getting  the  most  
effective  treatment  to  patients.    While  there  are  cheap  versions  of  some  first-­‐‑line  ARVs  
available,  a  number  of  these  treatments  are  toxic  and/or  pose  resistance  problems.    As  
more  patients  need  newer,  patented  ARV  for  effective  treatment,  financially  constrained  
donor  organizations  will  not  be  able  to  provide  these  treatments  on  a  large  scale  unless  
the  drugs  are  affordable.    The  MPP  has  the  ability  to  make  these  newer  drugs  affordable  
by  allowing  the  introduction  of  generic  competition  into  the  market  well  before  the  
expiration  of  the  patent  term.  
  While  there  are  a  number  of  barriers  to  the  development  of  new  FDCs,3  patents  
are  arguably  the  biggest.    As  a  result  of  these  patent  barriers,  a  number  of  WHO-­‐‑
recommended  valid  combinations  are  unavailable  in  LMICs.    By  offering  sub-­‐‑licensees  
technology  transfer  packages  from  multiple  patent  holders,  the  MPP  can  foster  easier,  
                                                                                                              
3  In  addition  to  patent  barriers,  producing  high-­‐‑quality  and  effective  FDCs  poses  a  number  of  technical  
challenges.  
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less  costly,  and  more  rapid  development  of  new  FDCs  and  formulations  [68].    By  
allowing  more  than  one  party  to  work  with  patents  relevant  for  a  new  FDC  or  pediatric  
formulation,  the  MPP  has  the  potential  to  foster  innovation  in  this  area,  particularly  
because  pharmaceutical  companies  do  not  have  incentives  to  develop  formulations  for  
resource-­‐‑poor  settings.    The  MPP  can  also  simplify  the  licensing  process,  thereby  
reducing  transaction  costs  for  combinations  [42].    Without  the  MPP,  a  generic  company  
would  potentially  need  to  obtain  licenses  from  at  least  three  different  patent  holders  in  
order  to  develop,  manufacture,  and  sell  a  FDC.    The  MPP  lowers  the  coordination  and  
time  costs  associated  with  trying  to  coordinate  the  right  to  manufacture  and  sell  FDCs  
from  each  individual  patent  holder  [42].    
The  voluntary  nature  of  the  MPP  makes  its  success  dependent  on  the  willing  
participation  of  patent  holders,  and  thus  adequate  incentives  must  exist  in  order  to  
compel  participation  in  the  MPP.    In  addition  to  lowering  transaction  costs  for  generic  
manufacturers,  the  MPP  would  also  lower  transaction  costs  for  pharmaceutical  
companies.    Rather  than  negotiating  with  a  number  of  different  generic  manufacturers  
on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  basis,  patent  holders  will  only  have  to  negotiate  one  license,  with  the  
MPP.    Another  incentive  for  patent-­‐‑holders  to  join  the  MPP  is  the  ability  to,  as  donors,  
use  any  future  patents  in  the  pool  that  may  be  granted  with  respect  to  new  formulations.    
Joining  the  MPP  may  also  offer  patent  holders  an  alternative  to  compulsory  licensing  
[69].    If  relevant  patents  are  in  the  pool  and  readily  available  in  LMICs,  there  would  be  
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little  need  for  a  country  to  issue  a  compulsory  license  to  procure  a  reliable,  affordably  
supply  of  the  drug.    
The  MPP  also  offers  reputational  benefits  to  patent  holders.    It  is  clear  now  that  
pharmaceutical  companies  recognize  the  need  to  improve  access  to  ARVs  in  LMICs,  as  
almost  every  multinational  pharmaceutical  company  is  engaged  in  one  or  more  access  
initiative.    Joining  the  MPP  can  become  a  part  of  those  access  initiatives,  and  offer  
reputational  benefits  by  showing  that  companies  are  really  committed  to  improving  
global  health.    
5.3 MPP Engagement 
To  date,  the  MPP  has  struck  seven  license  deals  with  five  patent  holders⎯the  US  
National  Institutes  of  Health  (NIH),  Gilead  Sciences,  ViiV  Healthcare,  Roche,  and  
Bristol-­‐‑Myers  Squibb  (BMS).    While  all  of  these  licenses  have  their  benefits  and  
shortcomings,  they  are  the  only  license  agreements,  voluntary  or  otherwise,  that  are  
publicly  available  in  their  entirety,  and  the  MPP’s  dedication  to  transparency  with  
respect  to  licensing  must  be  commended.      
The  MPP  is  currently  in  negotiations  with  AbbVie,  which  holds  patents  on  two  of  
the  MPP’s  “Level  1”  priority  compounds4  (Lopinavir  and  Ritonavir)  and  Boehringer-­‐‑
Ingelheim,  which  holds  a  patent  on  the  “Level  2”  priority  compound  Nevirapine.    Thus  
                                                                                                              
4  The  MPP  bases  priority  levels  on  a  medicine’s  clinical  importance  and  the  existence  of  market  and/or  
patent  barriers  that  prevent  access.  
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far,  Merck  and  Tibotec/Johnson  &  Johnson,  both  of  which  hold  patents  on  a  number  of  
“Level  2”  priority  compounds,  have  refused  in  engage  with  the  MPP.      
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6. Overview of Current MPP Licenses 
6.1 NIH License 
In  September  2010,  the  US  National  Institutes  of  Health  became  the  first  to  
contribute  to  the  MPP.    The  MPP-­‐‑NIH  license  was  a  royalty-­‐‑free,  non-­‐‑exclusive  license  
for  LMICs  for  patents  related  to  darunavir,  a  protease  inhibitors  used  to  treat  HIV,  
particularly  drug-­‐‑resistant  HIV.    While  the  license  permits  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  make  and  
use  darunavir  for  research  purposes,  it  is  rather  limited.    Because  of  others  patents,  at  
the  time  held  by  Tibotec,1  related  to  the  manufacture  of  darunavir,  sub-­‐‑licensees  were  
not  permitted  to  manufacture  or  sell  the  drug.    Thus,  the  real  benefit  of  the  license  was  
not  in  its  terms  but  rather  what  it  represented  politically⎯a  display  of  support  for  the  
MPP  from  the  US  government  and  the  NIH,  an  organization  with  a  significant  patent  
portfolio  and  the  world’s  largest  funder  of  biomedical  research.      
6.2 Gilead Sciences License 
The  MPP  reached  an  agreement  with  Gilead  in  July  2011.    While  the  license  has  
many  shortcomings,  it  marked  an  important  step  in  the  MPP’s  history,  as  it  was  the  first  
agreement  between  the  MPP  and  a  private  pharmaceutical  company.    In  addition  to  
containing  a  covenant  not  to  enforce  patents  related  to  the  ARV  emtricitabine  (FTC),  the  
                                                                                                              
1  Tibotec  is  a  subsidiary  of  Johnson  &  Johnson  
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license  covered  the  ARV  tenofovir  (TDF),  two  ARVs  in  Gilead’s  pipeline2⎯elvitegravir  
(EVG)  and  cobicistat  (COBI)⎯and  a  single-­‐‑pill  combination  of  the  four  called  the  
“Quad”  [70].    The  license  grants  to  sub-­‐‑licensees  a  non-­‐‑exclusive  right  to  manufacture  
the  drugs  in  India  and  sell  them  in  India  and  in  certain  LMICs  in  exchange  for  a  3-­‐‑5%  
royalty  payment3  [71].    Under  the  terms  of  the  license,  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  choose  to  license  
or  not  license  any  of  the  drugs  covered  by  the  license.4  
In  November  2011,  the  original  license  agreement  was  amended  in  response  to  
concerns  raised  by  civil  societies  and  others  about  certain  provisions  [71].    The  first  
amendment  related  to  ambiguity  regarding  the  non-­‐‑assert  provision  with  respect  to  
FTC.    The  amendment  clarified  that,  in  the  event  a  sub-­‐‑licensee  terminates  the  TDF  
portion  of  the  license,  they  can  continue  manufacturing  TDF/FTC  combinations  without  
fear  that  Gilead  will  revoke  the  non-­‐‑assert  with  respect  to  any  product  containing  FTC  
[71].    The  second  amendment  related  to  a  provision  of  the  license  that  permits  sub-­‐‑
licensees  to  supply  drugs  to  territories  outside  the  geographic  scope  of  the  license,  which  
is  permissible  in  the  event  an  uncovered  country  issues  a  compulsory  license.    The  
original  license  required  that  Gilead  and  the  sub-­‐‑licensee  be  in  agreement  regarding  the  
                                                                                                              
2  “Pipeline  Products”  are  products  that  are  still  in  development  and  have  not  yet  received  regulatory  
approval  from  the  appropriate  country  authorities.    
  
3  The  agreement  also  contained  a  clause  in  which  Gilead  agreed  to  pay  the  MPP  5%  of  all  sub-­‐‑licensee  
revenue,  capped  at  $1  million  per  year,  for  identifying  sub-­‐‑licensees  and  administering  the  licenses.    
However,  it  is  unclear  whether  this  impacted  the  royalty  provision  terms  in  the  license.  
  
4  This  is  referred  to  as  the  “unbundling  provision”  in  the  license.  
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terms  of  any  compulsory  license;  the  amendment  removed  this  provision  and  clarified  
the  right  of  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  supply  drugs  outside  the  covered  license  territories  in  the  
event  a  compulsory  license  is  issued  [71].    
Since  signing  the  agreement,  a  number  of  Indian  generic  manufacturers  have  
engaged  with  the  MPP,5  with  a  notable  exception  of  the  Indian  generic  manufacturer  
Cipla.    The  license  with  the  MPP  was  really  an  extension  of  a  previous  license  that  
Gilead  had  for  the  production  of  TDF  with  a  number  of  Indian  generic  companies,  
though  the  MPP  was  able  to  get  much  better  terms  than  were  in  the  previous  TDF  
voluntary  licenses.  
At  the  same  time  Gilead  signed  its  license  with  the  MPP,  it  also  signed  additional  
“semi-­‐‑exclusive”  voluntary  licenses  for  the  pipeline  products⎯COBI  and  EVG⎯with  
certain  Indian  generic  manufacturers.    These  licenses  contain  higher  royalty  rates  and  
cover  sales  to  nine  middle-­‐‑income  countries  that  were  outside  the  geographic  scope  of  
the  MPP  license  [12].    
Gilead’s  agreement  with  the  MPP  was  monumental  in  that  it  paved  the  way  for  
future  private-­‐‑sector  engagement  with  the  MPP,  but  it  unfortunately  received  a  lot  of  
criticism  from  civil  societies  and  access  to  medicines  advocates,  some  going  so  far  as  to  
say  that  “the  outcome  [of  the  agreement]  was  a  setback  for  the  global  movement  on  
                                                                                                              
5  The  following  are  sub-­‐‑licensees:  Shilpa  Medicare,  Shasun  Pharma  Solutions,  Aurobindo  Pharma  Limited,  
Emcure  Pharmaceuticals,  Hetero  Labs,  and  Laurus  Labs.  
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access  to  life-­‐‑saving  medicines”  [72].    Some  provisions  received  only  minor  criticism,6  
but  some  have  been  vehemently  criticized.    While  these  criticisms  may  or  may  not  be  
unfounded,  it  almost  killed  the  MPP.    There  were  some  companies  that  were  
considering  engaging  with  the  MPP,  even  some  that  thought  they  would  have  to  
eventually  engage  with  the  MPP,  but  when  the  criticisms  surrounding  the  Gilead  license  
came  out,  companies  became  more  reluctant  to  join  the  MPP  [134].    These  criticisms  
resulted  in  a  two-­‐‑year  time  period  post-­‐‑Gilead  in  which  pharmaceutical  companies  
refused  to  engage  with  the  MPP.    
The  geographic  scope  of  the  license  was  heavily  criticized  because  a  number  of  
important  middle-­‐‑income  countries  with  high  HIV  burdens  were  excluded.7    While  the  
license  explicitly  states  that  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  supply  drugs  outside  the  covered  
territories,  it  is  only  permitted  if  the  drugs  are  off  patent,  if  the  country  has  issued  a  
compulsory  license,  or  if  India  has  issued  a  compulsory  license  for  export.    This  is  
problematic  because,  for  countries  that  have  patents  on  any  of  the  drugs  covered  by  the  
license,  which  is  very  likely  for  the  pipeline  products,  their  only  option  for  accessing  
                                                                                                              
6  For  example:  a  provision  that  prohibits  parallel  importation  and  grants  to  Gilead  the  right  to  terminate  the  
license  if  it  determines  this  has  occurred;  the  fact  that  the  MPP  has  no  right  of  action  to  enforce  the  
agreement;  the  requirement  that  royalties  be  paid  for  sales  even  in  countries  where  there  are  the  drugs  are  
off-­‐‑patent;  and  the  limitation  that  allows  only  Indian  generic  companies  to  become  sub-­‐‑licensees.  
  
7  TDF  and  FTC  territories  include  122  countries;  COBI  territory  includes  102  countries;  EVG  and  the  Quad  
territories  include  99  countries.    Notably  excluded  countries  (with  high  HIV  burdens)  include:  Argentina,  
Brazil,  China,  Egypt,  Peru,  Thailand,  and  Ukraine.  
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cheap  generics  is  to  garner  the  political  will  necessary  for  issuing  a  compulsory  license,  
either  for  local  production  or  importation  from  India.      
The  API  restrictions  have  also  received  a  lot  of  criticism.    Under  the  terms  of  the  
license,  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  only  purchase  APIs  from  other  sub-­‐‑licensees  or  from  Gilead.    
The  result  of  this  restriction  is  that  Gilead  is  essentially  ensuring  that  sub-­‐‑licensees  buy  
APIs  from  them  (or  one  of  their  licensees),  even  if  they  are  available  elsewhere  at  a  lower  
price,  with  the  potential  result  that  the  price  of  APIs,  and  thus  the  final  drug  price,  is  
unnecessary  inflated.    The  license  also  restricts  the  sale  of  APIs  by  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  only  
other  licensees  or  to  Gilead.    This  means  that  unlicensed  manufacturers  in  India  and  
other  developing  countries  cannot  buy  APIs  from  any  sub-­‐‑licensees8.    As  a  result,  the  
ability  of  generic  companies  outside  of  India  to  obtain  APIs  for  production  of  drugs  
covered  by  the  license,  even  if  they  are  not  patented,  is  greatly  hindered  because  many  
Indian  generic  companies  that  dominate  the  API  market  for  ARVs  have  signed  licenses  
with  Gilead.    This  could  potentially  inflate  the  price  of  APIs,  and  thus  generic  versions  of  
the  covered  drugs,  worldwide.    Despite  the  API  restrictions’  potential  to  manipulate  the  
market  for  the  covered  medicines,  the  Competition  Commission  of  India  refused  to  find  
the  restrictions  unlawfully  anticompetitive  [73].  
                                                                                                              
8  In  fact,  part  of  the  reason  that  Cipla  refused  to  join  the  MPP-­‐‑Gilead  license  was  because  of  a  pre-­‐‑existing  
agreement  with  Quality  Chemicals  in  Uganda.    
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While  the  API  restrictions  are  problematic,  the  criticism  was  blown  out  of  
proportion.    This  restriction  is  something  that  the  MPP  really  did  not  want,  but  Gilead  
was  adamant  about  [74].    While  this  does  restrict  sub-­‐‑licensees  ability  to  sell  APIs  
outside  of  India,  the  market  today  is  by  and  large  made  up  primarily  of  Indian  
manufacturers,  so  it  is  not  as  problematic  as  criticisms  suggested.    Also,  because  many  
sub-­‐‑licensees  have  terminated  TDF,9  they  can  sell  APIs  related  to  TDF  to  anyone,  and  
thus  the  API  restrictions  only  really  apply  to  the  pipeline  products.  
Despite  these  criticisms,  the  MPP-­‐‑Gilead  license  has  a  number  of  really  attractive  
features.    Under  the  agreement,  Gilead  has  waived  data  exclusivity  rights  and  royalties  
on  new  pediatric  formulations  (which  can  also  be  sold  in  any  country,  even  those  
outside  the  geographic  scope  of  the  license)  [70].    Gilead  also  allows  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  
supply  drugs  outside  the  geographic  scope  of  the  license  if  the  drug  is  either  off  patent  
in  the  importing  country  or  the  government  has  issued  a  compulsory  license.    The  
agreement  grants  to  sub-­‐‑licensees  the  right  to  terminate  the  license  unilaterally  at  any  
time  and  for  any  reason,  so  that  if  a  sub-­‐‑licensee  believes  that  any  of  the  patents  have  
expired  or  later  decides  they  would  prefer  to  operate  outside  the  license,  they  are  
permitted  to  do  so  [70].    Sub-­‐‑licensees  also  retain  the  right  to  challenge  any  patent  
covered  in  the  license.      
                                                                                                              
9  Of  the  Gilead  sub-­‐‑licensees,  Aurobindo  Pharma  Limited,  Hetero  Labs,  and  Emcure  Pharmaceuticals  
Limited  have  terminated  the  TDF  portion  of  the  license.  Shipla  Medicare,  Shasun  Pharma  Solutions,  and  
Laurus  Labs  have  retained  the  TDF  portion  of  the  license.  
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The  license  also  contains  an  “unbundling”  clause10  that  permits  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  
choose  which  drugs  it  wishes  to  license,  so  that,  for  example,  a  licensee  can  choose  to  
license  EVG  and  COBI  but  not  TDF  [70].    The  license  also  has  broad  field  of  use  
provisions,11  which  will  allow  the  pipeline  drugs  to  be  marketed  and  sold  for  newly  
discovered  therapeutic  uses  and  TDF  to  be  sold  for  the  treatment  of  both  HIV  and  
Hepatitis  B.    Perhaps  most  significant  is  the  license’s  inclusion  of  pipeline  products  
(EVG,  COBI,  and  the  Quad),  so  that  as  soon  as  these  are  approved  by  the  FDA,  generic  
versions  of  these  new  drugs  can  immediately  enter  developing-­‐‑country  markets.12  
6.3 ViiV Healthcare License for Pediatric ABC 
The  MPP  signed  its  third  license  agreement  with  ViiV  Healthcare  on  February  13,  
2013  and  in  June  2013,  Aurobindo  Pharmaceuticals  of  India  became  the  first  sub-­‐‑
licensee.    This  license  has  received  much  less  criticism  than  the  Gilead  license,  partially  
because  the  terms  are  better,  and  partially  because  civil  society  groups  perhaps  realized  
that  their  vehement  criticisms  turned  pharmaceutical  companies  off  of  the  MPP  for  a  
while  after  Gilead  [134].    The  license  covers  patents  related  to  abacavir  (ABC),  a  WHO-­‐‑
                                                                                                              
10  This  feature  of  the  license  was  really  important,  as  TDF  is  off  patent  in  almost  every  country  in  the  license  
territory,  including  India.  
  
11  Products  containing  TDF  can  be  used  for  the  treatment  of  both  HIV  and  Hepatitis  B;  Products  containing  
COBI  or  EVG  can  be  used  for  “any  use  that  is  consistent  with  the  label  approved  by  the  FDA  or  applicable  
foreign  regulatory  authority.”  
    
12  Inclusion  of  pipeline  products  is  really  significant  because  there  has  been  a  huge  access  problem  in  
developing  countries  with  respect  to  newer  drugs  since  2005  when  India  started  patenting  pharmaceuticals.    
Most  new  second-­‐‑  and  third-­‐‑line  ARVs  (which  are  increasingly  needed)  are  patented  in  India.  
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recommended  pediatric  ARV  for  first-­‐‑  and  second-­‐‑line  treatment,  and  grants  to  sub-­‐‑
licensee  a  non-­‐‑exclusive,  royalty-­‐‑free,  license  to  manufacture  and  sell  both  APIs  and  the  
finished  products  in  118  countries,  in  which  represent  98.7%  of  children  living  with  
HIV/AIDS  reside  [75].  
While  the  patent  on  ABC  has  expired  in  most  countries,  ViiV  still  has  patent  
claims  over  compounds  related  to  ABC,  including  a  hemisulfate  salt  (which  is  patented  
in  65  LMICs),  the  pediatric  formulation  (which  is  patented  in  a  number  of  countries,  
including  India),  and  a  combination  drug  with  lamivudine  (3TC)  (which  is  significant  
because  ABC  is  often  used  in  combination  with  3TC;  while  generic  formulations  of  3TC  
are  widely  available,  ViiV  still  has  patent  claims  over  3TC  in  a  number  of  countries)  [76].  
This  license  has  received  much  less  criticism  than  the  Gilead  license  and  is  a  step  in  the  
right  direction  for  the  MPP.  
Some  terms  of  the  ViiV  license  mirror  the  Gilead  license.    Like  Gilead,  ViiV  
waived  data  exclusivity  rights  under  the  agreement.    The  license  contains  no  restrictions  
on  challenging  patents,  and  no  restrictions  on  supplying  to  countries  outside  of  the  
geographic  scope  of  the  license,  provided  ABC  is  either  off-­‐‑patent  or  the  country  has  
issued  a  compulsory  license  [77].  
Despite  these  similarities,  the  ViiV  license  is  a  significant  improvement  over  the  
Gilead  license.    Under  the  terms  of  the  ViiV  license,  any  manufacturer  anywhere  in  the  
world  is  eligible  to  become  a  sub-­‐‑licensee,  unlike  the  Gilead  agreement,  which  was  
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limited  to  Indian  generic  firms.    The  license  also  lacks  the  API  restrictions  of  the  Gilead  
license,  granting  to  sub-­‐‑licensees  the  freedom  to  manufacture  and  sell  both  APIs  and  
finished  products  anywhere  in  the  world.    Additionally,  whereas  the  Gilead  license  
required  payment  of  royalties  (even  for  TDF,  which  is  off-­‐‑patent  in  most  countries),  the  
ViiV  license  is  completely  royalty-­‐‑free  [77].    The  ViiV  license  also  grants  to  the  MPP  the  
ability  enforce  the  agreement,  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  both  ViiV  and  sub-­‐‑licenses.    Finally,  the  covered  
license  territory  is  more  expansive  than  the  Gilead  license  territory;13  however,  a  number  
of  countries  with  not  insignificant  pediatric  HIV  burdens  are  still  excluded.14    
One  particularly  attractive  feature  of  the  license  is  a  grant-­‐‑back  provision  under  
which  any  improvements  developed  by  sub-­‐‑licensees  flow  back  to  both  ViiV  and  the  
MPP  [77],  unlike  the  Gilead  agreement,  in  which  improvements  flowed  back  only  to  
Gilead.    This  means  that,  if  and  when  improvements  are  developed,  the  MPP  can  sub-­‐‑
license  the  improvements  to  third  parties,  potentially  making  them  widely  available  
shortly  after  development.  
While  this  license  is  a  vast  improvement  from  the  Gilead  license,  there  are  still  
some  features  of  the  license  that  are  not  ideal.    Unlike  the  Gilead  license,  which  has  
broad  field  of  use  coverage,  the  ViiV  agreement  allows  for  use  of  ABC  only  in  
                                                                                                              
13  The  following  countries  that  were  excluded  from  the  Gilead-­‐‑MPP  license  are  included  in  the  ViiV-­‐‑MPP  
license:  Algeria,  Argentina,  Azerbaijan,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Korea  DPR,  Egypt,  Federated  States  of  
Micronesia,  Iraq,  Iran,  Kosovo,  Lebanon,  Libya,  Marshall  Islands,  Malaysia,  Morocco,  Panama,  Paraguay,  
Philippines,  Tunisia,  West  Bank,  and  Gaza.  
  
14  Most  notably,  China,  Brazil,  Russia,  and  Ukraine.    
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connection  with  the  treatment  of  pediatric  HIV/ADIS.    While  ABC  currently  has  no  other  
recommended  uses  other  than  treatment  of  pediatric  HIV,  any  uses  that  may  be  later  
discovered15  [2]  are  not  covered  in  the  license.    Additionally,  while  the  covered  
geographic  territory  is  broader  than  the  Gilead  license,  a  number  of  important  middle-­‐‑
income  countries,  in  which  1.3%  of  children  living  with  HIV/AIDS  reside,  are  still  
excluded.        
In  addition  to  the  license  agreement,  ViiV  and  the  MPP  signed  a  memorandum  
of  understanding  (MOU)16,  in  which  they  agreed  to  enter  further  license  negotiations  for  
pediatric  HIV  drugs  that  are  in  the  ViiV  pipeline,  if  and  when  ViiV  receives  regulatory  
approval  [78].    ViiV  lived  up  to  this  promise,  entering  into  two  new  agreements  with  the  
MPP  on  April  1,  2014.    Even  more  significant  in  the  MOU  is  a  stated  commitment  by  
both  the  MPP  and  ViiV  to  jointly  seek  out  partnerships  with  third  parties  for  the  
development  of  new  FDCs  needed  to  pediatric  HIV  [78].    This  has  the  potential  to  be  
quite  significant,  as  other  pharmaceutical  companies  holding  key  patents  necessary  for  
the  development  of  FDCs  might  be  more  amenable  to  collaborating  with  the  MPP  if  
another  key  player  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry  is  involved  in  the  negotiations.      
                                                                                                              
15  ABC  can  also  be  used  as  an  alternative  treatment  in  adults,  but  adds  complexity  and  cost  to  treatment  
without  significant  clinical  advantage.    Thus,  it  is  currently  only  recommended  for  pediatric  use.  
  
16  The  MOU  is  not  legally  binding,  but  it  is  still  significant  because  it  publicly  sets  out  ViiV’s  commitment  to  
further  collaboration  with  the  MPP.    
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6.4 Roche Agreement 
The  fourth  agreement  the  MPP  entered  into  was  with  Roche.    This  agreement,  
signed  on  August  5,  2013,  is  not  a  license  agreement,  but  rather  a  price  discount  
agreement  for  the  drug  valganciclovir,  an  oral  medication  for  the  treatment  of  
cytomegalovirus  (CMV),  a  viral  infection  affecting  an  estimated  10.1%  of  people  living  
with  HIV  in  LMICs  [80]  that  can  lead  to  irreversible  blindness  in  people  living  with  HIV  
[81].    This  is  significant  because  the  only  other  treatment  option  for  CMV,  ganciclovir,  
requires  a  series  of  injections  directly  into  the  eyes  that  is  painful,  expensive,  and  
difficult  to  administer  on  a  large  scale,  and  thus  rarely  sought  by  patients  suffering  from  
CMV  [82].    The  agreement  was  necessitated  by  a  “vicious  cycle”  that  currently  exists  
with  CMV⎯because  “current  treatment  options  are  either  unaffordable  or  inconvenient,  
HIV  clinics  rarely  screen  for  the  disease.    Because  clinics  rarely  screen  for  CMV,  there  is  
little  demand  for  treatment  and  therefore  little  demand  for  easy  to  administer,  
affordable  solutions”17  [81].    As  a  result  of  this  cycle,  market  conditions  are  such  that  
there  is  not  currently  sufficient  demand  in  developing  countries  for  CMV  drugs  to  
facilitate  generic  competition  through  licensing.    In  this  respect,  CMV  is  really  a  ND  that  
suffers  from  the  same  market  failure  as  other  NDs.    
It  is  hoped  that  this  price  discount  agreement  with  Roche,  which  will  make  
valganciclovir  90%  cheaper  than  the  current  price,  will  “scale-­‐‑up  the  screening,  
                                                                                                              
17  Quote  from  Dr.  David  Heiden,  a  CMV  expert  working  with  Seva  and  Pacific  Vision  Foundations.  
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diagnosis,  and  treatment  of  HIV-­‐‑related  CMV”  [83].    By  reducing  drug  prices  enough  to  
make  them  readily  available  and  affordable,  a  new  market  for  valganciclovir  can  
emerge,  paving  the  way  for  the  introduction  of  generic  competition  and  making  CMV  
screening  a  routine  part  of  HIV  care  in  developing  countries.  
Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  Roche  will  provide  valganciclovir  to  non-­‐‑
profit  HIV  treatments  organization⎯specifically,  organizations  financed  by  national  
governments,  the  Global  Fund,  PEPFAR,  UNITAID,  and  MSF⎯and  “any  other  similar  
organizations  identified  by  the  MPP  and  accepted  by  Roche”  [83]  at  the  price  of  250  
CHF/pack  (approximately  $275USD,  with  each  pack  containing  sixty  tablets)  [83].    This  
price  discount  is  quite  significant⎯the  lowest  price  Roche  currently  offers  (solely  to  
MSF)  for  valganciclovir  is  CHF  500/pack;  retail  prices  in  most  developing  countries  are  
up  to  ten  times  the  CHF  250/pack  price  [82].    The  agreement  will  remain  in  place  for  five  
years,  with  an  option  for  renewal.    Roche  may  terminate  the  agreement  sooner,  but  only  
if  there  is  a  quality-­‐‑assured  generic  version  of  valganciclovir  available  at  a  similar  or  
lower  price  [83].    
    Under  the  agreement,  138  LMICs  are  eligible  for  the  price  discount.    This  is  a  
geographic  expansion  from  both  the  Gilead  and  ViiV  agreements,  but  again  some  key  
middle-­‐‑income  countries  are  still  excluded.18    However,  unlike  the  Gilead  and  ViiV  
                                                                                                              
18  Excluded  middle-­‐‑income  countries  include:  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  China,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Romania,  Russia,  
and  Turkey.  
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agreements,  this  agreement  allows  for  a  possible  expansion  of  the  covered  territory  if  the  
MPP  can  demonstrate  “unmet  treatment  needs”  in  any  excluded  country  [83].    While  
this  provision  of  the  agreement  is  promising,  a  demonstration  by  the  MPP  of  an  unmet  
treatment  need  in  any  excluded  country  merely  obliges  Roche  to  enter  into  good  faith  
discussions  with  the  MPP  regarding  any  expansion  [83].    
In  addition  to  the  price  discount,  the  agreement  stipulates  that,  in  one  year,  
Roche  will  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  MPP  for  the  licensing  and  technology  
transfer  necessary  for  the  development  of  a  generic  version  of  valganciclovir  [83].    The  
agreement  also  stipulates  an  option  for  negotiations  regarding  a  license  for  the  ARV  
saquinavir  (SQV),  provided  that  a  significant  medical  need  for  the  drug  is  identified  by  
the  MPP  [83].  
Ultimately,  the  Roche  agreement  offers  promise  for  future  collaborations  
between  the  MPP  and  Roche  for  the  licensing  of  SQV,  but  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  
Roche  will  take  their  good  faith  negotiation  obligations  seriously.    By  creating  a  market  
for  valganciclovir,  the  agreement  may  help  lay  the  groundwork  for  generic  market  
entry,  particularly  since  the  agreement  stipulates  future  licensing  and  technology  
transfer  commitments  from  Roche.    However,  this  process  will  take  time.    Thus  far,  there  
have  been  few  purchases  of  valganciclovir  from  qualified  organizations,  with  many  
more  signing  an  acknowledgement  letter  for  potential  future  purchased  [74].    The  
impact  of  the  agreement  has  not  been  that  significant  yet  because  in  order  for  
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organizations  to  purchase  valganciclovir,  demand  for  it  has  to  increase,  and  that  can  
only  occur  through  increased  screening  for  CMV.    By  making  valganciclovir  available  at  
discounted  prices,  the  MPP  is  paving  the  way  for  an  eventual  scale-­‐‑up  of  screening  and  
treatment  of  CMV.    Thus,  the  price  discount  has  the  potential  to  be  significant  and  marks  
a  step  in  the  right  direction  in  providing  treatment  access  to  a  treatable  ND.    
6.5 Bristol-Myers Squibb License 
The  latest  agreement  the  MPP  signed,  on  December  12,  2013,  was  with  Bristol-­‐‑
Myers  Squibb  (BMS).    The  agreement,  which  covers  the  HIV  drug  atazanavir  (ATV),  is  
significant  in  that  it  is  the  first  agreement  covering  a  WHO-­‐‑preferred  second-­‐‑line  
treatment19  [84].    There  has  been  a  lot  of  sub-­‐‑licensing  interest  from  generic  
manufacturers  [74],  but  to  date  no  sub-­‐‑licenses  have  been  signed.    Prior  to  this  
agreement,  BMS  had  agreements  in  place  with  other  generic  manufacturers  for  the  
manufacture  of  sale  of  ATV  on  a  royalty-­‐‑free  basis,  but  coverage  was  limited  to  Sub-­‐‑
Saharan  Africa  and  India  (about  fifty  countries)  [47].    The  MPP  agreement  expands  the  
geographic  scope  of  ATV  coverage  to  110  developing  countries  that  represent  88.5%  of  
people  living  with  HIV/AIDS  in  LMICs  [85].  
The  BMS  agreement  contains  many  of  the  attractive  features  of  the  ViiV  
agreement.    The  agreement  allows  generic  manufacturers  anywhere  in  the  world  to    
                                                                                                              
19  UNITAID  estimates  that  there  are  about  10  million  people  living  with  HIV/AIDS  in  low-­‐‑  and  middle-­‐‑
income  countries  who  need  second-­‐‑line  treatments.    
    73  
become  sub-­‐‑licensees.    It  also  contains  favorable  royalty  provisions,  an  optional  
technology  transfer  package  to  help  facilitate  sub-­‐‑licensees’  manufacture  of  ATV,  and  a  
grant-­‐‑back  provision  that  allows  the  MPP  to  sub-­‐‑license  any  improvements  or  new  
formulations  made  by  sub-­‐‑licensees  [86].    BMS  also  waived  data  exclusivity  rights  and  
granted  to  the  MPP  a  right  of  action  to  enforce  the  agreement.  
While  the  BMS  agreement  is  not  entirely  royalty-­‐‑free,  the  royalty  provisions  are  
interesting  and  different  from  previous  MPP  license  royalty  provisions.    Like  previous  
MPP  agreements,  no  royalty  payments  are  required  on  pediatric  formulations  [86],  nor  
are  they  required  in  the  countries  that  were  covered  under  the  previous  BMS  agreement  
or  from  sales  made  in  countries  where  BMS  does  not  yet  have  a  patent  granted  and  in  
force  [86].    Thus,  royalties  are  not  required  in  countries  where  BMS  has  a  pending  patent  
application.    Of  the  countries  covered  under  the  license  territory,  BMS  has  only  obtained  
a  valid  ATV  patent  in  Georgia,  Pakistan,  and  South  Africa  [86].    However,  because  South  
Africa  was  included  in  the  previous  BMS  agreement,  sales  in  South  Africa  are  not  
royalty  bearing  [87].    For  sales  in  Pakistan  and  Georgia  (and  anywhere  else  a  patent  
might  be  granted),  a  3%  royalty  will  be  charged.    However,  the  royalty  will  not  go  to  
BMS,  but  will  go  to  the  MPP,  which  is  then  mandated  to  “distribute  [the  royalties]  .  .  .  to  
suitable  community-­‐‑based  HIV  organizations  based  in  the  country  from  which  royalties  
were  collected”  [86].  
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Like  the  other  MPP  licenses,  the  BMS  license  is  not  without  its  shortcomings.    
The  license  territory,  while  more  expansive  than  the  previous  BMS  licenses,  excludes  a  
number  of  middle-­‐‑income  countries⎯representing  approximately  10%  of  the  HIV  
burden  in  LMICs⎯are  excluded.20    Like  the  previous  MPP  licenses,  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  
supply  ATV  outside  of  the  license  territory,  but  only  if  the  sale  does  not  infringe  any  
BMS  patent  rights  and  the  sub-­‐‑licensee  does  not  rely  on  the  BMS  technology  transfer  
package  to  provide  ATV  [86].    Because  either  ATV  or  one  or  more  of  the  APIs  necessary  
for  its  production  (or  both)  are  patented  in  the  excluded  middle-­‐‑income  countries,  their  
only  option  under  the  agreement  for  obtaining  low-­‐‑cost  ATV  is  the  issuance  of  a  
compulsory  license.    In  addition  to  garnering  the  political  will  necessary  for  the  issuance  
of  a  compulsory  license,  countries  must  also  rely  on  sub-­‐‑licensees’  rejection  of  the  BMS  
technology  transfer  package  in  their  production  of  ATV,  instead  choosing  to  reverse-­‐‑
engineer  ATV  without  help  from  BMS.    However,  should  sub-­‐‑licensees  reject  the  
technology  transfer  package,  there  are  a  number  of  LMICs  excluded  from  the  agreement  
to  which  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  sell  ATV  because  no  patent  is  currently  in  force.21    
                                                                                                              
20  The  license  notably  excludes  the  following  middle-­‐‑income  countries:  Argentina,  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  China,  
Egypt,  Indonesia,  Lebanon,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Peru,  the  Philippines,  Romania,  Russia,  and  Thailand.  
  
21  Excluded  countries  with  no  ATV  patent  in  force  include:  Albania,  Algeria,  American  Samoa,  Bosnia  and  
Herzegovina,  Kosovo,  Jordan,  Macedonia,  Montenegro,  Morocco,  Paraguay,  Serbia,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  
and  Vietnam.  
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Additionally,  like  the  previous  MPP  agreements,  the  BMS  license  allows  sub-­‐‑
licensees  to  use  ATV  in  combination  products  [86].    This  is  particularly  important  for  
ATV  because  it  requires  boosting  with  ritonavir  (RTV)  for  its  effectiveness.    
Unfortunately,  AbbVie22  holds  patent  rights  over  RTV  in  about  twenty  LMICs,  some  of  
which  are  within  the  BMS  license  territory.23    This  means  that,  in  countries  where  RTV  is  
not  patented  (or,  if  patented,  a  compulsory  license  is  issued),  BMS  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  not  
only  produce  cheaper  versions  of  ATV,  but  also  boost  it  with  RTV⎯a  FDC  that  requires  
only  one  pill  a  day  and  has  few  side  effects.    If  the  MPP  reaches  an  agreement  with  
AbbVie,24  generic  companies  can  become  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  both  agreements  and  produce  
an  ATV+RTV  combination  without  any  fear  of  infringement  actions.      
Should  the  negotiations  with  AbbVie  fail,  COBI25  represents  a  viable  alternative  
to  RTV  for  combinations,  as  it  has  been  shown  to  be  as  effective  a  booster  [88].    It  will  be  
interesting  to  see  in  the  future  if  any  manufacturers  that  are  sub-­‐‑licensees  of  both  
agreements  make  this  combination.    However,  there  are  some  countries  that  are  covered  
                                                                                                              
22  AbbVie  is  a  subsidiary  of  Abbott  Pharmaceuticals.  
  
23  Ritonavir  is  patented  in  the  following  LMICs:  Albania,  Armenia*,  Azerbaijan*,  Belarus*,  Bosnia  and  
Herzegovina,  Brazil,  China,  Kazakhstan*,  Kyrgyzstan*,  Mexico,  Moldova*,  Montenegro,  The  Philippines,  
South  Africa*,  Sri  Lanka*,  Tajikistan*,  Turkey,  Turkmenistan*,  Ukraine,  and  Vietnam  (*  indicates  inclusion  in  
the  BMS  License  Territory).  
  
24  The  MPP  and  AbbVie  are  currently  in  negotiations  for  a  license  on  RTV.  
  
25  Patented  by  Gilead  and  covered  in  the  MPP-­‐‑Gilead  license.  
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under  the  BMS  license  but  excluded  from  the  COBI  territory26  in  the  Gilead  license  and  
vice  versa,27  so  any  sub-­‐‑licensee’s  ability  to  sell  a  combination  product  will  be  subject  to  
these  geographical  restrictions,  barring  the  issuance  of  a  compulsory  license.      
6.6 ViiV Healthcare License for DTG for Adult and Pediatric Use 
and ABC for Adult Use 
Shortly  after  signing  it’s  first  agreement  and  a  MOU  with  the  MPP,  ViiV  received  FDA  
approval  for  a  new  adult  formulation,  dolutegravir  (DTG)  [79].    The  MOU  signed  at  the  
time  of  the  pediatric  ABC  license  contained  a  commitment  on  the  part  of  ViiV  to  enter  
into  future  negotiations  with  the  MPP  for  pipeline  products  that  obtain  regulatory  
approval.    ViiV  honored  this  commitment,  signing  two  license  agreements  with  the  MPP  
on  April  1,  2014  covering  dolutegravir  (DTG)  and  ABC  for  both  adult  use  (the  “adult  use  
license”)  and  pediatric  use  of  DTG  (the  “pediatric  use  license”).    DTG  is  an  important  
new  ARV  because  it  has  fewer  side  effects  than  existing  medications,  is  extremely  
potent,  can  be  dosed  once  per  day,  does  not  require  boosting,  and  has  a  high  barrier  to  
resistance  [2].    Additionally,  DTG  is  cheaper  to  manufacture  than  other  ARVs  of  its  
                                                                                                              
26  The  following  countries  are  included  in  the  ATV  License  Territory  but  excluded  from  the  COBI  License  
Territory:  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Botswana,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Iraq,  Kazakhstan,  Korea,  
Democratic  Republic,  Libya,  Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia,  Federated  States,  Namibia,  Panama,  Sri  Lanka,  
Turkmenistan,  and  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  
  
27  The  following  countries  are  included  in  the  COBI  License  Territory  but  excluded  from  the  ATV  License  
Territory:  Anguilla,  Aruba,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Montserrat,  
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Turks  and  Caicos,  and  Vietnam.  
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class28  because  it  contains  a  lower  amount  of  APIs  [136],  which  make  up  a  large  portion  
of  the  final  cost  of  a  drug.    Furthermore,  DTG  can  be  used  both  as  a  first-­‐‑line  therapy  in  
treatment-­‐‑naïve  patients  or  as  a  second-­‐‑line  therapy  in  patients  who  have  developed  
resistance  to  other  first-­‐‑line  ARVs  [135].  
The  “adult  use  license”  covers  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  DTG  and  ABC  for  use  
in  the  treatment  of  HIV  in  adults  [138].    The  license  covers  seventy-­‐‑three  
countries⎯sixty-­‐‑seven  low-­‐‑income  countries,  LDCs,  and  countries  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  
Africa,  as  well  as  six  middle-­‐‑income  countries,  in  which,  collectively,  93%  of  adults  
living  with  HIV  reside  [135].    The  middle-­‐‑income  countries  covered  in  the  license  are  
India,  Vietnam,  The  Philippines,  Indonesia,  Turkmenistan,  and  Egypt.    This  is  the  most  
limited  geographic  scope  of  any  of  the  MPP  licenses,  excluding  a  number  of  important  
middle-­‐‑income  countries.29  
It  is  disappointing  that  the  geographic  scope  for  ABC  was  not  expanded  to  
include  those  countries  in  the  original  ABC  license  for  pediatric  use,  instead  covering  
                                                                                                              
28  DTG  is  an  integrase  inhibitor.  
  
29  Excluded  MICs  include:  Albania,  Algeria*+,  American  Samoa,  Antigua  &  Barbuda,  Argentina+,  
Armenia*+,  Azerbaijan*+,  Belarus*+,  Belize+,  Bolivia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Brazil+,  Bulgaria*+,  Chile+,  
China*+,  Colombia*,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Dominica+,  Dominican  Republic+,  Ecuador+,  El  Salvador+,  Fiji+,  
Georgia+,  Granada,  Guatemala+,  Guyana,  Honduras+,  Iran+,  Iraq,  Jamaica+,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan*+,  Latvia,  
Lebanon+,  Libya+,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Malaysia+,  Maldives,  Marshall  Islands,  Mexico*+,  Micronesia,  
Moldova*+,  Mongolia*,  Montenegro,  Morocco*+,  Nicaragua+,  Pakistan+,  Palau,  Panama+,  Papau  New  
Guinea,  Paraguay+,  Peru+,  Romania*+,  Russia*,  Serbia,  Sri  Lanka+,  St.  Lucia+,  St.  Vincent+,  Suriname,  Syria+,  
Thailand+,  Timor-­‐‑Leste,  Tonga,  Tunisia+,  Turkey*+,  Ukraine*,  Uruguay,  Uzbekistan+,  Venezuela,  West  Bank  
&  Gaza  [*  represents  countries  in  which  ViiV  has  obtained  a  patent  over  DTG;  italicized  and  underlined  
countries  and  those  in  which  a  DTG  patent  has  been  filed;  +  represents  countries  in  which  ViiV  has  obtained  
a  patent  over  ABC].  
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only  those  same  territories  included  in  the  DTG  territory.    However,  combinations  
containing  ABC  are  not  currently  a  WHO-­‐‑recommended  treatment  for  adults,  being  
preferred  over  other  first-­‐‑line  ARVs  only  in  “special  circumstances”30  [7].    Thus,  the  
limited  nature  of  the  geographic  scope  for  ABC  likely  is  not  going  to  be  problematic.    
Under  the  license,  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  sell  ABC  and  DTG  royalty-­‐‑free  in  Sub-­‐‑
Saharan  Africa,  low-­‐‑income  countries,  and  LDCs.    In  the  six  middle-­‐‑income  countries  
covered  in  the  agreements,  royalty  payments  are  decided  on  a  sliding  scale  based  on  
country  per  capita  income,  with  three  tiers  of  pricing.    Sales  to  “tier  1”  countries⎯India,  
Vietnam,  and  the  Philippines⎯require  a  royalty  payment  of  5%;  sales  to  “tier  2”  
countries⎯Indonesia  and  Egypt⎯require  a  royalty  payment  of  7.5%;  and  sales  to  the  
“tier  3”  country⎯Turkmenistan⎯require  a  royalty  payment  of  10%  [138].      
Within  these  tiers,  royalty  payments  are  only  required  in  countries  where  there  is  
a  patent  granted  and  in  force  [136].    ViiV  currently  has  obtained  DTG  patents  in  the  
Philippines,  Indonesia,  and  Turkmenistan,  with  patents  pending  in  India,  Vietnam,  and  
Egypt.    For  ABC,  ViiV  holds  one  or  more  patents  related  to  the  manufacture  of  ABC,  by  
itself  or  in  combination,  in  Egypt,  Indonesia,  and  the  Philippines.    While  ViiV  holds  a  
patent  over  pediatric  ABC  in  India,  other  patents  related  to  ABC  have  been  withdrawn  
after  opposition,  making  it  unlikely  that  ViiV  will  be  able  to  obtain  a  patent  over  ABC  in  
                                                                                                              
30  The  WHO  only  recommends  combinations  containing  ABC  to  be  used  for  adult  treatment  in  “special  
circumstances,”  including  “situations  where  preferred  or  alternative  regimens  may  not  be  available  or  
suitable  because  of  significant  toxicities,  anticipated  drug-­‐‑drug  interactions,  drug  procurement  and  supply  
management  issues,  or  for  other  reasons.”  
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India  in  the  future.    It  is  not  publicly  available  whether  patents  related  to  ABC  are  
pending  in  Vietnam  and/or  Turkmenistan,  but  based  on  data  provided  by  ViiV  in  the  
MPP  license,  patents  are  not  yet  in  force  in  these  countries.    Because  it  will  be  a  few  
years  before  generic  versions  of  DTG  and  adult-­‐‑use  ABC  will  come  to  market,  it  is  
unclear  what  the  effect  of  these  royalty  provisions  will  be  in  those  countries  in  which  
ViiV  has  not  yet  obtained  a  patent  over  DTG  and/or  ABC.  
Within  the  geographic  scope  of  the  license,  further  sale  restrictions  apply  of  the  
royalty-­‐‑bearing  middle-­‐‑income  countries.    While  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  sell  ABC  and  DTG  in  
any  market  in  the  royalty-­‐‑free  license  territories,  the  royalty-­‐‑bearing  license  territory  is  
segmented  between  the  public  and  private  markets,  and  sub-­‐‑licensees  are  permitted  to  
sell  ABC  and/or  DTG  only  in  the  public  market  [138].    This  includes  sales  to  various  not  
for  profit  institutions,  including  governments  and  government-­‐‑run  institutions,  NGOs,  
UN  organizations,  not-­‐‑for  profit  organizations  (e.g.  MSF,  Oxfam),  and  funding  
mechanisms  and  programs  (e.g.,  PEPFAR,  USAID,  Global  Fund)  [138].    Sub-­‐‑licensees  are  
required  to  obtain  consent  from  ViiV  before  selling  to  any  of  these  not  for  profit  
institutions.  
The  terms  of  the  “pediatric  use  license”  are  nearly  identical  to  the  terms  of  the  
previous  pediatric  ABC  license,  with  some  minor  improvements.        The  license  covers  
121  LMICs  in  which  99%  of  children  living  with  HIV  reside  [135].    Under  the  license,  
sub-­‐‑licensees  have  the  right  to  manufacture  and  sell  DTG  for  use  in  the  treatment  of  HIV  
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in  children  ages  12-­‐‑18,  but  the  license  stipulates  an  expansion  of  the  field  of  use  for  
treatment  in  children  under  the  age  of  12  if  and  when  ViiV  get  FDA  approval  for  such  a  
formulation  [137].    Like  the  pediatric  ABC  license,  this  license  is  also  royalty-­‐‑free.    The  
geographic  scope  of  the  license  is  slightly  broader,  covering  those  countries  covered  in  
the  pediatric  ABC  license,  with  Peru,  Ukraine,  and  Venezuela  added  to  the  territory.    
While  this  still  excludes  some  middle-­‐‑income  countries,31  this  expansion  represents  a  
step  in  the  right  direction.  
Under  both  agreements,  generic  manufacturers  anywhere  in  the  world  can  
become  sub-­‐‑licensees  [137,  138].    Additionally,  both  agreements  contain  no  restrictions  
on  the  development  and  formulation  of  FDCs.    Both  licenses  also  grant  perhaps  the  
broadest  ability  of  all  of  the  MPP  licenses  for  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  supply  outside  the  license  
territory  under  certain  circumstances.    Specifically,  sub-­‐‑licensees  are  permitted  to  sell  the  
licensed  products  outside  the  license  territory  in  the  following  circumstances:  (i)  where  
there  are  no  patents  over  the  products  in  the  country;  (ii)  where  there  are  only  pending  
patents  in  the  country;  (iii)  where  there  are  granted  patents,  but  not  infringed  (e.g.,  the  
sale  of  DTG  as  a  single  agent  where  only  a  combination  patent  exists);  (iv)  where  there  is  
a  patent  in  force  but  a  compulsory  license  has  been  issued;  and  (v)  where,  under  
national  laws,  certain  acts  are  not  defined  as  patent  infringement  [136].    Additionally,  
                                                                                                              
31  Excluded  MICs:  Albania,  Timor-­‐‑Leste,  American  Samoa,  Antigua  &  Barbuda,  Belarus*,  Bosnia  and  
Herzegovina,  Brazil,  Bulgaria*,  China*,  Dominica,  Granada,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan*,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  
Macedonia,  Mexico*,  Montenegro,  Romania*,  Russia,  Serbia,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent,  Suriname,  Turkey*,  
Uruguay  [*  represents  countries  in  which  ViiV  has  obtained  a  patent  for  pediatric  DTG].  
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like  previous  MPP  licenses,  there  is  no  restriction  on  sub-­‐‑licensees’  ability  to  challenge  
patents  covered  in  the  license  and  ViiV  has  waived  data  exclusivity.    
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7. Comparison of the MPP to Traditional Alternatives 
As  compared  to  non-­‐‑assert  declarations,  tiered  pricing,  and  drug  donations,  the  
MPP  is  far  better  suited  to  bring  about  long-­‐‑term  price  reductions  on  ARVs,  as  nothing  
impact  prices  in  the  long-­‐‑term  as  much  as  generic  competition.  
When  compared  to  compulsory  licensing,  the  MPP  is  an  attractive  alternative  for  
both  generic  manufacturers  and  patent  holders.    By  engaging  with  the  MPP  and  
increasing  access  to  otherwise  high-­‐‑priced  ARVs,  patent  holders  can  avert  the  treat  of  a  
compulsory  license.    The  MPP  similarly  benefits  generic  manufacturers  because  they  are  
able  to  obtain  licenses  on  favorable  terms  and  thus  the  need  to  resort  to  compulsory  
licensing  is  diminished.    This  is  significant,  as  compulsory  licensing  not  only  takes  a  lot  
of  political  will,  but  also  has  potentially  adverse  side  effects,  both  from  governments  and  
pharmaceutical  companies.  
A  number  of  pharmaceutical  companies  already  offer  voluntary  licenses  for  the  
patents  in  the  MPP  (Appendix  A).    The  relevance  of  the  MPP  then  is  whether  it  can  go  
beyond  the  status  quo  with  respect  to  voluntary  licensing,  either  by  engaging  with  
companies  that  are  generally  unwilling  to  offer  voluntary  licenses  or  widening  the  scope  
of  and  reducing  transaction  costs  associated  with  existing  voluntary  licenses.  
With  respect  to  company  engagement,  the  existence  of  the  MPP  has  been  an  
impetus  for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  engage  in  other  access  initiatives.    For  
example,  Johnson  &  Johnson  has  publicly  refused  to  engage  with  the  MPP.    However,  
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after  refusing  to  negotiate  with  the  MPP,  Johnson  &  Johnson  announced  a  licensing  deal  
for  rilpivirine  covering  the  same  112  territories  covered  in  the  MPP-­‐‑Gilead  license.    
Thus,  the  MPP  can  act  an  impetus  for  increasing  access  to  ARVs  in  LMICs  by  
encouraging  companies  to  expand  their  access  initiatives  in  other  ways.  
The  MPP  offers  benefits  over  current  voluntary  licenses  with  respect  to  the  
formulation  of  FDCs.    A  current  WHO-­‐‑recommended  first-­‐‑line  FDC  consists  of  tenofovir  
(patent  held  by  Gilead),  lamivudine  (GSK)  and  either  nevirapine  (Boehringer-­‐‑Ingelheim)  
or  efavirenz  (BMS).    An  FDC  of  these  drugs  currently  does  not  exist  or  is  in  limited  
supply  [28],  largely  because  generic  manufacturers  wishing  to  develop  it  would  have  to  
not  only  seek  voluntary  licenses  from  all  three  or  four  patent-­‐‑holders,  but  would  also  
have  to  negotiate  the  freedom  to  make  FDCs  in  the  license  agreements.    All  of  the  
current  MPP  licenses  allow  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  develop  FDCs,  and  thus  this  formulation  is  
now  possibly  available  to  sub-­‐‑licensees.    Other  potential  combinations  that  will  be  
available  to  sub-­‐‑licensees  include  an  ATV/COBI  combination,  a  three  in  one  pill  that  
uses  ABC  (and  two  other  compounds  on  which  the  patents  have  expired),  and  an  
ABC/3TC/DTG  combination  that  has  been  shown  to  be  potentially  more  effective  than  
the  current  WHO-­‐‑preferred  single-­‐‑pill  first-­‐‑line  regimen  of  TDF/FTC/EVG  [2].  
A  good  point  of  comparison  to  see  if  the  MPP  is  able  to  get  better  license  terms  as  
compared  to  traditional  voluntary  licenses  is  the  2006  Gilead  voluntary  licenses,  which  
were  a  precursor  to  the  MPP-­‐‑Gilead  license  (Appendix  D).    While  the  MPP  license  was  
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basically  a  restatement  of  the  previous  TDF  voluntary  license,  it  offers  much  more  
favorable  terms  from  an  access  to  medicine  perspective.    While  the  2006  TDF  license  
included  only  95  countries,  the  MPP  license  includes  112  countries.    Even  though  TDF  is  
off  patent  in  most  countries,  the  2006  license  restricted  sales  to  the  95  listed  territories,  
regardless  of  whether  a  patent  was  in  place  in  other  territories.      
In  addition  to  expanding  the  geographic  scope  of  the  TDF  license,  the  MPP  was  
also  able  to  negotiate  an  unbundling  clause  that  allows  licensees  to  terminate  the  TDF  
license;  the  2006  license  did  not  allow  generic  manufacturers  to  terminate  the  license.    
Because  of  this  unbundling  provision,  generic  manufacturers  that  were  tied  to  95  
countries  in  the  2006  license  can  drop  the  TDF  portion  of  the  MPP  license  and  sell  to  any  
country  in  the  world.    This  is  really  significant  because  TDF  is  one  of  the  most  important  
first-­‐‑line  ARVs  in  existence  today.    The  MPP  license  also  has  lower  royalty  rates⎯3%  as  
compared  to  the  5%  royalty  rate  in  the  2006  licenses.    
Additionally,  as  compared  to  other  voluntary  licenses  for  ATV,  the  MPP-­‐‑BMS  
license  covering  ATV  offers  much  more  favorable  terms.    Under  a  2011  voluntary  license  
between  BMS  and  Mylan  pharmaceuticals,  Mylan  was  granted  a  non-­‐‑exclusive  right  to  
manufacture  and  sell  ATV  in  certain  undeveloped  countries⎯only  India  and  Sub-­‐‑
Saharan  Africa⎯on  a  royalty-­‐‑free  basis.    The  license  contains  an  anti-­‐‑diversion  clause  
that  prohibits  Mylan  from  selling  ATV  outside  of  certain  territories,  in  countries  where  
BMS  has  a  patent  or  a  pending  patent,  and  gives  BMS  a  rescission  right  if  Mylan  breaches  
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this  clause.    This  is  in  contrast  to  the  MPP  license,  which  prohibits  sales  only  in  countries  
where  BMS  has  been  granted  a  patent,  and  does  not  give  BMS  a  rescission  right  in  the  
event  that  ATV  is  sold  outside  the  license  territory.    The  MPP  license  also  has  a  much  
more  expensive  geographic  scope,  allowing  for  sale  in  110  countries  as  opposed  to  the  
fifty  countries  covered  by  BMS  voluntary  licenses.    Also,  in  an  agreement  between  BMS  
and  Brazil,  BMS  prohibited  Brazilian  manufacturers  from  boosting  ATV  with  ritonavir  
[2].  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  MPP  agreement,  which  allows  for  combinations.  
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8. Is the MPP better than the Alternatives? 
With  respect  to  some  alternatives⎯non-­‐‑assert  declarations,  tiered  pricing,  and  
drug  donations⎯the  MPP  is  better  because  it  allows  for  generic  competition  in  the  
marketplace  for  ARVs,  which  is  more  effective  than  any  other  mechanism  at  bringing  
down  prices  and  making  medicines  more  widely  available.  
With  respect  to  voluntary  licensing,  the  MPP  offers  clear  advantages  over  the  
status  quo.    By  negotiating  with  patent  holders  from  a  public  health  perspective,  the  
MPP  aimed,  and  succeeded,  in  negotiating  better  terms  than  what  was  contained  in  
existing  voluntary  licenses,  with  the  result  that  more  countries  will  benefit  from  the  
licenses,  and  the  countries  that  were  already  benefitting  from  voluntary  licenses  will  
benefit  on  better  terms.    The  MPP  has  not  only  been  able  to  expand  the  geographic  scope  
of  the  licenses,  but  also  increase  the  number  of  licensees  able  to  produce  generic  versions  
of  licensed  products,  thereby  increasing  competition  and  potentially  lowering  the  prices  
of  ARVs.    The  MPP  licenses  have  also  been  able  to  give  sub-­‐‑licensees  the  right  to  
challenge  patent  applications  and  supply  licensed  products  in  countries  where  the  drug  
is  off  patent  or  the  country  has  issued  a  compulsory  license.    Perhaps  most  importantly,  
the  MPP  has  granted  to  sub-­‐‑licensees  the  ability  to  formulate  new  FDCs  that  contain  the  
licensed  drugs,  which  previously  was  often  not  an  option  for  licensees  under  voluntary  
licenses.  
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The  MPP  has  also  been  able  to  facilitate  licenses  of  pipeline  products  and  new  
ARVs,  which  will  be  available  cheaply  much  sooner  than  what  would  otherwise  be  a  20-­‐‑
year  patent  term.    This  has  not  had  an  impact  yet  in  terms  of  increasing  access,  but  is  
nevertheless  important  because  it  will  reduce  the  timeline  for  generics  being  on  the  
market,  allowing  for  more  rapid  price  reduction.    However,  the  pipeline  drugs  included  
in  the  Gilead  agreement  have  only  recently  obtained  regulatory  approval  in  the  US,  and  
generic  companies  have  only  just  started  to  develop  generic  versions  of  these  ARVs.    
Likewise,  DTG  has  only  recently  received  regulatory  approval  in  the  US.    Because  the  
process  for  drug  development  takes  time⎯generic  manufacturers  have  to  develop  the  
API  and  then  the  finished  formulation⎯it  will  be  a  couple  of  years  before  a  generic  
version  can  even  be  submitted  for  regulatory  approval,  after  which  it  will  be  another  six  
months  to  a  year  before  the  drug  actually  comes  to  market.    However,  this  two  to  three  
year  timeline  is  certainly  better  than  the  usual  twenty-­‐‑year  plus  timeline.  
It  is  also  too  early  to  tell  what  the  impact  of  the  MPP  will  be  with  respect  to  the  
development  of  new  FDCs.    With  respect  to  the  MPP’s  ability  to  stimulate  the  
development  of  new  formulations,  it  is  too  early  to  tell  whether  or  not  it  has  been  
successful.    An  MPP  sub-­‐‑licensee  has  started  working  on  the  development  of  a  three-­‐‑in-­‐‑
one  pill  that  includes  ABC  and  two  other  compounds  on  which  the  patents  have  
expired.    The  MPP  was  able  to  facilitate  this,  however  it  will  be  at  least  few  years  before  
any  new  FDC  to  materialize.    Another  potential  combination  that  has  been  proven  
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effective  at  treating  HIV  is  an  ATV/COBI  combination  (with  COBI  as  a  booster,  rather  
than  historically-­‐‑used  booster  ritonavir,  which  is  patented  by  AbbVie  in  a  number  of  
LMICs).    Because  both  of  these  drugs  are  licensed  to  the  MPP,  sub-­‐‑licensees  wishing  to  
develop  this  formulation  only  have  to  go  to  one  place⎯the  MPP⎯to  obtain  formulation  
rights,  rather  than  negotiating  individually  with  BMS  and  Gilead  for  the  rights.    A  
previous  BMS  voluntary  license  for  ATV  prohibited  licensees  boosting  ATV  with  
ritonavir  [2],  and  it  is  not  public  knowledge  whether  previous  Gilead  licenses  restricted  
the  development  of  combination  products.    It  is  thus  possible  that  individual  voluntary  
licenses  for  these  two  compounds  would  have  prohibited  the  development  of  an  
ATV/COBI  combination,  which  is  clearly  permitted  under  both  MPP  agreements.    In  this  
way,  the  MPP  has  the  potential  to  foster  the  development  of  FDCs  that  may  otherwise  
not  exist  in  generic  form  before  the  expiration  of  the  patent  term,  particularly  FDCs  
containing  newer  ARVs  that  may  be  patented  in  India.    
The  MPP  has  also  been  a  valuable  tool  in  promoting  access  to  ARVs  even  outside  
the  context  of  the  MPP.    As  seen  with  the  2011  Johnson  &  Johnson  license  for  riplivine,  
the  mere  existence  of  the  MPP  can  serve  as  an  encouragement  for  pharmaceutical  
companies  to  expand  their  access  initiatives.  
It  is  clear  that  the  MPP  is  a  vital  component  of  the  overall  strategy  to  increase  
access  to  ARVs  globally.    However,  the  MPP  should  be  used  in  concert  with  other  
initiatives,  especially  in  the  near  future  when  generic  products  of  newer  drugs  are  not  
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yet  on  the  market.    In  addition,  there  need  to  be  policies  in  place  in  LMICs  that  improve  
the  overall  health  infrastructure  in  countries.    Without  these  efforts,  there  will  always  be  
patients  without  access  to  treatment,  regardless  of  how  inexpensive  or  widely  available  
they  are.  
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9. R&D Efforts for NDs 
9.1 The ND R&D Landscape 
Historically,  there  has  been  little  investment  in  R&D  aimed  at  developing  new  
treatments  for  NDs.    From  1975  to  1999,  only  sixteen  of  the  1,393  new  chemical  entities  
marketed  were  for  NTDs  [89]  and  tropical  diseases  accounted  for  only  1.5%  of  all  
biomedical  citations  on  PubMed  [90].  Because  patent  protection  is  the  primary  policy  
tool  that  drives  R&D  investments,  until  the  early  2000s,  only  0.5%  of  pharmaceutical  
patents  were  for  drugs  aimed  at  treating  NDs  [90].  
During  this  time,  less  than  10%  of  global  health  R&D  expenditure  was  spent  on  
health  problems  affecting  the  developing  world,  which  represented  more  than  90%  of  
the  world’s  global  disease  burden  [91].    This  phenomenon  came  to  be  known  as  the  
“10/90  gap.”    Recognition  of  this  gap  in  the  late-­‐‑1990s  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  
Global  Forum  for  Health  Research,  which  aimed  to  help  narrow  the  gap  by  facilitating  
collaborations  between  partners  in  both  the  public  and  private  sectors  [90].    While  this  
gap  has  decreased  since  the  1990s,  North  America  and  Europe  still  make  up  80%  of  the  
global  market  for  drugs,  so  drug  development  globally  remains  primarily  focused  on  the  
needs  of  developed  nations,  resulting  in  disproportionate  development  of  “lifestyle  
drugs”  and  drugs  for  non-­‐‑communicable  diseases  [18].    
However,  since  the  early  2000s,  there  has  been  increasing  interest  in  NDs,  and  a  
number  of  initiatives  that  aim  to  address  the  issue  and  incentivize  investment  in  R&D  
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for  NDs  have  come  to  life.    This  has  been  brought  about  by  a  dramatic  increase  in  
funding  for  R&D  for  historically  neglected  diseases,  primarily  from  the  NIH1  and  the  Bill  
and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation  [139].    Because  of  increased  funding  for  ND  R&D  by  
donor  organizations  and  governments  over  the  past  two  decades,2  over  140  ND  
products  are  now  in  development,  from  a  baseline  of  almost  zero  pre-­‐‑2000s,  and  in  2009  
alone  there  were  69  drugs,  vaccines,  and  diagnostics  in  the  pipeline  for  NDs  (excluding  
HIV)  [92].    This  has  been  spurred  largely  by  the  proliferation  of  product  development  
partnerships  (PDPs)  and  other  public-­‐‑private  partnerships  and  initiatives  on  behalf  of  
governments  and  pharmaceutical  companies  to  address  the  ND  problem.    Nevertheless,  
ND  R&D  funding  remains  small  compared  global  funding  for  R&D  in  the  
pharmaceutical  industry  generally,  representing  only  about  2%  of  total  funding  [93].    
Despite  the  recent  increase  in  ND  R&D  funding,  there  remains,  in  addition  to  a  
disparity  between  health  R&D  that  is  needed  (based  on  global  disease  burden)  and  that  
which  is  undertaken,  a  disparity  between  R&D  expenditure  within  the  ND  category.    
While  some  NDs  receive  significant  amounts  of  global  ND  R&D  funding,  others  receive  
virtually  no  funding,  often  with  little  correlation  to  global  disease  burden  (Table  1).    This  
can  likely  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  diseases  such  as  HIV/AIDS,  TB,  and  malaria  
(which  account  for  over  4.3  million  deaths  annually)  have  developing-­‐‑country  markets,  
                                                                                                              
1  The  NIH  is  by  far  the  largest  funder  of  ND  R&D,  providing  about  40%  of  global  funding  in  2007.  
  
2  Global  estimated  funding  for  ND  R&D  in  2010  was  about  $3  billion  
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despite  primarily  affecting  those  living  in  LMICs,  and  thus  there  is  more  of  an  incentive  
for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  engage  in  R&D.    As  compared  to  diarrheal  diseases  
and  pneumococcal  disease  (which  claim  about  3.8  million  lives  annually),  HIV/AIDS,  
TB,  and  malaria  have  four  times  the  number  of  R&D  projects  currently  [94].  
Table  1:  Percentage  of  Global  Neglected  Disease  R&D  Funding  
Disease   Global  Disease  Burden  
(DALYs)  
Total  Global  ND  R&D  
Funding  
HIV/AIDS   57.8  million   33.8%  
Tuberculosis   34  million   17.3%  
Malaria   33.9  million   18.4%  
Dengue   663,000   7.5%  
Diarrheal  Disease   72.3  million   5.0%  
Kinetoplastids   4.1  million   4.3%  
Bacterial  pneumonia  &  
meningitis  
93.3  million   3.2%  
Helminth  infections   12  million   2.7%  
Salmonella  infections   22  million   1.5%  
Trachoma   1.3  million   0.3%  
Leprosy   194,000   0.2%  
Buruli  ulcer   *   0.2%  
Rheumatic  fever   5.1  million   0.0%  
*No  DALY  figures  are  available,  but  the  WHO  estimates  that  Buruli  Ulcer  affects  more  than  7,000  people  each  year    
  
The  current  patent  landscape  for  compounds  and  technologies  related  to  NDs  is  
scattered,  with  a  number  of  different  stakeholders⎯pharmaceutical  companies,  
universities,  smaller  biotechnology  companies,  governments,  and  PDPs⎯all  owning  
patents  related  to  NTDs.    These  parties  also  have  important  trade  secrets  covering  data  
and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  NDs,  which  is  arguably  more  important  than  the  patents  
    93  
themselves.    There  is  thus  a  pressing  need  to  increase  both  funding  and  efficiency  of  ND  
R&D,  as  funding  and  disease  focus  is  scattered  and  there  are  often  several  efforts  
targeting  the  same  outcomes  running  in  parallel  with  little  exchange  of  information.  
9.2 ND R&D Collaborations 
The  increase  in  ND  R&D  has  been  spurred  by  the  proliferation  of  collaborative  
efforts  between  the  non-­‐‑profit  and  for-­‐‑profit  sectors.    These  initiatives  bring  together  
funding  and/or  expertise  from  governmental,  inter-­‐‑governmental,  and  non-­‐‑profit  
organizations  and  funding  and/or  expertise  from  the  for-­‐‑profit  sector  [90].    The  partners  
in  these  collaborations  are  varied,  ranging  from  international  organizations  (e.g.  WHO),  
public  institutions  (e.g.  NIH),  and  private  foundations  (e.g.  the  Rockefeller  Foundation)  
to  the  private  actors  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry,  and,  in  addition  to  providing  R&D  
funding,  these  organizations  often  directly  support  basic  ND  research  [90].  
9.2.1 Product Development Partnerships 
Product  Development  Partnerships  (PDPs)  represent  perhaps  the  most  
significant  type  of  these  collaborations.    PDPs  aim  to  coordinate  the  development  of  new  
ND  drugs,  vaccines,  diagnostics,  and  other  technologies.    By  working  with  the  public  
sector,  donor  organizations,  and  pharmaceutical  companies,  which  provide  funding  and  
other  resources,  PDPs  are  able  to  initiate  ND  R&D  that  otherwise  would  not  be  
undertaken  [37].    In  addition  to  product  development,  many  PDPs  simultaneously  
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engage  in  global  advocacy  work  aimed  at  increasing  awareness  of  their  targeted  NDs  
[95].  
PDPs  have  played  a  significant  role  in  ND  R&D,  accounting  for  upwards  of  75%  
of  all  NTD  R&D  and  attracting  over  40%  of  global  ND  R&D  funding  [95].    However,  
PDPs  focusing  on  HIV/AIDS,  TB,  and  malaria  receive  by  far  the  most  funding.    Notable  
exceptions  to  this  are  the  $25.6  million  PATH  received  for  the  development  of  a  vaccine  
against  diarrheal  disease  and  the  $22.7  million  DNDi  received  for  the  development  of  
kinetoplastic  drugs  [95].    
While  all  PDPs  ultimately  share  the  common  goal  of  increasing  R&D  for  NDs,  
they  vary  significantly  with  respect  to  disease  and  product  focus  (Table  2),  with  some  
focusing  on  a  single  disease  or  single  product,  and  others  focusing  on  a  range  of  diseases  
and/or  products.    Additionally,  some  PDPs  concern  themselves  only  with  product  
development,  while  others  engage  in  a  variety  of  technology  transfer  and  capacity-­‐‑
building  initiatives  [95].  
Table  2:  Various  PDPs,  with  Disease  and  Product  Focus  
PDP   Disease  Focus   Product  
Focus  
Aeres  Global  TB  Vaccine  
Foundation  
TB   Vaccines  
Drugs  for  Neglected  Diseases  
Initiative  (DNDi)  
Malaria,  kinetoplastids  
(sleeping  sickness,  Chagas,  
and  leishmaniasis)  
Drugs  
European  Malaria  Vaccine  Initiative  
(EMVI)  
Malaria   Vaccines  
Foundation  for  Innovative  New   TB,  malaria,  sleeping   Diagnostics  
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Diagnostics  (FIND)   sickness  
Global  Alliance  of  TB  Drug  
Development  (TB  Alliance)  
TB   Drugs  
Infectious  Disease  Research  Institute  
(IDRI)  









International  AIDS  Vaccine  
Initiative  (IAVI)  
HIV/AIDS   Vaccines  
International  Partnership  for  
Microbicides  (IPM)  
HIV/AIDS   Microbicides  
International  Vaccine  Institute  (IVI)   Diarrheal  disease,  dengue,  
bacterial  pneumonia  and  
meningitis,  typhoid  and  
paratyphoid  fever  
Vaccines  
Medicines  for  Malaria  Venture  
(MMV)  
Malaria   Drugs  
Program  for  Appropriate  
Technology  in  Health  (PATH)  
HIV,  malaria,  rotavirus  and  








WHO-­‐‑Special  Programme  for  
Research  and  Training  in  Tropical  
Diseases  (WHO-­‐‑TDR)  
TB,  malaria,  kinetoplastids,  
helminth  diseases,  dengue  
Diagnostics,  
drugs  
Source:  Moran  et  al.,  “The  Role  of  Product  Development  Partnerships  in  Research  and  Development  for  Neglected  Diseases  
  
PDPs  are  further  differentiated  from  one  another  with  respect  to  organizational  
structure  and  reliance  on  external  partners  for  R&D.    Some  PDPs  are  independent  
organizations,3  while  some  are  programs  set  up  within  larger  organizations.4    With  
                                                                                                              
3  For  example:  Aeras  Global  Vaccine  Initiative  and  Medicines  for  Malaria  Venture.  
  
4  For  example:  MVI,  the  Meningitis  Vaccine  Project  hosted  by  PATH,  and  the  Pediatric  Dengue  Vaccine  
Initiative,  hosted  by  IVI.  
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respect  to  R&D  activities,  some  PDPs  have  their  own  labs  and  manufacturing  plants,  
while  others  are  fully  reliant  on  external  partners  for  these  activities  [95].  
Despite  these  organizations  differences,  the  activities  of  PDPs  have  been  highly  
influential,  spurred  by  the  relative  low  costs  PDPs  require  to  develop  products,  from  the  
drug  development  stage  to  the  clinical  trial  phase,  as  compared  to  pharmaceutical  
companies.    Though  estimates  vary  and  remain  controversial,  the  average  private-­‐‑sector  
cost  to  develop  a  new  drug  has  been  estimated  as  high  as  $1.3  billion  [96].    PDPs  have  
been  able  to  similarly  develop  products  at  a  fraction  of  the  price.    For  example,  between  
2003-­‐‑2011,  DNDi  was  able  to  build  a  significant  pipeline  of  products  and  develop  six  
new  products5  with  an  investment  of  just  EUR100  million;  over  a  ten  year  period,  and  
MMV  built  a  pipeline  of  sixty  products  and  developed  three  new  products6  with  a  
budget  of  just  $310  million  [93].    Another  advantage  of  PDPs  is  that,  because  of  their  
public  health  focus,  they  are  able  to  push  pharmaceutical  companies  contributing  
patents  and  know-­‐‑how  to  keep  the  products  they  develop  off  patent,  as  was  seen  in  the  
case  of  the  antimalarial  FDC  ASAQ,  developed  by  DNDi  [37].    
While  PDPs  have  played  a  monumental  role  in  changing  the  ND  R&D  landscape,  
they  cannot  solve  the  ND  problem  alone.    PDPs  are  heavily  dependent  on  donations  for  
funding  their  operations,  with  many  funded  primarily  by  a  few  donor  organizations.    
                                                                                                              
5  Including  five  combination  treatments  for  malaria,  sleeping  sickness,  and  visceral  leishmaniasis,  and  a  
pediatric  formulation  for  Chagas.  
  
6  Including  a  pediatric  formulation,  injectable  artesunate,  and  a  new  FDC.  
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Funding  is  extremely  concentrated,  with  five  organizations7  accounting  for  almost  80%  
of  all  PDP  funding  and  the  Gates  Foundation  alone  providing  almost  50%  [95].    This  
means  that  if  even  one  donor  for  a  particular  PDP  were  to  cut  or  cease  funding,  the  
entire  operation  would  be  jeopardized.    This  is  particularly  relevant  for  PDPs  that  are  
moving  to  the  clinical  trial  stage  of  drug  development,  which  is  significantly  more  
expensive  than  the  initial  R&D  stages.8      
Additionally,  there  is  currently  a  lack  of  sources  tracking  ND  R&D  among  
various  initiatives,  a  lack  of  sharing  of  clinically  relevant  knowledge  and  data,  and  a  lack  
of  coordination  of  donor  funding  [97].    Because  PDPs  compete  with  one  another  for  
funding,  these  is  little  incentive  for  them  to  coordinate  their  research  efforts  with  one  
another  with  respect  to  both  successful  and  failed  efforts,  and  as  a  result  there  is  a  lot  of  
duplication  among  PDPs  focusing  on  the  same  disease  [37],  which  increases  the  cost  and  
timeline  associated  with  ND  R&D.    
PDPs  are  also  heavily  dependent  on  pharmaceutical  companies  for  access  to  
compounds,  data,  and  infrastructure  necessary  to  conduct  R&D.    While  IP  barriers  have  
not  been  a  huge  problem  with  PDPs  in  the  past  [12],  their  efforts  depend  on  the  on-­‐‑going  
goodwill  of  pharmaceutical  companies  to  offer  access  to  this  type  of  information.    
Additionally,  although  PDPs  focus  their  efforts  on  diseases  primarily  affecting  LMICs,  
                                                                                                              
7  The  Gates  Foundation,  USAID,  the  UK  Department  of  International  Development,  the  Dutch  Ministry  of  
Foreign  Affairs,  and  Irish  Aid.  
  
8  Clinical  trials  represent  as  much  as  60%  of  total  drug  development  costs.  
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there  is  little  engagement  with  governments  and  people  actually  living  in  LMICs,  with  
87.8%  of  PDP  R&D  funds  being  reinvested  into  Western  academic  institutions,  
contractors,  and  pharmaceutical  companies  [95].    As  many  scholars  have  noted,  ”not  one  
global  PDP  is  led  by  a  person  who  is  a  developing-­‐‑country  national  and  not  one  resides  
within  one  of  the  developing  countries  severely  affected  by  neglected  infectious  
diseases”  [98].    Thus,  their  efforts  may  not  reach  their  potential  with  respect  to  
addressing  problems  most  pressing  to  LMICs.  
9.2.2 Other ND R&D Collaborations 
Pharmaceutical  companies,  in  addition  to  involvement  in  PDPs,  have  become  
active  in  ND  R&D  in  other  ways,  such  as  opening  their  own  ND  R&D  facilities  
(Appendix  E),  donating  drugs  to  LMICs,  making  their  compound  libraries  available  to  
various  open  source  initiatives,  and  various  other  one-­‐‑off  collaborations  aimed  at  
increasing  access  to  ND  drugs  and  R&D.  
A  notable  example  of  one  such  collaboration  is  the  case  of  Merck  and  the  river  
blindness  drug  Mectizan.    Merck  spent  million  of  dollars  developing  the  drug  
throughout  the  1990s,  before  which  there  was  no  cure  for  the  disease.    Merck  
collaborated  with  the  WHO,  the  World  Bank,  and  other  NGOs  to  distribute  free  doses  of  
Mectizan  to  those  suffering  from  river  blindness  in  various  LMICs,  mostly  in  Africa.    It  
is  estimated  that  these  efforts  have  spared  sixteen  million  children  from  river  blindness  
and  have  prevented  over  600,000  cases  the  disease  [31].    
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Other  collaborations  include  a  partnership  between  Novartis  and  iOWH  that  
gave  iOWH  access  to  proprietary  research  data  for  the  development  of  a  diarrhea  drug;  
a  collaboration  between  Novartis  and  the  Institute  for  Microbiology  and  Epidemiology  
in  Beijing  for  the  development  of  an  antimalarial  drug;  a  Pfizer  initiative  in  Africa  aimed  
at  eliminating  trachoma  [31];  and  a  collaboration  between  GSK,  the  University  of  
Liverpool,  the  Wellcome  Trust,  and  the  UK  Department  for  International  Development,  
all  of  whom  collaborated  to  develop  a  new  first-­‐‑line  antimalarial  drug,  LAPDAP,  that  is  
currently  in  late-­‐‑stage  clinical  development  [90].    This  small  sample  of  collaboration  
efforts  is  nowhere  near  exhaustive,  and  represents  only  a  few  of  the  various  private  
sector,  public  sector,  and  non-­‐‑profit  initiatives  aimed  at  increasing  ND  R&D.  
A  number  of  collaborations  for  drug  repurposing  have  also  come  to  life.    The  
NIH  National  Center  for  Advancing  Translational  Sciences  (NCATS)  is  one  such  
initiative.    Like  other  drug  repurposing  initiatives,  NCATS  aims  to  foster  collaboration  
between  academic  institutions  and  pharmaceutical  companies  to  find  new  uses  for  old  
compounds  on  which  no  research  is  currently  being  conducted.    To  date,  a  number  of  
pharmaceutical  companies  have  signed  on  to  the  initiative,9  making  fifty-­‐‑eight  different  
compounds  available  to  academic  institutions  [99].    NCATS  and  other  drug  repurposing  
initiatives  add  to  the  ND  R&D  landscape  significantly,  as  the  compounds  have  already  
undergone  initial  stage  R&D  and  testing.  
                                                                                                              
9  Pfizer,  AstraZeneca,  Eli  Lilly,  Abbott,  BMS,  GSK,  Janssen  Pharmaceuticals,  and  Sanofi  
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10. WIPO Re:Search Consortium 
While  PDPs  and  other  collaborations  have  facilitated  broader  ND  R&D,  they  are  
often  fragmented,  ad  hoc,  insufficient  [93],  and/or  rely  heavily  on  funding  that  may  or  
may  not  be  available  in  the  future.    The  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization’s  
(WIPO)  Re:Search  Consortium  hopes  to  overcome  these  shortcomings  by  offering  an  
innovative  solution  to  sharing  IP  and  other  technologies  and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  ND  
R&D.    
10.1 History of WIPO Re:Search 
In  2009,  pharmaceutical  company  GSK  founded  the  Pool  for  Open  Innovation  
against  Neglected  Tropical  Diseases  and  placed  500  patents  and  300  pending  patents  in  
the  Pool  in  hopes  that  access  to  this  information  would  to  help  others  more  rapidly  
develop  potential  medicines  for  NTDs  [105].    Spearheaded  by  GSK  CEO  Andrew  Witty,  
the  vision  of  the  Pool  was  to  make  IP  related  to  NTDs⎯small  molecule  compounds  
and/or  process  patents⎯available  for  free  to  researchers  and  developers  pursuing  R&D  
aimed  at  treatments  for  NTDs  [106].    Witty  recognized  the  need  to  make  NTD-­‐‑related  IP  
freely  available  because  the  lack  of  a  market  incentive  for  the  development  of  NTD  
drugs  resulted  in  an  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  pharmaceutical  companies  to  engage  
in  R&D  for  NTDs  [106].    Witty  felt  that  the  real  value  of  the  Pool  would  be  in  the  form  of  
“enabling  technologies,  data,  maybe  failed  trials  or  other  things  [GSK  has]  done  that  
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failed,  all  of  which  would  make  is  easier  for  others  to  build  on  the  foundations  of  what  
has  already  been  achieved  or  tried”  [106].  
A  year  after  the  Pool  was  formed,  GSK  had  granted  free  licenses  to  more  than  
800  patents  on  NTDs  and  had  made  available  data  it  had  generated  on  13,500  
antimalarial  compounds.    GSK  was  also  able  to  engage  with  Alnylam  pharmaceuticals,  
which  donated  an  additional  1,500  patents  in  the  Pool,  and  the  Massachusetts  Institute  
of  Technology,  which  contributed  IP  rights  and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  NTD  research.    
Despite  these  contributions,  the  Pool  achieved  limited  success,  leading  to  only  one  
publicly  disclosed  partnership  between  GSK,  iThemba  Pharmaceuticals,  and  the  Emory  
Institute  of  Drug  Discovery,  working  together  to  develop  targets  for  latent-­‐‑state  TB  
[107].  
This  limited  success  was  likely  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  pharmaceutical  
industry  was  perceived  to  be  solely  a  GSK  initiative.    In  2010,  the  Pool  was  transferred  to  
BioVentures  for  Global  Health  (BVGH),  and  again  transferred  to  WIPO  in  October  2011  
and  renamed  WIPO  Re:Search  Consortium.    
With  the  transfer  of  the  Pool  to  WIPO,  a  number  of  changes  were  implemented.    
Re:Search  expanded  the  focus  of  the  Pool  for  Open  Innovation  to  cover  more  diseases  
and  to  incorporate  patents  for  vaccines  and  diagnostics  in  addition  to  drug  patents  [12].  
Re:Search  also  implemented  a  policy  that  requires  innovators  to  make  any  future  
products  available  in  LDCs  on  a  royalty-­‐‑free  basis  [12].  
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10.2 Overview of Re:Search 
The  aim  of  Re:Search  is  to  accelerate  the  discovery  and  product  development  of  
drugs,  vaccines,  diagnostics,  and  other  technologies  related  to  NTDs,  TB,  and  malaria  by  
embracing  an  “open  innovation  framework  for  the  sharing  of  intellectual  property,  and  
technology  and  research  materials  not  protected  by  intellectual  property  rights”  [108].  
By  providing  researchers  with  access  to  not  only  the  IP  for  pharmaceutical  compounds  
and  technologies,  but  also  know-­‐‑how  and  data  for  R&D  for  NTDs,  TB,  and  malaria,  
Re:Search  hopes  to  stimulate  the  development  of  new,  better  treatment  options  for  
NTDs  [109].    This  is  significant  because  much  of  the  data  and  know-­‐‑how  that  is  essential  
for  drug  discovery,  though  not  patented,  is  not  publicly  available.    Providing  researchers  
with  this  “intellectual  capital,  including  screening  hits,  expertise,  and  know-­‐‑how”  [107]  
can  potentially  facilitate  more  rapid  and  efficient  drug  discovery.  
Re:Search  also  aims  to  facilitate  technology  transfer  and  capacity  building  in  
developing  countries.    It  hopes  to  do  this  through  a  Funds-­‐‑in-­‐‑Trust  grant  that  enables  
scientists  from  developing  countries  and  LDCs  to  take  “sabbaticals”  at  research  facilities  
in  developed  countries  [109].    
Re:Search  Members  are  comprised  of  institutions  from  the  public  and  private  
sectors,  as  well  as  academic  institutions  and  civil  societies.    “Providers”1  are  Members  
                                                                                                              
1  Current  Providers  are:  Aberystwyth  University;  African  Institute  of  Biomedical  Science  and  Technology;  
Alnylam;  Biotech;  Caltech;  Center  for  Excellence  for  Malaria  Diagnosis,  University  of  Lagos,  Nigeria;  Center  
for  World  Health  &  Medicine;  DNDi;  Eisai;  Eskitis  Institute,  Griffith  University;  FIND;  Fundacao  Owealdo  
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that  contribute  IP,  materials,  or  services  into  the  pool  for  license  or  use,  and  “Users,”2  
which  can  be  anyone  (e.g.  academic  institutions,  researchers,  PDPs,  and  pharmaceutical  
companies)  with  a  commitment  to  improving  access  to  NTD  medicines  in  LDC,  are  
those  Members  that  have  entered  into  license  agreements  with  Providers  to  use  the  IP  
and  other  materials  donated  to  the  pool.    Re:Search  also  have  a  number  of  “Supporters3”  
that  encourage  the  facilitation  of  NTD  R&D.    
Re:Search  has  three  components  to  it:  (1)  a  Database,  which  provides  Users  with  
details  of  IP  available  for  licensing,  as  well  as  services  and  other  technology  or  materials  
not  necessarily  protected  by  IP  rights  which  can  be  accessed  by  Users;  (2)  a  Partnership  
                                                                                                              
  
Cruz  (Fiocruz);  GSK;  Infectious  Disease  Research  Institute;  Institut  Pasteur  Korea;  Institute  Pasteur  de  Tunis;  
International  Centre  for  Genetic  Engineering  and  Biotechnology;  International  Federation  of  Intellectual  
Property  Owners;  IVI;  iThemba;  Kenya  Agricultural  Research  Institute;  Kusami  Center  for  Collaborative  
Research,  Ghana;  Liverpool  School  of  Tropical  Medicine;  Mass  General  Hospital;  MIT;  McMaster  University,  
Canada;  McGill  University;  Medical  Research  Council,  South  Africa;  MMV;  Merck;  Murdoch  Children’s  
Research  Institute;  NIH;  Nigerian  Institute  of  Medical  Research;  Northeastern  University;  Novartis;  Pfizer;  
PATH;  Sanofi;  Seattle  Biomed;  60  Pharmaceuticals;  Stanford;  Swiss  Tropical  and  public  Health  Institute;  
National  Institute  of  Immunology,  India;  Noguchi  Memorial  Institute  for  Medical  Research,  University  of  
Ghana;  Theodor  Bilharz  Research  Institute;  Tulane;  University  of  Bamako,  Mali;  University  of  British  
Colombia;  University  of  Buea,  Cameroon;  Berkeley;  University  of  Dundee;  University  of  Ibadan,  Nigeria;  
University  of  Kansas;  University  of  Vermont;  University  of  Washington;  Walter  Reed  Army  Institute  of  
Research.  
  
2  Current  Users  include:  many  providers  (DNDi,  Fiocrus,  MMV,  MRC,  among  others),  as  well  as  Anacor;  
Emory  University;  GALVmed;  Sabin  Vaccine  Institute;  University  of  Calgary;  UCSF.  
  
3  Current  Supporters  include:  Africa  Fighting  Malaria;  Association  of  University  Technology  Managers;  BIO;  
Council  on  Health  Research  for  Development;  Developing  World  Health;  European  Commission  –  
Directorate  General  for  Research  and  Innovation;  Indian  Council  of  Medical  Research;  IFPMA;  International  
Hospital  Federation;  Kenya  Medical  Research  Institute;  Licensing  Executive  Society  International;  Mahidol  
University;  National  Institute  of  Industrial  Property,  Brazil;  Public  Interest  Intellectual  Property  Advisors;  
Tech  Transfer  Summit  Ltd;  USPTO.  
    104  
Hub,  managed  by  BVGH,  where  Members  and  other  interested  parties  can  learn  about  
Re:Search,  available  licensing  and  research  collaboration  opportunities,  networking  
possibilities,  and  funding  options;  and  (3)  a  range  of  supporting  activities  (e.g.  
facilitating  negotiations  of  licensing  agreements  and  identifying  research  needs  and  
opportunities)  [108].  
The  focus  of  Re:Search  is  on  obtaining  patents,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  
TB,  malaria,  and  twenty-­‐‑three  NTDs.4    Re:Search  seeks  IP  related  to  drugs,5  vaccines,6  
and  diagnostics7  that  are  or  may  be  relevant  for  NTD  treatments.    Providers  contribute  
IP,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  NTDs,  which  is  then  put  into  the  Database.    Any  
interested  party  can  search  the  Database⎯by  data  type,  Provider,  or  disease  focus⎯for  
“compounds,  unpublished  scientific  results,  patents  and  patent  rights,  screening  and  
platform  technologies,  and  regulatory  dossiers”  [110].    If  a  researcher  finds  something  in  
                                                                                                              
4  Buruli  Ulcer;  Chagas  disease  (American  trypanosomiasis);  Cysticercosis;  Dengue/dengue  hemorrhagic  
fever;  Dracunculiasis  (guinea-­‐‑worm  disease);  Echinococcosis;  Endemic  treponematoses  (Yaws);  Foodborne  
trematode  infections;  Clonorchiasis;  Opistorchiasis;  Fascioliasis;  Paragonimiasis;  Human  African  
trypanosomiasis;  Leishmaniasis;  Leprosy;  Lymphatic  filariasis;  Onchocerciasis;  Rabies;  Schistosomiasis;  Soil  
transmitted  helminthiasis;  Trachoma;  Podoconiosis;  and  Snakebite.  
  
5  This  includes:  compounds  with  ND  data  (known  activity  against  NTDs);  compound  libraries  from  other  
projects  (drug  targets  for  other  diseases/conditions);  other  compounds  of  potential  interest  in  NTD  research;  
technologies  or  drug  target  identification  and  validation,  high  throughput  screening,  or  complex  dataset  
analysis;  technologies  for  drug  formulations  or  drug  administration.  
  
6  This  includes:  existing  or  novel  adjuvants  for  vaccines;  viral,  DNA,  or  bacterial  vaccine  vectors;  vaccine  
delivery  technologies;  cold  chain/stability  solutions  for  vaccines;  clinical  trial  data  or  patient  samples  from  
ND  vaccines  in  development.  
  
7  This  includes:  validated  biomarkers;  detection  methods;  platform  technologies;  patient  samples  from  ND  
diagnostics  in  development.  
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the  Database  that  interests  them,  they  then  contact  BVGH⎯the  administrator  of  the  
Partnership  Hub⎯for  more  information  regarding  licensing.    BVGH  works  to  match  the  
User  with  the  Provider,  who  then  develop  their  own  research  collaboration  [110].  
With  one  of  the  aims  of  Re:Search  being  new  product  development,  IP  issues  will  
invariably  arise  with  respect  to  both  the  inputs  from  Providers  and  outputs  by  Users.    
With  respect  the  management  of  IP,  Re:Search  mandates  that  Providers  grant  Users  
royalty-­‐‑free  licenses  for  R&D  and  manufacture  of  technologies  to  sell  in  LDCs  [108].  
Users  retain  IP  rights  in  any  innovation  generated  through  the  Re:Search  collaboration,  
but  must  commit  to  providing  any  products  born  out  of  these  collaborations  to  LDCs  on  
a  royalty-­‐‑free  basis,  and  to  negotiate  with  other  developing  countries  on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  
basis,  with  public  health  goals  in  mind  [108].    While  Providers  cannot  claim  any  IP  rights  
from  Users  for  future  products  developed,  they  can  require  that  Users  do  not  assert  IP  
rights  against  them  for  any  future  research  or  product  development  [108].  
10.3 Theoretical Benefits of Re:Search 
The  overall  goal  of  Re:Search⎯and  the  overall  benefit  that  will  stem  from  it⎯is  a  
faster  rate  of  ND  drug  innovation,  which  “can  be  achieved  through  radical  innovation  
springing  from  openness,  connectivity,  flexibility,  and  adaptability”  [111].    While  there  
are  many  PDPs  currently  working  on  R&D  for  NDs,  there  are  “more  researchers  and  
projects  that  could  benefit  from  the  IP  and  knowledge  of  biopharmaceutical  companies,  
research  institutions,  and  universities”  [109].    Recognizing  this  need  for  further  
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collaboration,  Re:Search  hopes  to  make  greater  progress  in  ND  R&D  beyond  what  PDPs  
have  accomplished.    By  offering  researchers  and  PDPs  access  to  IP  related  not  only  to  
patents,  but  also  related  data,  technologies,  and  know-­‐‑how,  Re:Search  has  the  potential  
to  be  a  driving  force  for  innovation  in  the  discovery  and  development  of  new  drugs  and  
reduce  the  costs  associated  with  drug  development  [12].    
There  are  currently  a  number  of  other  open  source  and  database  initiatives8  
aimed  at  ND  R&D,  but  these  initiatives  are  often  focused  on  a  particular  disease,  
restricted  to  patents,  and/or  geographically  limited.    Re:Search  expands  the  efforts  of  
these  other  open  source  initiatives  by  broadening  and  diversifying  the  scope  of  the  
initiatives,  encouraging  participation  from  researchers  around  the  world  and  from  a  
number  of  different  sectors,  and  expands  the  information  in  the  database  well  beyond  
patents.    Additionally,  by  providing  a  publicly  searchable  database  of  available  IP  and  
other  resources,  Re:Search  can  go  beyond  other  open  source  and  database  initiatives  by  
facilitating  new  partnerships  that  would  otherwise  not  be  facilitated  [112].  
Re:Search  has  the  potential  to  speed  up  the  development  of  new  drugs  for  the  
treatment  of  NTD,  TB,  and  malaria  by  increasing  access  not  only  to  IP,  but  also  to  
research  tools,  screening  infrastructure,  technologies,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how,  which  
should  facilitate  a  more  rapid  development  of  new  compounds  for  the  potential  
                                                                                                              
8  Examples  of  such  open  source  collaborations  include:  Open  Source  Drug  Discovery;  open  compound  
databases  such  as  CDD  and  PubChem;  the  Tropical  Disease  Initiative;  and  TDR  Targets.  
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treatment  of  diseases  such  as  TB  and  malaria  [113].    Such  sharing  of  data  and  know-­‐‑how  
can  “take  out  some  of  the  error  from  the  trial-­‐‑and-­‐‑error  process  of  drug  discovery”  [107]  
by  providing  researchers  with  knowledge  about  “what’s  worked  before  and  what  hasn’t  
worked”  [107].    The  drug  development  process  may  also  be  accelerated  by  Re:Search’s  
potential  to  lower  the  transaction  costs  and  time  associated  with  locating  and  licensing  
multiple  patents,  which  can  be  overly-­‐‑burdensome  for  some  research  organizations.    
Re:Search  is  able  to  do  this  by  taking  a  very  proactive  approach  to  forming  new  
collaborations.    When  a  new  member  wishing  to  engage  in  ND  R&D  joins  Re:Search,  
BVGH  visits  their  headquarters,  learns  about  their  research,  and  inquires  as  to  what  
could  help  move  their  help  move  their  research  forward.    BVGH  then  looks  across  their  
network  to  see  which  Members  may  have  the  assets  these  researchers  seek,  ultimately  
linking  two  parties  that  would  otherwise  not  have  collaborated  [140].  
Because  product  markets  for  ND  treatments  are  small,  patent  holders  often  do  
not  have  much  of  an  incentive  to  withhold  IP  related  to  ND  treatments.    Thus,  access  to  
IP  is  not  necessarily  the  most  important  benefit  that  that  Re:Search  offers  to  researchers  
engaged  in  ND  R&D.    However,  in  the  case  drugs  and  technologies  that  are  used  to  treat  
diseases  endemic  in  developed-­‐‑countries  but  simultaneously  have  known  or  potential  
therapeutic  benefits  for  NTD  treatments,  access  to  IP  is  important.    Additionally,  for  
NDs  that  have  a  developed-­‐‑country  market  (e.g.  TB,  malaria,  Chagas),  access  to  patents  
and  know-­‐‑how  is  similarly  important.      
    108  
Because  access  to  patents  may  not  be  important  for  some  ND  R&D,  the  real  
benefit  of  Re:Search  in  these  cases  is  not  so  much  in  providing  access  to  patents,  but  in  
providing  access  to  data  and  know-­‐‑how  that  may  not  be  protected  not  by  patents  but  is  
nevertheless  not  publicly  available.    Access  to  this  type  of  data  and  know-­‐‑how  is  critical  
for  early  stage  development,  as  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  determine  what  compounds  
merit  further  testing  [12].    Another  benefit  of  Re:Search  is  the  forging  of  new  
partnerships  between  organizations  that  carry  out  research  on  treatments  of  NTDs  [111],  
particularly  researched  institutes  located  in  developing  countries  and  LDCs,  which  are  
most  attuned  to  the  ND  landscape.    
10.4 Re:Search so Far 
The  current  Re:Search  network  involves  pharmaceutical  companies,  smaller  
biotechnology  companies,  PDPs,  universities,  and  research  institutes,  both  in  developed  
and  endemic  countries,  who  have  all  come  together  to  help  each  other  through  licensing  
agreements  and  other  collaborations.    As  of  February  2014,  forty-­‐‑six  agreements  had  
been  signed  among  eighty  members  granting  access  to  patents,  data,  know-­‐‑how,  and  
other  technologies  related  to  ND  R&D  (Appendix  F).  
Re:Search  has  also  facilitated  five  “sabbatical”  collaborations  where  researchers  
from  developing  counties  and  LDCs  have  gone  to  research  institutes  in  developed  
countries,  a  level  of  collaboration  that  is  not  seen  in  PDPs.    These  sabbatical  
arrangements,  which  aim  to  facilitate  technology  transfer  and  capacity  building  in  
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developing  countries  and  LDCs,  have  allowed  scientists  in  Africa  to  work  with  top  
researchers  and  industry  players  in  developed  countries.    These  scientists  can  take  what  
they  learn  in  these  collaborations  back  with  them  to  their  home  countries  and  implement  
what  they  have  learned,  thus  fostering  greater  ND  R&D  in  the  countries  actually  
impacted  by  NTDs,  TB,  and  malaria.    To  date,  five  sabbatical  arrangements  have  started,  
involving  scientists  from  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ghana,  Nigeria,  and  South  Africa,  who  have  
gone  to  R&D  facilities  at  pharmaceutical  companies  (Novartis  and  AstraZeneca)  and  
universities  (Stanford  University  and  the  University  of  California-­‐‑San  Francisco)  [114].  
  In  addition  to  these  agreements,  a  number  of  Providers  have  contributed  to  the  
Database.    Contributions  have  come  in  many  forms,  have  been  made  by  pharmaceutical  
companies,  PDPs,  universities,  and  research  institutions,  and  have  covered  a  range  of  
diseases  (Table  3).  
Table  3:  Contributions  to  the  Re:Search  Database  
Type  of  Data   #  Documents   Diseases  Covered  
Screening  or  Hits  data   7   TB,  malaria,  Chagas,  HAT  
Hit-­‐‑to-­‐‑Lead  Data   4   Leishmaniasis;  malaria;  TB;  HAT  
Lead  Series   7   Leishmainiasis;  Chagas;  HAT;  malaria;  
foodborne  trematode  infections;  lymphatic  
filariasis;  Onchocerciasis;  Schistosomiasis;  
soil  transmitted  helminthiasis;  Cysticercosis;  
guinea  worm  disease;  Echinococcosis;  Yaws  
Pre-­‐‑Clinical  Candidate   7   Chagas;  leishmaniasis;  6  unknown  
Clinical  Candidate   0     
Marketed  Products   6   HAT;  leishmaniasis;  malaria;  TB  
Enabling  Technology  
Platforms  
8   Leishmaniasis;  malaria;  dengue;  Buruli;  
leprosy;  lymphatic  filariasis;  Onchocerciasis;  
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Podoconiosis;  rabies  
IP  (patents)   91   Malaria;  TB;  15  unknown;  dengue;  trachoma;  
leishmaniasis;  lymphatic  firbalisis;  rabies;  
Buruli;  leprosy;  Onchocerciasis;  
Schistosomiasis;  Chagas;  HAT;  
Podoconiosis;  snakebite;  soil  transmitted  
helminthiasis;  Cysticercosis;  guinea  worm  
disease;  Echinococcosis;  Yaws;  foodborne  
trematode  infections  
Formulations   0     
Diagnostic  Tool   3   Malaria;  dengue;  Buruli;  leishmaniasis;  
leprosy;  lymphatic  filariasis;  Onchocerciasis;  
Podoconiosis;  rabies  
Vaccine  Technology   3   Malaria;  dengue;  rabies;  Chagas;  TB  
New  Biological  Entity   0     
Other  Data,  Know-­‐‑How,  
Services,  or  Resources    
47   Malaria;  Schistosomiasis;  HAT;  
Onchocerciasis;  soil  transmitted  
helminthiasis;  leishmaniasis;  TB;  12  
unknown;  lymphatic  firbalisis;  Chagas;  
Buruli;  leprosy;  Podoconiosis;  rabies;  
snakebite;  trachoma;  Cysticercosis;  dengue;  
guinea-­‐‑work  disease;  Echinococcosis;  Yaws;  
foodborne  trematode  infections    
  
BVGH  has  also  started  a  “Funders  Database,”  which  lists  all  open  funding  
opportunities  relevant  to  ND  research.    The  database  “summarizes  and  categorizes  
funding  opportunities'ʹ  critical  information,  including  program  description,  disease  and  
product  focus,  stage  of  R&D,  researcher  and  institute  eligibility  requirements,  
geographic  restrictions,  deadline,  contacts,  and  URL”  [115].    
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11. Does Re:Search Make a Positive Difference in 
Facilitating ND R&D? 
It  is  clear  that,  because  of  the  nature  of  ND  R&D  and  the  lack  of  market  
incentives  that  exist  to  facilitate  it,  no  single  no  incentive  scheme  or  innovative  financing  
model  can  address  all  of  the  challenges  currently  surrounding  R&D  for  NDs.    PDPs  have  
played  an  important  role  in  facilitating  ND  R&D,  but  their  efforts  are  often  fragmented  
and/or  have  a  narrow  disease  or  product  focus.    Additionally,  there  are  many  research  
efforts  being  undertaken  at  academic  institutions  around  the  world,  and  these  efforts  
can  provide  insights  to  PDPs  and  complement  their  work,  thereby  potentially  speeding  
up  ND  drug  development,  but  researchers  and  PDPs  often  are  not  aware  of  one  
another’s  efforts,  and  thus  collaborations  often  do  not  come  to  fruition  [140].    Re:Search  
is  attempting  to  solve  this  problem,  complementing  the  initiatives  of  PDPs  by  forming  
collaborations  between  researchers  PDPs  who  may  be  able  to  provide  insight  and  
guidance  to  one  another  in  ND  drug  development  [140].    
Re:Search  has,  to  date,  made  a  significant  contribution  to  ND  R&D,  
complementing  the  efforts  of  PDPs  and  other  open  source  collaborations.    Open  sharing  
of  knowledge  and  information  is  absolutely  necessary  for  ND  R&D,  because  without  it,  
transaction  costs  remain  high  and  many  are  unable  to  engage  in  ND  R&D.    Additionally,  
Re:Search  has  been  able  to  foster  partnerships  that  would  otherwise  have  not  come  to  
fruition,  particularly  with  respect  to  technology  transfer  and  capacity  building  within  
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LMICs  that  is  being  fostered  through  the  Re:Search  sabbatical  program.    Without  the  
efforts  of  Re:Search,  upwards  of  80%  of  the  collaborations  in  the  consortium  would  not  
otherwise  have  come  to  fruition  [140].    In  this  respect,  Re:Search  has  achieved  great  
success,  getting  a  number  of  companies  to  donate  patents,  data,  and  know-­‐‑how  and  
facilitating  forty-­‐‑six  license  agreements  and  five  collaborations  aimed  at  technology  
transfer  and  capacity  building  in  LMICs.    
Re:Search  currently  relies  on  the  goodwill  of  pharmaceutical  companies  and  
other  patent  holders  for  participation,  and  Providers  often  receive  few  benefits  beyond  
reputational  and  humanitarian  benefits.    While  a  number  of  pharmaceutical  companies  
have  been  eager  to  engage  with  Re:Search,  this  depends  a  lot  on  the  leadership  within  an  
organization  and  their  commitment  to  ND  R&D.    Fortunately,  it  seems  that  momentum  
has  been  building  for  addressing  the  ND  problem  in  LMICs.  
With  respect  to  the  ability  of  Re:Search  to  speed  up  the  development  of  new  
medicines,  vaccines,  and  diagnostics  for  NTD,  TB,  and  malaria,  it  is  hard  to  say  what  its  
impact  has  been  to  date.    These  sorts  of  developments  takes  years  to  move  from  early-­‐‑
stage  R&D  to  a  final  product,  and  thus  it  will  be  a  number  of  years  before  it  any  tangible  
product  born  out  of  Re:Search  materializes.    However,  by  providing  a  meeting  place  for  
diverse  organizations  from  around  the  world  and  foster  collaborations  between  these  
groups  of  people,  Re:Search  certainly  has  laid  the  groundwork  for  achieving  this  goal.  
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12. Conclusion 
In  order  to  assess  the  value  of  patent  pools  for  global  health,  more  time  is  
necessary  to  assess  whether  the  two  pools⎯the  MPP  and  Re:Search⎯are  accomplishing  
their  stated  objectives  and  offering  sufficient  benefits  over  existing  alternatives  that  aim  
to  facilitate  access  to  essential  medicines.      
While  the  MPP,  to  date,  has  received  better  licensing  terms  than  existing  
voluntary  licenses,  it  will  take  a  few  years  before  any  new  FDCs  or  pediatric  
formulations  are  developed  more  efficiently  and  cheaply  from  the  licenses  in  the  MPP.    
There  seems  to  be  interest  on  the  part  of  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  develop  these  formulations,  
with  many  licensees  expressing  an  intention  to  start  the  process,  but  to  date,  none  have  
actually  began  the  process.    However,  momentum  is  building  among  pharmaceutical  
companies  with  respect  to  negotiating  licenses  with  the  MPP,  as  pharmaceutical  
companies  seem  to  be  increasingly  willing  to  work  with  the  MPP  to  reduce  the  price  of  
ARVs  in  the  long-­‐‑term.    Thus,  the  MPP  can  be  said  to  be  going  beyond  the  status  quo  
with  respect  to  increasing  access  to  ARVs,  both  through  negotiating  better  licensing  
terms  with  pharmaceutical  companies  than  current  voluntary  licenses  offer  and  
increasing  the  access  initiatives  of  pharmaceutical  companies  and  have  thus  far  not  
engaged  with  the  MPP.  
The  value  of  Re:Search,  an  upstream  patent  pool  for  previously  neglected  
diseases,  will  take  even  more  time  for  success  to  be  realized.    It  seems  that  there  is  a  lot  
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of  interest  on  the  part  of  pharmaceutical  companies,  smaller  biotechnology  companies,  
PDPs,  universities,  and  other  research  institution  to  work  with  Re:Search  to  increase  
access  to  IP  and  know-­‐‑how  related  to  neglected  diseases.    However,  because  Re:search  is  
trying  to  foster  the  development  of  novel  drugs  and  a  lot  of  ND  treatments  are  still  in  
the  very  early  stages  of  drug  discovery,  it  will  take  a  number  of  years⎯maybe  even  a  
decade  or  more⎯for  the  full  benefits  of  Re:Search  to  be  realized.    However,  Re:Search  
has  proven  successful  in  fostering  collaborations  between  entities  that  would  otherwise  
not  occur,  and  these  collaborations  may  eventually  spur  new,  better  treatments  for  
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Drug   Licensees   Geographic  





ViiV   MVC   0   none     
ViiV   ABC   1  (Aspen)   SSA  +  LDCs  +  
LICs  (69)  
No  







SSA  +  LDCs  +  
LICs  (69)  
  
ViiV   DLG   0   None     
BMS   ATV   7  (Aspen,  Mylan,  







SSA  +  India  
(48)  
Royalty-­‐‑free  



















ddI  +  d4T;  
royalty-­‐‑free  
BMS   d4T      SSA  +  India  
(49)  
  
J&J   ETV   2  (Aspen;  
Emcure)  
SSA  +  LDCs  
(48)  
Royalty-­‐‑free  
J&J   DRV   2  (Aspen,   SSA  +  LDCs  +   Royalty-­‐‑free  
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Emcure)   India  (66)  





















SSA  +  LDCs  
(65)  
  
Abbott   LPV/r,  r   0   none     
Merck   RAL   2  (Emcure,  
Mylan)  
SSA  +  LICs  
(60)  
  










for  EFV  in  
the  rest  of  
SSA]  
Royalty-­‐‑free  










All  Africa  +  
LDCs  +  LICs  
(78)  
Also  has  non-­‐‑


























Source:  “Barriers  to  Accessing  Generics:  The  Restrictions  Posed  by  Certain  Voluntary  License  Agreements,”  Medecins  Sans  Frontieres  Access  
Campaign,  accessed  February  23,  2014,  http://utw.msfaccess.org/annexes/4fe7877930d7010002000003     
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Appendix B: Countries Eligible for Pharmaceutical 
Company Price Discounts 
  
Pharmaceutical  Company   Eligible  Countries  
AbbVie  (Abbott)   Category  1  Countries:  All  
African  countries  and  all  LDCs  
outside  of  Africa  
  
Category  2  Countries:  
Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  
Belarus,  Bolivia,  Bosnia  and  
Herzegovina,  China,  
Colombia,  Dominican  
Republic,  Ecuador,  El  
Salvador,  Fiji,  Georgia,  
Guatemala,  Guyana,  
Honduras,  India,  Indonesia,  
Jamaica,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  
Kyrgyzstan,  Macedonia,  
Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia,  
Moldova,  Mongolia,  
Montenegro,  Nicaragua,  
Pakistan,  Papua  New  Guinea,  
Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  
Serbia,  Sri  Lanka,  Suriname,  
Syria,  Tajikistan,  Thailand,  
Tonga,  Turkmenistan,  
Ukraine,  Uzbekistan,  Vietnam  
  
  
Boehringer  Ingelheim   Category  1  Countries:  all  
LDCs;  all  low-­‐‑income  
countries;  all  of  Africa  
Category  2  Countries:  all  
middle-­‐‑income  countries  not  
covered  in  Category  1  
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BMS   Category  1  Countries:  all  of  
Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa  (except  
Southern  African  countries);  
low-­‐‑income  countries  (except  
Korea,  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova  
and  Uzbekistan)  
  
Category  2  Countries:  
Southern  African  countries  
(Botswana,  Lesotho,  South  
Africa,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  
Swaziland,  Zambia,  and  
Zimbabwe)  
  
All  Other  Developing  
Countries:  prices  in  this  
category  negotiated  on  a  case-­‐‑
by-­‐‑case  basis  
  
Gilead   Category  1  Countries:  111  
countries,  including  all  African  
countries  and  additional  
countries  based  on  a  country’s  
economic  status  and  HIV  
prevalence  
  
Category  2  Countries:  24  
countries,  based  on  a  country’s  
economic  status  and  HIV  
prevalence  
  
Janssen  (Johnson  &  Johnson)   Category  1  Countries:  all  Sub-­‐‑
Saharan  African  countries  and  
all  LDCs  outside  of  Africa  
  
All  Other  Low-­‐‑  and  Middle-­‐‑
Income  Countries:  prices  
negotiated  on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  
basis  
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Merck  (Efavirenz  and  Reltegravir)   Category  1  Countries:  All  
countries  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  




Middle  Income  Countries:  
prices  discounted  from  high-­‐‑
income  country  prices,  
negotiated  on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  
basis,  based  on  country  income  
and  disease  burden    
  
Merck  (TDF/FTC/EFV)   Category  1  Countries:  
Afghanistan,  Angola,  Antigua  
and  Barbuda,  Bangladesh,  
Belize,  Benin,  Bhutan,  
Botswana,  Burkina  Faso,  
Burundi,  Cambodia,  
Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  
Central  African  Republic,  
Chad,  Comoros,  Congo,  Congo  
(DRC),  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Djibouti,  
Dominica,  Dominican  
Republic,  Equatorial  Guinea,  
Eritrea,  Ethiopia,  Gabon,  
Gambia,  Ghana,  Grenada,  
Guatemala,  Guinea-­‐‑  Bissau,  
Guinea,  Guyana,  Haiti,  
Honduras,  Jamaica,  Kenya,  
Kiribati,  Laos,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  
Madagascar,  Malawi,  
Maldives,  Mali,  Mauritania,  
Moldova,  Mozambique,  
Myanmar,  Namibia,  Nepal,  
Niger,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  
Panama,  Papua  New  Guinea,  
Rwanda,  São  Tomé  and  
Príncipe,  Senegal,  Sierra  
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Leone,  Solomon  Islands,  
Somalia,  South  Africa,  St  Kitts  
and  Nevis,  St  Lucia,  St  Vincent  
and  the  Grenadines,  Samoa,  
Sudan,  Suriname,  Swaziland,  
Tanzania,  Timor-­‐‑Leste,  Togo,  
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Tuvalu,  
Uganda,  Ukraine,  Vanuatu,  
Yemen,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe  
  
Category  2  Countries:  Bolivia,  
Indonesia,  Kyrgyzstan,  
Mauritius,  Mongolia,  





ViiV  Healthcare   Category  1  Countries:  all  low-­‐‑
income  countries,  all  LDCs,  
and  all  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  African  
countries  
     
Source:  Medecins  Sans  Frontieres  Access  Campaign.  2013.  Untangling  the  Web  of  Antiretroviral  Price  Reductions,  16th  Edition.  
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Appendix C: Comparison of MPP Licenses 
 
License  Term   Gilead  License   ViiV  License  
(ABC)  
BMS  License   ViiV  License  (DTG  
for  Adult  and  
Pediatric  Use;  ABC  
for  adult  use)  





ATV   DTG  and  ABC  for  




TDF  and  FTC  
territories:  121  
countries  
COBI  territory:  102  
countries  
EVG  and  Quad:  99  
countries  
  
118  LMICs   110  LMICs   Adult:  66  royalty-­‐‑























































































































































Serbia,  Sri  Lanka,  












Antigua  &  Barbuda,  














Royalties   3%  for  TDF  and  
TDF  combinations;  
5%  for  EVG  and  
EVG  combinations;  






waived  for  FTC  
  
Royalty-­‐‑free   3%  in  countries  
BMS  has  a  
patent  granted  












66  LMICs;  sliding  
scale  royalty  
scheme  based  on  
country  per-­‐‑capita  
income  in  6  MICs  
(Tier  1  (5%):  India,  
Vietnam,  The  
Philippines;  Tier  2  
(7.5%):  Indonesia,  
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formulations  
  
Field  of  Use   TDF:  HIV  and  
Hepatitis  B;  COBI  
and  EVG:  “any  use  
that  is  consistent  
with  the  label  
approved  by  the  








Adult:  treatment  of  
adult  HIV  
Pediatric:  treatment  








flow  back  to  
ViiV  and  the  
MPP  
Improvements  
flow  back  to  













No  restrictions  on  
formulation  of  
combinations  for  


































Waiver  of  Data  
Exclusivity  
  
Yes   Yes   Yes   Adult  and  
Pediatric:  Yes  
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territory;  limited  to  
supply  for  sale  in  
public  market  only  











covered  territory  if  
drug  is  off-­‐‑patent  





if  ABC  is  off-­‐‑
patent  or  a  






territory  if  ATV  
is  off-­‐‑patent  or  a  





licensee  can  supply  
outside  covered  
territory  if  DTG  (or  
ABC)  is  off-­‐‑patent  
or  a  country  issues  a  
compulsory  license  
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Appendix D: Comparison of MPP-Gilead License to 2006 
Gilead Voluntary Licenses for TDF 
 
License  Term   MPP-­‐‑Gilead  License   2006  Gilead  Voluntary  
Licenses  
Geographic  Scope   112  countries  (but,  if  TDF  
portion  of  license  is  
terminated,  sub-­‐‑licensees  can  
supply  TDF  to  143  countries  




Restrictions  on  Sale  Outside  License  
Territory  
  
Sale  outside  license  territory  
permitted  in  countries  where  
TDF  is  off-­‐‑patent  
  
No  sale  permitted  outside  
license  territory,  regardless  
of  patent  status  of  TDF  
Termination  of  License   Unbundling  clause  that  
permits  sub-­‐‑licensees  to  
terminate  the  TDF  portion  of  
the  license  at  any  time,  for  
any  reason  
  
Licensees  not  permitted  to  
terminate  license  
Payment  of  Royalties   3%  royalty   5%  royalty  
Field  of  Use   HIV  and  Hepatitis  B   HIV  only  
Treatment  of  Compulsory  Licensing   Sub-­‐‑licensees  can  supply  
licensed  drugs  to  excluded  
countries  if  they  have  issued  
a  compulsory  license  
  
No  public  knowledge  
whether  or  not  this  license  
contained  a  similar  
provision  
API  Restrictions   Sub-­‐‑licensees  can  only  
purchase  APIs  from  and  
supply  APIs  to  Gilead  or  
another  sub-­‐‑licensee  
  
Sub-­‐‑licensees  can  only  
purchase  APIs  from  and  
supply  APIs  to  Gilead  or  
another  sub-­‐‑licensee  
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Appendix E: Private Sector ND R&D Facilities 
 
 
Source:  "ʺ2012  Status  Report  on  Pharmaceutical  R&D  to  Address  Diseases  that  Disproportionately  Affect  People  in  Low-­‐‑  and  Middle-­‐‑Income  
Countries."ʺ  IFPMA,  2012.  
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Appendix F: Re:Search Collaboration Agreements 
Collaboration  
Participants  
Collaboration  Description   Collaboration  Overview  
Kumasi  Centre  for  
Collaborative  Research  
in  Tropical  Medicine  
(KCCR)  and  Stanford  
University    
  
Develop  and  test  a  
diagnostic  for  helminthes  
  
Collaboration  will  enable  the  sharing  of  
stool  samples  to  support  Stanford’s  
helminth  diagnostic  product  
development  and  testing    
  
GSK  and  Center  for  
World  Health  and  
Medicine  (CWHM)  
  
MetAp-­‐‑1  inhibitor  drug  
development  for  TB  
  
GSK  has  shared  information  and  data  
with  CWHM  and  has  provided  insights  
into  the  development  of  MetAp-­‐‑1  
inhibitors  for  TB;  information  sharing  
resulted  in  approximate  savings  of  
$50,000  and  3  months  of  FTE  time  for  
CWHM    
  





support  for  TB  
drug  candidates  
  
AZ  is  providing  computational  and  
predictive  chemistry  know-­‐‑how  and  
support  to  iThemba  in  order  to  improve  
compound  characteristics  for  TB  drug  
candidates.      
  
AZ  and  University  of  




inhibitors  library  for  
multiple  ND  drug  
discovery  
  
AZ  is  providing  UCSF  with  a  diverse  
cysteine  protease  inhibitor  compound  
library  to  screen  against  T.  cruzi,  T.  
brucei,  P.  falciparum  and  S.  
mansoni.  Agreement  was  amended  to  
include  screening  of  compounds  against  
hookworm  
  
AZ  and  University  of  
Dundee  
  
Glycogen  Synthase  Kinase  
3  (GSK-­‐‑3)  inhibitors  for  
kinetoplastids  drug  
discovery      
  
AZ  is  providing  a  GSK-­‐‑3  inhibitor  
compound  library  to  Dundee  to  screen  
against  Kinetoplastids.        
  
NIH  and  Emory  
University  
  
In-­‐‑kind  support  from  the  
NIH  for  dengue  drug  
discovery  
  
This  agreement  provides  Emory  
University  researcher  with  biology  
expertise  and  support  from  the  NIH  for  
RNA-­‐‑dependent  RNA  polymerase  
inhibitor  program  for  dengue.  The  
characterization  of  the  compounds  
included  screening  against  the  Rift  
Valley  Fever  virus.      
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GlaxoSmithKline  
(GSK)  and  University  
of  Washington  (UW)  
  
Characterize  pre-­‐‑clinical  
compounds  for  malaria  
  
This  agreement  enables  the  sharing  of  
confidential  information  and  transfer  of  
UW  compounds  to  GSK.  Compounds  
will  be  re-­‐‑profiled  at  GSK  in  Tres  Cantos  
for  transmission  blocking  in  malaria.      
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
Anacor  
  
Fabl  inhibitor  compound  
structures  and  data  
sharing  for  Shigella  
  
  AZ  has  shared  knowledge  and  data  on  
Fabl  inhibitors  and  compound  
structures  to  inform  and  support  
Anacor’s  development  of  products  for  
Shigella.    
  
Merck  and  University  






Confidentiality  agreement  enabled  
discussions  around  compound  selection.  
Collaborative  study  agreement  allows  
for  the  sharing  of  compounds  with  
UCSF  for  screening  against  S.  mansoni.      
  
GlaxoSmithKline  
(GSK)  and  University  




inhibitors  in  malaria    
  
GSK  to  work  collaboratively  with  UWto  
identify  lead  compound  in  a  series.  The  
initial  compounds  screened  at  UW  were  
from  the  Tres  Cantos  Anti-­‐‑Malaria  
(TCAMS)  data  set.    
  
PATH  and  Kumasi  
Center  for  
Collaborative  Research  






Confidentiality  agreement  will  enable  
discussions  and  planning  for  co-­‐‑
development  of  a  novel  Onchocerciasis  
diagnostic.  
  





drug  discovery      
  
Anacor  compounds  will  be  screened  
against  AZ  tuberculosis  targets.      
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
Liverpool  School  of  
Tropical  Medicine      
  
Sharing  of  preclinical  
compound  libraries  for  
malaria      
  
This  agreement  will  enable  sharing  of  
AZ’s  advanced  preclinical  and  clinical  
compounds  for  screening  against  the  
malaria  parasite.      
  





Sharing  of  CYP51  
inhibitors  for  screening  
against  kinetoplastids    
  
Non-­‐‑azole  CYP51  inhibitors  and  a  
diverse  set  of  compounds  from  AZ  will  
be  made  available  to  UCSF  for  screening  
against  Chagas  and  Leishmaniasis.  
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
McGill  University  
  




AZ  compounds  that  were  promising  in  a  
DNDi  phenotypic  anti-­‐‑helminth  screen  
will  be  tested  at  McGill  University  
against  C.  elegans  mutant  strains  to  
elucidate  the  mechanism  of  action.      




(IDRI  )  and  South  
African  Medical  
Research  Council  
(MRC))      
  
Expertise  and  advise  will  
be  shared  to  optimize  
natural  product  derived  
compounds  
  
  IDRI  will  share  expertise  and  provide  
advice  to  improve  solubility  and  
bioavailability  of  anti-­‐‑TB  compounds  
developed  at  MRC  /University  of  Cape  
Town.  
  
Eisai  and  University  of  
Dundee  
  




  Eisai  has  transferred  a  compound  to  the  
University  of  Dundee  under  an  MTA  for  
testing  against  the  malarial  parasite.      
  
Eisai  and  University  of  
Dundee  
  
Sharing  of  proteasome  
inhibitor  compound  
  
Eisai  has  transferred  a  compound  to  the  
University  of  Dundee  under  an  MTA  for  
testing  against  the  malarial  parasite.  
  
Pfizer  and  Center  for  
World  Health  and  
Medicine  (CWHM)  
  
Sharing  of  compounds  to  
support  anti-­‐‑diarrheal  
product  development      
  
Pfizer  will  provide  two  compounds  to  
CWHM  for  evaluation  in  a  rat  diarrhea  
model.  
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
Stanford  University  
  
Advice  and  knowledge  
sharing  for  peptide  
formulation  
  
AZ  (MedImmune)  will  share  technical  
know-­‐‑how  with  Stanford  researcher  to  
enable  peptide  formulation  for  
cutaneous  leishmaniasis.      
  
Eisai  and  University  of  
Kansas  (KU)  
  
Advice  and  knowledge  
sharing  for  anti-­‐‑fungal  
formulation      
  
One-­‐‑way  CDA  enabled  sharing  of  
expertise  and  ideas  to  address  
formulation  issues.  KU  faculty  member  
confirmed  that  all  strategies  had  been  





Sharing  of  reagent  for  
dengue  research      
  
Novartis  shared  a  polyclonal  anti-­‐‑
dengue  antibody  with  a  McMaster  
University  researcher.      
  









AZ  will  provide  computational  
prediction  of  blood  brain  barrier  
penetration  for  a  set  of  compounds  from  
Northeastern  University.      
  
Sanofi  &  Center  for  
World  Health  &  
Medicine  (CWHM)  
  
Testing  of  neutral  
endopeptidase  inhibitors  
for  use  against  acute  
secretory  diarrhea  (ASD)      
  
Sanofi  has  granted  access  to  its  neutral  
endopeptidase  inhibitors  for  evaluation  
in  CWHM’s  animal  model.      
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
Anacor  
  
Fabl  inhibitor  compound  
structures  and  data  
sharing  for  Shigella  
  
  AZ  has  shared  knowledge  and  data  on  
Fabl  inhibitors  and  compound  
structures  to  inform  and  support  
Anacor’s  development  of  products  for  
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Shigella.  
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
Swiss  Tropical  and  
Public  Health  Institute  
(Swiss  TPH)  
  
Sharing  of  inhibitors  of  M.  
tuberculosis  for  screening  
against  Buruli  ulcer  
  
AZ  will  provide  compounds  including  
their  compound  in  clinical  trials  against  
TB  for  screening  against  M.  ulcerans,  the  
causative  agent  for  Buruli  ulcer.  
  
Merck  and  Emory  
University  
  
Sharing  of  protein  
purification  know  how  
  
Merck  will  share  know  how  for  
membrane  bound  protein  purification  
with  a  researcher  working  on  
tuberculosis  at  Emory.  
  
AZ  and  Liverpool  STM  
  





AZ  is  providing  Liverpool  STM  
scientists  with  access  to  its  labs  and  
high-­‐‑throughput  screens  of  compounds  
to  test  against  Wolbachia  in  order  to  
identify  new  Onchocerciasis  and  
lymphatic  filariasis  therapies.  
  
Eisai  and  Northeastern  
  
A  discussion  between  
Northeastern  and  Eisai  to  
obtain  advice  from  Eisai  
on  SARs  for  the  design  of  
phosphodiesterase  
inhibitors  of  HAT.  
  
A  discussion  between  Northeastern  and  
Eisai  to  obtain  advice  from  Eisai  on  
SARs  for  the  design  of  
phosphodiesterase  inhibitors  of  HAT.  
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
Eskitis  
  
Natural  products  for  
tuberculosis  
  
Eskitis  will  share  its  natural  product  
library  with  AZ  Bangalore  to  screen  
against  tuberculosis.  
  
AstraZeneca  (AZ)  and  
McGill  
  
Compound  libraries  for  
anti-­‐‑helminthic  HTS  
  
AZ  will  provide  McGill  with  ~10,000  
diverse  compounds  to  test  against  C.  
elegans.  Data  from  the  screen  will  be  
included  in  a  re-­‐‑submission  of  a  
Wellcome  Trust  grant  application.  
  




Eisai  provided  IDRI  with  
advice  regarding  
parameters  to  consider  
during  vaccine  adjuvant  
design.  
  
Eisai  provided  IDRI  with  advice  
regarding  parameters  to  consider  during  
vaccine  adjuvant  design.  
  
GlaxoSmithKlein  





Kinase  inhibitors  for  
malaria  
  
GSK  will  share  kinase  inhibitors  with  
NII  to  use  to  study  various  molecular  
pathways  in  malaria.  
  
Kumasi  Centre  for   MOU  to  explore  several   An  MOU  was  signed  between  KCCR  
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Collaborative  Research,  







and  Northeastern  that  will  enable  the  
institutions  to  explore  grant  
opportunities  together,  develop  
exchange  between  students,  and  
conduct  collaborative  lab  projects  
together.  
  
National  Institute  of  





Natural  products  for  
tuberculosis  
  
NIH  will  provide  IDRI  with  natural  
product  compounds  to  screen  against  
tuberculosis.  
  






Pfizer  will  provide  its  investigators  
brochure  for  a  discontinued  compound  
to  60P.  60P  is  hoping  to  repurpose  the  
drug  as  a  dengue  treatment.  
  
Pfizer  and  McGill  
  
Anti-­‐‑inflammatory  
compounds  for  malaria  
  
Pfizer  will  share  JAK  inhibitors  with  
McGill  to  screen  in  a  cerebral  malaria  
model.  
  
Merck  and  University  
of  California,  San  
Francisco  (UCSF)  
  
Providing  HMG  Co-­‐‑A  
reductase  inhibitors  for  
schistosome  research  
  
  Merck  will  share  compounds  with  
UCSF  to  screen  against  Schistosomiasis  
  
AZ  and  Liverpool  STM  
  
Sharing  set  of  compounds  
for  malaria  
  
AZ  will  share  an  additional  set  of  
compounds  with  Liverpool  STM  to  
screen  against  malaria.  
  
GSK  and  NII  
  
Kinase  inhibitors  for  
tuberculosis  
  
GSK  will  share  kinase  inhibitors  with  
NII  to  study  tuberculosis  metabolic  
pathways.  
  
GSK  and  UCSF  
  
Kinase  inhibitors  for  
Schistosomiasis  
  
  GSK  will  share  a  set  of  kinase  inhibitors  
with  UCSF  to  test  against  
Schistosomiasis.  
  
GSK  and  UCSF  
  
Kinase  inhibitors  for  
Schistosomiasis  
  
GSK  will  share  a  second  set  of  kinase  
inhibitors  with  UCSF  to  test  against  
Schistosomiasis.  
  
Pfizer  and  PATH  
  
  Pfizer  will  share  an  
investigator  brochure  
with  PATH.  PATH  aims  
to  repurpose  a  drug  to  
treat  diarrheal  diseases.  
  
  Pfizer  will  share  an  investigator  
brochure  with  PATH.  PATH  aims  to  
repurpose  a  drug  to  treat  diarrheal  
diseases.  
  
Sanofi  and  CWHM   Sharing  compounds  to   Sanofi  provided  two  compounds  to  
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   support  anti-­‐‑diarrheal  
product  development  
  
CWHM  to  evaluate  in  a  rat  diarrhea  
model.  
  
U.  of  Lagos  and  
Stanford  
  
Testing  paper  microscope  
for  malaria  
  
The  University  of  Lagos  will  host  two  
researchers  from  Stanford  to  test  their  
paper  microscope  using  field  samples.  
  
Kitis  Institute,  Griffith  
University  and  Swiss  
Tropical  and  Public  
Health  Institute  (Swiss  
TPH)    
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